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This dissertation examines the historical narratives of Rome in the fourth century BCE, as 
well as the lists of consuls and triumphs, in order to demonstrate that they are based on 
contemporaneously recorded documents, in the form of eponymous magistrate lists, pontifical 
records, and proceedings of the Senate. The historical material from this century has largely been 
viewed as fictitious, the creation of later historians through a combination of self-aggrandizing 
family narratives, anachronistic retrojection, and didacticism. This project does not argue that these 
were not operative factors in the creation of the existing records, but rather that there is a 
foundation of reliable records around which these later accretions were constructed. Thus, this 
dissertation rehabilitates certain details of the fourth century that likely stem from these records, 
such as elections and actions taken by the Senate.  
The pivotal moment in the advent of these records is the social and political turmoil of the 
early fourth century BCE, which leads to a series of power sharing compromises between the 
patricians and the plebeians. To demonstrate this connection between state record keeping and 
socio-political transformation, archival notices from Livy’s second pentad are identified and 
accumulated; these show an increased presence after the first compromise in 367 BCE and as the 
fourth century progresses. Alterations to governmental structures, a changing relationship between 
the Senate and chief magistrates, and a wider pool of participants in political and religious positions 
all provide motivations for the publication of these records, including efforts at legitimization and 
providing access to religious knowledge. To accompany this quantitative analysis, a study of the 
 
viii 
social, economic, and political environment of the early fourth century demonstrates that such 
radical change in the Roman state was a predictable result. 
The second part of the dissertation is a qualitative analysis of the historical material in order 
to demonstrate internal consistency, plausibility, and coherence, and thus the likely product of 
contemporaneously recorded documents. Seeming inconsistencies in the records, such as 
conflicting magistrate names, provinciae, and triumphs are analyzed and explained as the product 
of a Roman state in the early to middle Republic that is not bound to the same degree of legal 
rigidity as in later periods. Additionally, potential Senate records are considered; a coherent and 
consistent sphere of foreign policy emerges from these notices and mirrors the growth of the 
Roman state throughout this period. 
Ultimately, this dissertation takes a cautiously optimistic approach to the historical 
narrative of the fourth century BCE, while accounting for the presence of interpolated material, 
especially campaign and battle narratives. Nevertheless, it is argued that domestic notices of 
governmental and religious functions become increasingly anchored to archival material and 
therefore constitute a reliable backbone of historical information for a period that was once 
disregarded by scholars as largely pre-historic. This project, therefore, provides increased access 











When does the historical record of Rome transition from an unreliable narrative full of 
retrojection, interpolation, creative reconstruction, and etiology—as characterized by Livy’s first 
books—into one based on solid source material? In other words, at what point in the progression 
of the tradition can we begin reading with confidence in the historicity of the transmitted 
information? This question, much discussed by scholars of Roman history since the height of 
Quellenkritik in 19th century Germany, necessarily pivots on a very small selection of late 
republican and imperial notices concerning the records kept by early pontifices. Trusting Cicero 
when he says, “To preserve public affairs and memory, the pontifex maximus used to, from the 
beginning of the Republic until P. Mucius held the office, committed every event of each year to 
letters, recorded them on a white tablet, and deposited it in his home,”1 should we have confidence 
in the historical tradition’s ability to convey accurate information from so early a date? Or should 
we heed Cato’s assessment of these records as containing little more than “how often grain was 
expensive or how often darkness or something obscured the light of the sun or the moon,”2 and 
therefore conclude that they were ultimately useless for an historian’s reconstructive efforts? Of 
course, there were other sources of information that could be consulted, such as the first treaty 
                                                 
1 Cic. De Or. 2.52: cuius rei memoriaeque publicae retinendae causa ab initio rerum Romanarum usque ad P. 
Mucium pontificem maximum res omnis singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus referebatque in 
albo et proponebat tabulam domi. See also Serv. Dan. ad Aen. 1.373 for an even stronger restatement of Cicero’s 
sentiment. The fourth century CE grammarian, however, assuredly had less knowledge of the ancient document than 
Cicero, and much less than Cato, below, who was alive during its publication. 




between Rome and Carthage in 509 BCE mentioned by Polybius,3 an early inscription concerning 
the praetor maximus,4 or the XII Tables. The documents, however, could not provide the sufficient 
narrative stream required to compose a fulsome historical account. 
Reading the first decade of Livy’s massive work with an historical eye, one finds a new 
perspective on the ancient sôritês paradox. Argued by Eubulides of Miletus in the 4th century BCE, 
this puzzle asks when a mound of sand, with grains removed individually, ceases to still be a 
“mound.”5 It is a paradox founded on the uncertainties of gradual transition, realized by ancient 
philosophers, and played out in the scrolls of Livy: when does an unhistorical text, growing 
increasingly better informed as it moves through the centuries, covering events closer to the time 
of its composition and drawing upon steadily increasing source material, become “historical.” The 
tradition of regal Rome and the early Republic is quite clearly a “mound,” while the third decade 
of Livy, confirmed by Polybius and within the lifetime of Rome’s first historian, obviously is not. 
On this transition, therefore, hinges a great deal of importance for the study of these intervening 
centuries. 
 This paradox, of course, highlights the vagueness of language in the face of the exactitude 
of mathematics. For it to be fully solved, we would need to determine the exact number of grains 
of sand that composes a “mound” and, in our situation, the necessary threshold of accuracy before 
a status of “historical” is achieved. This is an impossible question to answer definitively (hence 
the “paradox”), and each scholar’s standard of proof will vary, but we can certainly identify and 
agree on the criteria: the availability and accuracy of primary sources. This approach throws the 
question back at the feet of Cato and Cicero: what was the content, quality, and integrity of official 
                                                 
3 Polyb. 3.22 
4 Livy VII.3.5-8 
5 For the association of Eubulides with this paradox, see Diog. Laert. II.108. For a discussion of this paradox in 
modern philosophical thought, see Ludwig and Ray (2002), 419-61. 
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Roman records from the early to middle Republic, and how much do they inform the narratives of 
ancient scholars, in this case Q. Fabius Pictor and subsequent historians of the second century 
BCE? When do enough of these records, theoretically without the license of epic invention, 
aristocratic distortion, and etiological habit, signal a transition from a “mound” to a reliable 
“history”? 
 
The Tradition of the Fourth Century BCE 
 
At the heart of the constitutional reforms of the fourth century is a compromise between 
the patrician families at Rome and the plebs, a poorly understood social class at Rome, whose 
defining characteristic, as far as we can tell, was that they were not patrician.6 As the historical 
tradition relates, they were originally denied access to the highest political and religious offices in 
the city and, therefore, disenfranchised from full participation in the state. By the fourth century, 
economic conditions had devolved to the point of rampant landlessness and debt-bondage, and 
wealthy plebeians were becoming increasingly discontent at their exclusion from high honors. 
Political shrewdness created a powerful alliance: the top level of the plebeian order united with the 
poor and landless in order to advocate for redress. Thus, tradition holds that the tribuni plebis, G. 
Licinus and L. Sextius, achieved a landmark compromise in a suite of new legislation: it addressed 
the debt problem by deducting payments made from the principal, capped landholdings at 500 
                                                 
6 Although the nature and identity of the plebs falls outside the purview of the current study, significant scholarly 
attention has graced the topic. Momigliano (1989), 96-112 has claimed that the plebs were not simply “not 
patrician” but more specifically a movement within non-patrician groups which advocates against their dominance. 
This is followed by Cornell (1995), 242-71. Another opinion is held by Mitchell (1986), 173-4 who argues that a 
dichotomy between these two groups is a historical fiction exaggerated by the religious and legal nature of the 
surviving sources. Patricians were a priestly group, and not inherently political. 
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iugera, instituted the consular college,7 mandated that one consul be elected from the plebs, and 
(in a related bill) added plebeians to what would then be the decemviri sacris faciundis who were 
tasked with consulting the sacred Sibylline Books. For the benefit of patricians, these laws 
instituted the new positions of the praetor and curule aediles, which were intended to remain 
within their sole purview. In this way, the first compromise of the century, known as the leges 
Liciniae Sextae of 367 BCE, established a new dynamic in the city where restrictions on 
magisterial access were loosened and the pool of governmental participants widened. 
This trend continues throughout the fourth century, with incremental reprieve granted to 
the poor and a gradual loosening of the remaining magistracies and priesthoods obtained by the 
wealthy. These achievements were not linear, however, and they required later reassertion: 
namely, the Leges Genuciae of 342, or the second compromise of this century. Following this 
event, the fasti of the Roman republic were forever changed: a plebeian sat on the consular college 
every year thereafter. By 300, every major political and religious post was opened to the plebs and 
debt-bondage was outlawed. This “slow moving revolution” was a seeming success, although this 
by no means ended the conflict between these two social classes which would flare up occasionally 
over the next 200 years and become a defining narrative thread of the later Republic. 
Due to the perceived untrustworthiness of the historical sources for this period, the 
significance of these constitutional reforms at Rome has long been obscured and is, therefore, 
                                                 
7 This consular system, of course, was thought to have been seamlessly instituted immediately after the expulsion of 
the kings in 509 BCE. The consular lists from this early century of collegial power, however, instill little confidence 
that this is an accurate reconstruction. Plebeian names appear very early in the lists, which would be incongruous 
with the descriptions of the debate surrounding the first compromise and the attestation of the first plebeian consul 
in 366. Few scholars put much credence in this narrative and even less in the specific names of early plebeian 
consuls. The picture is complicated by a multitude of governmental types, all oligarchic in nature, that are also 
recorded in the period between 509 and 367 BCE, including boards of 10 officials in the mid-fifth century and 
military tribunes, usually six in number, in most years from 450-408, and every year of recorded magistrates after 
this until the laws of 367 BCE. It is a likely possibility, although beyond the scope and purview of this study, that 
367 marks the birth of the consulship and earlier attestations were inserted to give authority and legitimacy to this 
new power-sharing system. 
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underappreciated. The text of Livy is highly romanticized in parts and overly schematic in others. 
Moreover, there is a strong indication that the social dynamics and institutions of second and first 
century Rome have been retrojected backwards and mapped onto their fourth century counterparts, 
thus further obfuscating our ability to extract reliable information. Due to these problems, the 
dominant scholarly approach to this period has been tinged with skepticism and dismissal. This is 
an understandable position: Livy often juxtaposes episodes such as calm consular elections with 
those of stones raining from the sky8 or of birds alighting on helmets and aiding the Romans in 
battle.9 It is often not easy to accept the stories related in this narrative as much more than family 
legends told to glorify the maiores. 
 As this tradition presents such fundamental difficulties for the reader, it would be a 
ridiculous contention to advocate for the acceptance of any specific episode of the fourth century 
in toto. Rather, I will examine the general social, economic, and political trends in this century, set 
in the context of a demonstrably changing Roman world, in order to assess the impact of city’s 
widening sphere of governmental participation. My ultimate contention is that Rome, as a 
gradually more inclusive state, experienced increased pressures to keep reliable public records for 
in a wide variety of governmental and religious functions. In other words, this emerging archival 
habit to publicize and memorialize its public actions stems from this new environment of 
inclusiveness in the Roman state.  
I will demonstrate, therefore, that a reliable substratum of information gradually appears 
with increasing frequency and reliability throughout the fourth century, once the excess 
superstructure of Roman historical writing has been shaved away. Tim Cornell described this as 
the “hard core of authentic data” on which every ancient history is written, although concealed 
                                                 
8 Livy VII.28.7. 
9 Livy VII.26.3-5, hence the cognomen “Corvus” of a prominent branch of the gens Valeria. 
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behind a “great deal of misunderstanding and unconscious distortion.”10 Over the course of the 
latter half of the fourth century, however, an increased prevalence and coherence of primary source 
documentation constrained the abilities of later historians to misunderstand and distort. It is 
precisely during this complex period of social and political change that Rome developed the sort 
of self-reflective archiving habit that allows for a reliable historical reconstruction. This is not to 
say that all, or even most, of the material contained in Books VII-IX of Livy’s work is to be trusted; 
rather, the “hard core” of material grows increasingly larger, denser, and begins to exert its shape 
on the superstructure above. 
 
Governmental Inclusion and the Archival Habit 
 
 The mechanism that transforms governmental inclusion into archival tendencies is not a 
simple process, however, and likely resulted from many different motivations operating 
simultaneously. In the modern world, the concept of a free and open democracy is generally 
associated with a corresponding transparency of governmental behavior. In contrast, autocratic 
systems often try to limit access to information for their citizens in order to maintain more effective 
control, as there are no penalties for their dishonesty in the form of free and open elections, which 
might otherwise strip autocrats of their power. This creates a commonly accepted dichotomy: 
democracies are transparent, while autocracies are filtered at best and deceptive at worst. On a 
very basic level, modern political theory supports this belief, maintaining that electoral 
competition demands trustworthiness in those wielding power. As James Hollyer et al. state, “The 
most transparent regimes are those in which the key offices of the executive and the legislature are 
                                                 
10 Cornell (1995), 18. Cornell tends to be overly sympathetic to the tradition, however, and his work has been 
attacked for accepting even the most implausible notices (see Chapter 1). 
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filled through contested elections.”11 Agonistic competition for governmental power, therefore, 
necessitates policies of honesty, as political opponents are always eager to leverage any apparent 
misrepresentation of reality. In this way, democracies provide natural mechanisms through which 
popular leaders are held to account.12  
One should hesitate to transfer these theories of modern behavior to an ancient setting, but 
the power of popular opinion can arguably be applied to any context. In fourth century Rome, this 
shift towards increased record keeping was likely intended to generate an air of authority for the 
issuing body. With the influx of plebeians into governing roles, concerns probably circulated 
regarding legitimacy and efficacy. Publication of your accomplishments, the decisions and decrees 
of the body of which you were a member, or the propitious functioning of your priestly college 
would have been an important way of assuring the Roman people, and political rivals, that the 
operation of the state was in good order.13 Patricians, the hereditary possessors of these offices and 
priesthoods according to the tradition and endowed with religious legitimacy a priori, would not 
have needed to claim such legitimacy and, therefore, likely did not need such self-advertisement. 
It should be noted moreover, that even if the specifics of the patrician/plebeian divide are not 
accurately related but are in fact misunderstood by later historians, it would not necessarily affect 
this dynamic: any new and unproven assumption of power necessarily seeks to establish the 
legitimacy of its position. Record keeping, then, could have been part of a campaign to reify the 
laws of compromise passed in the middle of the fourth century BCE. 
                                                 
11 Hollyer, Rosendorff, Vreeland (2011), 1204. 
12 Shapiro (2003), 200-1. This has been problematized in recent studies, however. Mani and Mukand (2007), 507, 
523-4 observe that democracies are likely to be transparent in those venues where public perception is high, but 
disregard honesty when it will have minimal public backlash. Hollyer et al. (2011), 1204 argues that democratic 
system’s willingness to divulge the truth is inversely proportional to the political damage that that truth will reap. 
Thus, democracies are the most averse to revealing the most damning facts. 
13 For the plebeians, the necessity of this legitimization campaign likely seemed even more pressing according to the 
tradition: L. Genucius, the first plebeian consul leading an army under his own auspices, was ignominiously 
defeated and killed. Livy states that the patricians took some joy in this outcome (Livy VII.6.10-1). 
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It is no stretch to think that such an increase in production of state records was intended to 
provide legitimating cover for a newly enfranchised group, but public records could have operated 
to moderate public opinion in a different way. Simon Hornblower writes about the Athenian 
democracy, “the proliferation of inscriptions had to do with accountability: the Athenians made 
their magistrates strictly and publicly accountable for their actions, especially in the financial 
sphere, hence the practical need for inscribed permanent records.”14 This argument is at least 
partially true for Rome as well, but as there was no official review process upon leaving a 
magistracy, this accountability occurred the next time he submitted his name at an election. During 
the period when tribuni militum were elected before the power-sharing agreement of 367, the chief 
magistrates at Rome came from a very closed group of gentes, cycling power amongst a handful 
of individuals. With the fourth century reorganization of office holding practices, however, 
positions of power were no longer guaranteed to certain families, and performance and merit 
became of higher value.15 This transition would have exacerbated the climate of aristocratic 
competition for high honors already present at Rome;16 having a public, unalterable record of 
achievements would have constituted another venue for advertising one’s accomplishments. Thus, 
record keeping in this instance could have grown as a self-aggrandizing byproduct of this 
competitive atmosphere.  
 There are two further possible motivations for Rome’s emergent archival practice in the 
fourth century, both dealing with the importance of the dissemination of information. In the case 
of priesthoods achieved, the plebeians were not just reaching an office, but they were accessing a 
                                                 
14 Hornblower (2011), 7.  
15 This is not universally accepted, however. Some have postulated a rigid “party” system that structurally 
guaranteed office holding positions to its members. See discussion below. 
16 For general aristocratic competition, Harris (1979), 17-26. For the argument that specific conditions of the fourth 
century exacerbated this competition, see Harris (1990), 505. 
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previously occluded pool of religious knowledge. No longer was this information the sole purview 
of a closed group, who enjoyed the privileges of divine knowledge, but it could be communally 
understood and disseminated. Propitiation rituals, augural rites, and the taking of auspices all 
played a large part in the conduct of political and military activities. The primacy of religion in the 
public and political realm is revealed by Polybius, who compliments the Romans’ obsession with 
infusing every act of their lives with the divine.17 Thus, the plebeian exclusion from the state 
priesthoods, which left them without power to influence religious interpretation or implementation, 
must have been a frustrating feature of public life before the first compromise in the fourth century. 
Previously, the priesthoods tasked with divining and interpreting signs from the gods had been 
exclusively patrician. With the opening of the decemviri sacris faciundis to the plebs, they gained 
access to a new and important source of religious information which permeated every state 
action.18 Political power and religion strongly intersect in the interpretation and expiation of 
portents and prodigies, as these can vitiate an assembly, passing of a law, or appointment of a 
magistrate.19 Participating in this college and sharing in this divine knowledge must have been a 
watershed moment for the plebs, who previously had been at the whim of the interpretations of 
patrician priests for matters of state religion. 
In the same way, magisterial and senatorial action could be made more comprehensible 
and less arbitrary to the public at large. Indeed, this desire to formalize the actions of government 
had already forced an early codification of laws in the fifth century, one of the few events in 
Rome’s very early Republic that can be pinpointed with confidence. The XII Tables articulated, 
                                                 
17 Polyb. 6.56.7: καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ὀνειδιζόμενον, τοῦτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα, 
λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν: [8] ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἐκτετραγῴδηται καὶ παρεισῆκται τοῦτο τὸ μέρος παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς εἴς τε 
τοὺς κατ᾽ ἰδίαν βίους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ὥστε μὴ καταλιπεῖν ὑπερβολήν. 
18 Rüpke (2006), 229.  
19 Warrior (2015), 49-50. 
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among other things, the rights of citizens in the face of legal action, established procedures for 
grievance redress, and likely spun out of popular pressure to concretize the relationship between 
other social and economic groups. If the compromise of 367 was really driven by strong support 
from the lower strata of the plebs, they could have also advocated to continue this process of 
codification and transparency.20 Through an alliance of rich plebeians, in a position to advocate at 
the highest levels, and lower class plebs, who could provide popular support in political conflicts, 
the publication of state documents might constitute a simple means of promoting the perception 
of security and unity during Rome’s dangerous military engagements throughout the fourth 
century. Thus, the diffusion of information, both for religious and social reasons, might have 
prompted a regularization in the publication of state documents at Rome. 
It is likely that several of these reasons, as well as others, are responsible for the 
demonstrable improvement in the archival underpinning of Livy’s second pentad. It is 
acknowledged, however, that these hypotheses on the causal links between the dual processes of 
governmental inclusion and emerging archival habit are not unassailable. If the social dynamics 
between these groups or the nature of the fourth century compromises are fundamentally 
misrepresented in the sources, some of these postulations would necessarily fall apart. It is my 
contention, though, that firm data points are visible in the development of the fourth century, 
including increased militarism, expanded tribal organization, and colonial foundations that support 
the premises of these hypotheses even without strong corroboration with the literary record. This 
discussion of the contextual features of these compromises is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
                                                 




Methodology and Chapter Overview 
 
 Even though this argument that connects governmental inclusivity and record keeping is 
essentially historiographic in nature, it nevertheless relies upon a particular conception of the social 
dynamics of the fourth century in order to characterize and contextualize the emergent archival 
habit at Rome. It will be useful, therefore, to situate this work within contemporary theories of 
social development of the fourth century, in order to both draw clear lines of division and better 
clarify my position. 
 The prosopographical work of Münzer still looms large in any discussion of Roman politics 
and society in the middle Republic. Although he presents a coherent and plausible reconstruction 
of party affiliations and their effects on political trajectory, he nevertheless leans too heavily on 
the material, often impugning motivations or alliances from nothing more than coincidental 
appearances of names. Political parties operate, in his view, with amazing rigidity and efficacy 
throughout the Republic, such that the fasti contain “a record of the victors.”21 What is absent from 
Münzer’s argument is any sort of human agency, chaos, or interpersonal dynamics that every 
political body experiences. In this way, Münzer appears to be detailing the specifics of a basketball 
tournament by looking at the final scores alone. Further, it relies upon a highly fixed, deployable, 
and therefore highly predictable, client system that can be mobilized at the patron’s whim. Thus, 
elections are simply predetermined by those groups who can congregate the most clients.  
 Differing in methodology but similar in his elite-centric results, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp 
attempts to complicate the picture of factional dominance elaborated by Münzer.22 He rejects the 
                                                 
21 Münzer (1920), 5. 
22 Hölkeskamp (2011), 13. 
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notion of competing aristocratic factions and instead focuses on the process by which a single 
patricio-plebeian elite was created through the social and political turmoil of the fourth and third 
centuries. Hölkeskamp sees the Senate as instrumental in this cohesive process, which he considers 
to be patrician dominated,23 and describes the cooptation of the tribuni plebis into this system,  
who lose their incentive to perform their originally intended function. Like Münzer, he also seems 
to take for granted the approval and complicity of the electorate. Finally, he devotes his energies 
to the internal political development of the city, without taking into account the massive and 
systemic external changes that afflicted the Roman state at this time. 
Tim Cornell follows closely in the scholarly footsteps of Arnoldo Momigliano in positing 
an incredibly diverse social climate in the early Republic, of which the plebs was the lowest group 
and the patricians were the most privileged. The rivalry originated in the stark contrast between 
the fortunes of these groups and only progressed with incremental changes until the fourth century. 
The power base of the patricians, however, began to erode due to economic woes and military 
setbacks, while the plebeian numbers swelled with the disenfranchised wealthy and the indebted 
poor.24 This came to a head at the beginning of the fourth century as particularly potent advocates 
of the group sought to tear down social distinctions. Thus, the reforms of 367 BCE marked a 
cessation of the discrimination of the plebs, the enrollment of every non-patrician into their body, 
and access to the high magisterial positions for those of the small intermediate class.25  In this 
sense, the original plebs achieved only minor economic relief, but lost control of their own 
movement. After this, the plebs was a forgotten group with no powerful advocates and it would 
take the military successes of the fourth century to finally bring them economic relief.26  
                                                 
23 Hölkeskamp (2011), 16. 
24 Cornell (1983), 109-10. 
25 Cornell (1983), 118-9. 
26 Cornell (1983), 120. 
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 Kurt Raaflaub, however, creates a more schematic approach which breaks this conflict up 
into discreet phases. The first phase characterizes the plebs as interested in defensive goals, such 
as protection and security, against the abuses of the higher order. They demanded relief from debt 
and landlessness and a codification of law.27 As the members of the plebs became wealthier, 
Roman society entered the second phase, which lasts until the conquest of Veii. In the difficult 
wars of this period, they finally prove their worth on the battlefield. The resultant increase in status 
and prestige, which shifted this conflict into the third stage, caused this middle group to openly 
agitate against the patricians and challenge them for their privileges. Like Cornell, Raaflaub sees 
full relief coming to the lower orders of state, the fourth phase, from the economic rewards won 
by Rome’s external wars. 
Like many of the studies cited here, I accept the general portrayal of the plebs as a 
disenfranchised group, which was able to achieve some measure of compromise in the fourth 
century BCE. Unlike these scholars, however, I maintain a highly skeptical approach to the 
specifics presented in the literary sources about this and many events from this century. Instead, I 
distill the literary sources of Livy (mainly) and Diodorus Siculus, down to their basic archival 
notices, in order to demonstrate a gradual increase in the reliability of the archival system 
commencing around the passage of the first compromise, traditionally dated to 367 BCE.28  The 
first chapter of this study explores Livy’s source material from the fourth century, mainly through 
                                                 
27 Raaflaub (1986), 206-7. 
28 A note about absolute dates: It is commonly understood that the dating for the early Republican period was 
adjusted in the late first century BCE. Evidence for this is the addition of the so-called “Dictator years” which 
appear in the Fasti Consulares and the Fasti Triumphales, but not in the texts of Livy or Diodorus. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. The presence of a five-year anarchy from 375-371 further complicates the 
chronology. Although Beloch (1926), 31 credibly suggests that the anarchy could be a government deemed invalid 
by later Romans and then removed, these and the dictator-years are usually removed by modern scholars when 
calculating the chronology of this period. The determination, therefore, of absolute dates is difficult to establish, thus 




an in-depth mining of annalistic notices in Books VI-X. The results highlight a distinct 
improvement in these notices after the beginning of this compromise (Book VII) and again at the 
end of the century (Book X). The most important aspect of this close reading is, of course, 
distinguishing those elements of Livy’s narrative that can be considered “archival” from those that 
are likely the result of later narrative additions to the text. Chapter 1 explains in greater detail the 
criteria of this selection and presents the version of Livy’s text distilled down to its archival core. 
This chapter also includes an analysis of the potential source(s) of Diodorus Siculus, concluding 
that he has at best a very distant relation to the sources used in Livy, and therefore represents a 
suitably corroborative text. 
Chapters 2 turns to an examination of the qualitative value of the archival notices isolated 
in Chapter 1, in order to test the hypothesis that they stem from contemporaneous, fourth century 
sources. Key features under consideration are internal consistency, cohesion, and correspondence 
to other notices, such as those of legal developments. Chapter 2 focuses on the fasti, paying special 
attention to the list of eponymous magistrates, the dictator list, the triumph list, and the pontifical 
tables, and addresses the concerns of potential inconsistencies in each.  
 Chapter 3 attempts to demonstrate the integrity of the narrative in a different direction. 
The annalistic tradition has often been assailed for its retrojections of later caricatures and biases. 
The potential danger of this intrusion for the second pentad, which details the relationships 
between strong tribunician and patrician personalities, could be crippling to an argument of 
historical reliability. This discussion, however, will demonstrate that no such intrusion has 
corrupted the tradition that culminates in Livy’s second pentad, but rather Livy engages in a 
predictable process of characterization in order to construct didactic moments. Further, he seems 
fundamentally uninterested in politicizing key developments from this century of sociopolitical 
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compromise. Thus, potential archival material is not suppressed under a corrupting pro-plebeian 
or pro-patrician bias. 
Another evidentiary base used to demonstrate the link between socio-political change and 
emergent archival practices is the larger societal developments that occur concurrently with the 
internal socio-political events. These include the massive investment in military activity at the 
beginning of the fourth century and the enlargement and dispersal of the Roman electorate 
through the organization of the four tribal additions of the ager Veientinus. The consequences of 
these events, as analyzed in Chapter 4, are argued to be contributing factors to both the 
compromise of 367 BCE and the subsequent development of archival sources at Rome.  
Chapter 5 addresses the records presumably kept by the Senate. If the trend of increased 
archival habit is really operative in the fourth century, the real diagnostic will be in the 
reconstruction of the Senate records, the appearance of which most scholars delay until the late 
third century at the earliest. A reconstruction of these records, as they apply to the realm of foreign 
policy decisions at Rome, presents a consistent and cohesive picture of senatorial action, and 
therefore provides strong evidence for the fourth century as a watershed moment in archival 









Buried in Text: Archival Material in the Second Pentad of Livy 
 
Origins of Roman Record Keeping: A Review of Literature 
 
Modern scholarship is often in fundamental disagreement with the ancient opinion that 
early Romans maintained accurate records of major civic and religious events. The ancients had, 
confidence - unfortunately misplaced - that their history had been successfully chronicled from the 
beginning of the Republic in 509 BCE, and Cicero’s ab initio rerum Romanorum is particularly 
clear on this point.29 In addition to the ancient testimony for early city records, Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus states that he did not consult “the proof of the single and solitary tablet, residing 
with the chief priest” for information about the founding of the city.30 Quintilian mentions the 
“annals of the Pontiffs” as a foundatiuonal text of historical documentation of the city.31 Cicero 
uses the “annals of the Pontifex Maximus” as the ultimate expression of bland, unadorned prose32 
and cites the “public annals” for their inability to confirm the tutelage of young King Numa.33 
These are hardly the only references to such a source (or sources) from the beginning of the Roman 
                                                 
29 Cic. De Or. 2.52 (quoted in the Introduction). 
30 Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.74.3: οὐ γὰρ ἠξίουν ὡς Πολύβιος ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης τοσοῦτο μόνον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι κατὰ τὸ 
δεύτερον ἔτος τῆς ἑβδόμης ὀλυμπιάδος τὴν Ῥώμην ἐκτίσθαι πείθομαι, οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχιερεῦσι κειμένου 
πίνακος ἑνὸς καὶ μόνου τὴν πίστιν ἀβασάνιστον καταλιπεῖν. 
31 Quint. Inst. 10.2.7: nihil in historiis supra pontificum annales haberemus. 
32 Cic. Leg. 1.6: nam post annales pontificum maximorum, quibus nihil potest esse ieiunius. 
33 Cic. Rep. 2.28: neque vero satis id annalium publicorum auctoritate declaratum videmus. 
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Republic.34 These ancient testimonies are also, unfortunately, poor evidence for the reliability of 
very early Roman records: none of these writers claim to have seen the documents first hand. 
Cicero and Dionysius specifically invoke the annales for their inability to inform historical inquiry. 
This uncertainty concerning the quality of such records is compounded by the testimony 
about their actual contents: both Livy and Cicero challenge the information conveyed in these 
annals on the grounds of later fabrication and insertion. At the end of Book VIII, Livy makes a 
particularly damning claim: 
“It is not easy to prefer one account or authority over another. I think that memory is 
corrupted by blandishing funeral speeches and by the inaccurate titles of portrait masks, as 
each family draws to itself by mendacious falsehoods the fame of achievements and office; 
from this the achievements of individuals and public memory is certainly confused.”35  
 
Cicero echoes these sentiments thusly: “The history of our state, however, is made falser by these 
laudations. For much has been written in them which did not occur: fake triumphs, exaggerated 
consulships, false genealogy, and even conversions to the plebs.”36 It is quite clear, therefore, that 
ancient scholars had very little confidence in the specifics of such early records, were they still 
accessible at all by the Late Republic. As a seeming final condemnation of these archives and their 
impact on Roman historical writing, modern scholarship has sufficiently demonstrated that they 
were never directly consulted by any extant writers.37 
To compound the problem further, the ancients were also convinced that nearly all state 
records were destroyed during the Gallic occupation and sack of the city in 390 BCE. Claudius 
                                                 
34 See Diom. 1.484, Macr. 3.2.17, Origo Gentis Romanae praef., Livy 6.1.1-2 & 27.8.8-9. 
35 Livy VIII.40.3-5: Nec facile est aut rem rei aut auctorem auctori praeferre. Vitiatam memoriam funebribus 
laudibus reor falsisque imaginum titulis, dum familiae ad se quaeque famam rerum gestarum honorumque fallenti 
mendacio trahunt. inde certe et singulorum gesta et publica monumenta rerum confuse. For the implications of the 
use of memoria as a general historical term, see Dieter Timpe, “Memoria and Historiography in Rome,” in Greek 
and Roman Historiography, ed. John Marincola (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 150-74. 
36 Cic. Brut. 62: quamquam his laudationibus historia rerum nostrarum est facta mendosior. multa enim scripta sunt 
in eis quae facta non sunt: falsi triumphi, plures consulatus, genera etiam falsa et ad plebem transitions. 
37 See Rawson (1971), 158-69; and for the thesis that the annales ceased to exist altogether after the second century 
BCE, see Drews (1988), 289-99. 
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Quadrigarius, a historian of the early first century BCE and one of Livy’s main sources for his 
second pentad, was said to have begun his histories after the Gallic sack due to the poor quality 
and unreliability of earlier records. All fragments from Book I of his work cover the period from 
390 until about 311.38 Further, Plutarch’s Numa mentions a certain Clodius and his assertion that 
the ancient records were lost during this Gallic catastrophe.39 Whether this Clodius is the same as 
the aforementioned historian is an open question, but their stance regarding the early material is 
nevertheless consistent. Finally, Livy sets the basic structure of his work around this cataclysmic 
event, as the first pentad closes with the Gallic sack, and he reintroduces the second pentad with a 
new preface praising the improvement in sources.40 Thus, whatever records did exist for the sixth 
and fifth centuries at Rome, ancient commentators were sure they were retroactively constructed, 
while the originals were presumed lost in the fires of 390 BCE.  
The 1819 discovery of a new palimpsest containing much of Cicero’s De re publica has 
provided ammunition for both those scholars who espoused reliability in early record keeping and 
those more skeptical.  Contained therein, Cicero discusses an eclipse, mentioned in both the poetic 
Annales of Ennius and the Annales maximi, that occurred about 350 years after the founding of the 
city. Cicero continues to write that this eclipse has formed the mathematical basis by which all 
previous eclipses were calculated, back to the reign of Romulus.41 This event has been identified 
as a solar eclipse on 21 June, 400 BCE, which was visible at Rome, and thus evidencing the 
existence of a version of the pontifical tables at this date. Unfortunately, this accurate memory of 
                                                 
38 Briscoe (2013), 289n. 
39 Plut. Num. 1.2: ἀλλὰ Κλώδιός τις ἐν ἐλέγχῳ χρόνων (οὕτω γάρ πως ἐπιγέγραπται τὸ βιβλίον) ἰσχυρίζεται τὰς μὲν 
ἀρχαίας ἐκείνας ἀναγραφὰς ἐν τοῖς Κελτικοῖς πάθεσι τῆς πόλεως ἠφανίσθαι. 
40 Livy VI.1.1-2. 
41 Cic. Rep. 1.16.25: id (the eclipse) autem postea ne notrum quidem Ennium fugit; qui ut scribit, anno trecentesimo 
quiquagesimo fere post Romam conditam “Nonis Iunis soli luna obstetit et nox.” Atque hac in re tanta inest ratio 
atque sollertia, ut ex hoc die, quem apud Ennium et in maximis annalibus consignatum videmus, superiores solis 
defectionis reputatae sint usque ad illam, quae Nonis Quinctilibus fuit regnante Romulo. 
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the eclipse demonstrates only that events perceived to be of religious significance were recorded; 
this does not necessarily prove that events of historical value, which would indicate political and 
social developments, were recorded from the fourth century or before. Further, scholars have taken 
the implication that records needed to be calculated backwards (reputatae sint) to mean that the 
Gallic sack was in fact responsible for destroying any previously kept version of the pontifical 
tables in 390 BCE.42  
The early scholarly focus on the Gallic sack and its implications for later Roman historical 
writing needs to be set against recent archaeological discoveries, which definitively demonstrate 
that the notion that records predating 390 BCE had been lost was greatly exaggerated in antiquity 
and therefore mistakenly followed by modern scholars. Archaeological explorations in Rome 
suggest that early fourth century destruction, although visible, was not nearly of the magnitude 
that would have precipitated a pervasive loss of archival material. Thus, it is necessary to challenge 
this pessimistic impression perpetuated by both ancient and modern writers and look elsewhere 
for the development of state records in the fourth century. 
 Given the strong doubt placed on the records in antiquity, it is no surprise, therefore, that 
scholarship analyzing Roman historiography has maintained an overly cynical view of any early 
annals allegedly maintained by the chief priests at Rome. Theodor Mommsen, in the first 
generation of scholars looking skeptically at Livy and his sources, trusted the notices that pontiffs 
began keeping a calendar and list of consuls since the beginning of the Republic. Once again, he 
comprehends the poor reliability of the historical record for the fifth century as a result of the 
Gallic sack of 390, while assuming that lost names were reconstructed from surviving inscriptions. 
The chronicle arose, likely a generation or so later, in order to achieve a favorable reconstruction 
                                                 
42 For this argument, see Becker (1846), 7-8. 
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of the early periods of the Republic and was eventually collected and published in a liber annalis 
around the end of the fourth century.43 This is an important argument, as it restricts the freedom 
which Fabius Pictor had for his composition and thus explains the uniformity of tradition that 
confronts the reader for these earlier periods. Mommsen, however, recognizes that the mechanisms 
by which earlier information was collected and reintegrated are beyond our ability to ascertain, but 
he nevertheless concedes that accurate records do indeed form the base of Rome’s early republican 
narratives.44  
Although Mommsen’s optimism on this point is not shared by many later historians, the 
notion of an archival collection and subsequent redaction of this material does find adherents in 
the following century.  Wilhelm Soltau, for instance, argues that oral announcements were 
annually recorded at Rome beginning around 300 with the Ogulnian rogation, which opened many 
pontifical offices to the plebs.45 Soltau also sees Livy’s statement from the end of Book VIII that 
“no scriptor [of history] existed contemporaneously” with the Second Samnite War (326-304) to 
imply that no records at all exited from this period, an argument that requires too much of the 
word scriptor and ignores ancient testimony of earlier annals.46 Records stemming from the 
reorganization of the pontificate, however, were kept in two categories: a priestly chronicle that 
related events of religious and calendrical significance as well as state records with more extensive 
notices of Senate proceedings and other actions taken by state officials. Soltau identifies both 
layers of archival material within the text of Livy and argues that they are clearly visible by Livy’s 
                                                 
43 Mommsen (1859), 137, 209-11. 
44 Mommsen (1854), 211. 
45 Cn. Fulvius: Livy IX.46.4-5: fastosque circa forum in albo proposuit; Ogulnian Rogation: Livy X.6.6: 
Rogationem ergo promulgarunt ut, cum quattuor augures,, quinque pontifices ea tempestate essent placeretque 
augeri sacerdotum numerum, quattuor pontifices, quinque augures, de plebe omnes, adlegerentur. 
46 Livy XIII.40.5: Nec quisqam aequalis temporibus illis scriptor exstat, quo satis certo auctore stetur. For Soltau’s 
argument see Soltau (1909), 14. Rawson (1971), 167 also seems to take this passage to indicate a lack of all sources 
for this period. 
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third decade.47 Material for the fourth century, which according to Soltau was not originally 
contained in the chronicle, was gradually collected and added in the following centuries.48 Thus 
Soltau believes that the beginning of the third century constitutes the beginning of the “historical 
period.”   
Karl Julius Beloch similarly concludes that strong evidence for record keeping only exists 
from the beginning of the third century. Citing numerous problematic entries and discrepancies in 
the lists of dictators, censors, and triumphs for the fifth and fourth centuries, Beloch argues that 
there could not have been any such records before the third century.49 His assertions in this area 
rest largely on probability: for example, he finds it excessively unlikely that a Papirius would serve 
on four of the first six censorial commissions and that fourth century dictators could be appointed 
for such mundane tasks holding the ludi Romani. Beloch’s rejection of much of this material rests 
on questionable grounds and will be addressed in greater detail below, as it specifically relates to 
Books VII-IX of Livy. Further, Beloch attempts to minimize the implications of Cicero’s eclipse 
citation, arguing that either his scribe misquoted Ennius or a later commentator mistakenly 
emended the manuscript.50 Thus, Beloch is able to correct the date of the celestial event to the 
middle of the third century, supporting his view that state records did not exist during the fourth. 
Following Soltau, he too concludes that the archival tradition began with the Ogulnian rogation of 
300 BCE.  
 Scholars of the late twentieth century have been less willing to assign a specific date or 
development to the initiation of state record keeping at Rome, instead allowing the silence on this 
matter in the ancient sources to stand. They are able, however, to maintain the intense skepticism 
                                                 
47 Soltau (1896), 267-9. 
48 Soltau (1914/15), 321-3; in this opinion, Soltau is following Kornemann (1911), 245-57. 
49 Beloch (1926), 63-95. See also Fritz Bandel, Die römischen Diktaturen (Breslau: Korn, 1910). 
50 Beloch (1926), 92-3. 
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of early German studies. Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg sees very little of historical value in the 
first books of Livy’s work and in the traditions of the early republic, saying they “cannot retain 
much value for our attempts at reconstructing early Roman history.”51 He finds only the most basic 
facts about early Rome to be reliable: the city came into being at some point, grew in size, was 
ruled and freed from Etruscan kings, fought wars with their immediate neighbors, and underwent 
social upheavals.52 Other information from this period does not stem from state records, but rather 
from some combination of oral history, hazy memory, and limited documentary evidence. It is 
clear that Von Ungern-Sternberg intends this veil of uncertainty to extend well into what other 
scholars would consider an “historical period,” citing the faulty causes of the Second Macedonian 
War, corrected by Polybius, and the poor quality of notices between the Second Punic and Third 
Macedonian Wars.53 Further, he notes that the process of historical writing, as it existed in the last 
two centuries of the Republic, did not concern itself with authenticity or source criticism, but 
instead focused on taking published accounts and surpassing their author in literary fluency and 
didactic message. The goal of these early writers, therefore, is pseudo-historical precision for 
maximum moralistic impact.54 Further, any semblance of annalistic structure in these works—
evident in the organization of events by eponymous consuls and beginning yearly notices with 
elections, prodigies, etc.—are a way of affecting a foundation in authoritative source material, 
namely the annales, rather than reflecting any source’s actual structure.55 While Von Ungern-
Sternberg is likely correct that later historians did not directly consult the primary sources 
themselves (see above, p. 17), he does not acknowledge that the authority of such annales would 
                                                 
51 Von Ungern-Sternberg (1986), 81. 
52 Von Ungern-Sternberg (1986), 81-2. 
53 Von Ungern-Sternberg (2015), 170. 
54 Von Ungern-Sternberg (2005), 80-81; In this view, he follows Gelzer (1962), 95. 
55 Von Ungern-Sternberg (2015), 170. 
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have to be communally established and thus familiar to readers of the Late Republic in order for 
such a strategy of affectation to be both warranted and effective.56 
 T.P. Wiseman, always a skeptic of early historical traditions, shares the sentiments of his 
predecessors. His early scholarship is particularly pessimistic on the subject: there was no 
connection between the calendar and any magistrate lists, no public document until Augustus, and 
all fasti are cynically interpolated by later antiquarians and senators.57 He maintains that any early 
pontifical records were meant to educate people in divine matters and, therefore, contained 
ahistorical accounts of miracles, prodigies, and other events that elucidated the status of the pax 
deorum. If historical material was collected, in his view, it was not done intentionally or with any 
regularity.58 In this way, Cato’s sentiments about the uselessness of the archives find explanation.59 
Wiseman maintains that this record was known by a variety of names, but was ultimately replete 
with historical material only by later antiquarians and compilers.60 He follows Gregory Bucher, 
who argues that the chronicle, whenever it was in use, was likely a challenging and unwieldy 
document to read, written by a variety of hands, and subject to vast gaps and reconstructions.61 
Later in his career, Wiseman acknowledges that 367 BCE may indeed have been a watershed 
moment for magistrate lists at Rome, necessitated by the power sharing compromise; this 
preliminary assertion is followed and more fully realized in this study. He separates, however, the 
annales of the pontifices from this magistrate list, and he pins their origins to the Ogulnian rogation 
                                                 
56 The existence of any annales into the Late Republic is called into serious question by Rawson (n. 46 above) and 
James Richardson (discussed below, p. 29). 
57 Wiseman (1979), 13-6. 
58 Wiseman (2002), 354. 
59 F80=Gell. NA 2.28.4-7: non lubet scribere quod in tabula apud pontificem maximum est, quotiens annona cara, 
quotiens lunae aut soli caligo aut quid obstiterit. 
60 Wiseman (2002), 358-61. 
61 Wiseman (1996), 314; follows Bucher (1987) 38-40. Bucher does not try to make an argument concerning the 
initial date of the chronicle or what its original contents were. He is mainly arguing for reading Cic. De. Or. 2.52 in 




of 300 BCE.62 Thus, although he significantly softens his position over the course of his career, 
Wiseman presents a generally distrustful picture of these records and their assistance in the creation 
of reliable history for the Middle Republic. 
 Jorg Rüpke, in his intense studies of the history of the priestly colleges, has also made 
significant contributions to the study of early record keeping at Rome. Rüpke has a high standard 
for historical accuracy in verifying the presence of archival sources and, therefore, down-dates the 
introduction of priestly records to the first plebeian pontifex maximus, Ti. Coruncanius, in 249 
BCE.63 The arguments that he uses to support this conclusion, however, are problematic.  He 
quickly dismisses the majority of religious notices for the fourth century as spurious, citing 
uncertain attribution, coincidentally famous individuals, and a lack of any significant attempt at 
chronological association between names and events. These indicate, in his view, serious 
interpolation by later scholars. Because Livy did not treat the devotio of P. Decius Mus as the death 
of a pontiff but rather that of a consul, Rüpke maintains that such religious records were not in 
existence for 295 BCE and, therefore, not instituted as part of the Ogulnian rogation.64 Although 
he does have greater confidence in the list of augurs, Rüpke nevertheless argues in the familiar 
vein that little in Rome was committed to writing before the third century BCE.65 
 Gary Forsythe sees the origins of the pontifical chronicle in oral announcements to the 
populus concerning the days of the month, likely before any such calendrical publication by Cn. 
Fulvius in 304 BCE. The people would have to gather to hear such announcements—scheduled 
according to the phases of the moon which were observed by pontifical aides—in order to know 
what days were open (dies fasti) or closed (dies nefasti) for business and legal action.  When these 
                                                 
62 Wiseman (2007), 70-1. 
63 Jorg Rüpke, Fasti Sacerdotum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31-3. 
64 Rüpke (2008), 26-9. Rüpke (1995), 196-202. 
65 Rüpke (2008), 30. 
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records were finally chronicled (Forsythe is averse to ascribing a fixed point for this), they were 
likely intended as a religious journal to track days of fortune (or its opposite), temple dedications, 
eclipses, strange occurrences, and expiatory procedures.66 The religious material was eventually 
linked to civic developments and provided enough of a skeleton for later historians to compose 
their histories.67 According to Forsythe, the dearth of references to these state records in later 
authors is likely the result of their quick and complete absorption into the historical tradition, 
making later consultation after the first generation of historians superfluous.68  
 Bruce Frier has proposed some unique solutions to the problems of the pontifical records 
and the elusive meanings behind later citations. Working from a close reading of the sources, Frier 
concludes that the pontifical colleges were untouched by the civic reforms of the fifth century, the 
Twelve Tables, and the Valerio-Horatian Laws, which together served to weaken the powers of 
yearly magistrates and, therefore, emerged with augmented and variegated roles in Roman society. 
While the pontiffs were previously concerned only with temple dedication, their new position 
granted them authority over a range of activities, including orchestrating the plebeian elections in 
449 BCE, vowing the ludi magni in 431, overseeing the trial of a Vestal Virgin in 420, resolving 
a dedicatory dispute in Veii in 395, and leading a senatorial devotio during the Gallic sack.69  The 
same “principle of publicity” which produced the Twelve Tables and, indirectly, emboldened the 
pontiffs, also led to the publication of a pontifical chronicle of noteworthy state business. The 
priests, realizing the power that religious knowledge afforded them, began to jealously guard such 
material as early as 389,70 a development which would explain the lack of sources observed by the 
                                                 
66 Forsythe (1994), 61-6. 
67 Forsythe (2005), 71. 
68 Forsythe (1994), 55; while the Romans assuredly lacked the impulse of quellenkritik, this was compensated for by 
19th century German scholars. 
69 Frier (1979), 132-5. 
70 Frier (1979), 135, citing Livy VI.1.11-12. 
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ancients after the “Gallic sack.” These records were maintained as a source of precedents, 
transferred to permanent record, titled the Libri Annales Pontificum Maximorum, and kept until 
the second century BCE. Frier is understandably unwilling to comment on the diligence with which 
the record was kept and protected during the intervening centuries.  He fully admits, however, that 
this is a best-fit reconstruction of the scenario described by the ancient sources, which were 
assuming the direction of influence flowed from the annales into the annalistic tradition. This 
argument is vulnerable, as Frier admits, if the flow of influence was actually the opposite, and later 
historical narratives were used to reconstruct previously-non-existent annalistic notices.71 He 
vehemently rejects, however, any collection and republication of the material before the principate, 
such as the liber annalis proposed by Mommsen. Thus, Frier presents an optimistic view of this 
tradition, although with potentially severe caveats. 
 Continuing in the vein of cautious positivism, S. P. Oakley makes a case for accurate mid-
republican records, couched in a tradition of literary embellishment that started long before Livy. 
He sees the names, dates, and events described in Livy’s second pentad as unlikely to be derived 
from oral history, but he remains unwilling to identify the period in which such a record was 
initiated.72 Responding to criticism that such information is likely later interpolation (see 
discussion of Wiseman, Von Ungern-Sternberg, and Beloch, above), Oakley acknowledges no 
consistent pattern of falsification and observes that the nature of aristocratic competition in Roman 
politics would have precluded such personal aggrandizement on a meaningful scale.73 Further, he 
notes the remarkable unanimity of consular lists after 366 BCE (although admits less confidence 
with other lists) as well as the increase in archival material throughout the second pentad. Finally, 
                                                 
71 Frier (1979), 175-8. 
72 Oakley, vol. 1. (1997-2005), 24-5. 
73 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 26-32. 
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although Books VI-X likely rely on a good deal of archival material, such sources are by nature 
insufficient to supply the sort of detail contained in his political and military narratives. Thus, some 
invention must have been incorporated.74 Oakley refines his views later in his career and sees a 
marked increase in the quality of annalistic notices beginning in Book X or around 300 BCE.75 
While this does not preclude the presence of legitimate sources in earlier periods, it nonetheless 
reaffirms the views held by Beloch, Soltau, and others. 
  The most outspoken proponent of the early Roman historical tradition, Tim Cornell, 
presents expectedly positive views of early state records.  He says definitively, based on the 
accurate mention of the solar eclipse in 400 BCE, that pontifical records go back at least to the 
fifth century, but concedes that these records were likely very sparse.  In Cornell’s opinion, the 
archival material underpinning the historical tradition gradually improves throughout Livy’s first 
decade, such that notices by 350 BCE could be considered complete and accurate. This does not 
relegate the prior period to the mists of the unknown; Cornell still maintains that an accurate 
skeletal framework, built on magistrate lists and important annual events, supports later literary 
and rhetorical accretions.76 He also argues that other bodies, such as priestly colleges and other 
corporations, such as the curiae, might have kept their own records, which were used to fill out 
the narratives of later historians.77 In a earlier publication, Cornell states his support of for the 
historical tradition at Rome, stating that much of the legend, although highly contrived and 
unrealistic, is nevertheless based on fact.78 This position is difficult to accept in toto, as many 
stories of the first centuries of the city are obviously forced into Hellenic models of foundation 
                                                 
74 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 72. 
75 Oakley, vol. 4 (1997-2005), 479-80. 
76 Cornell (1995), 13-15. 
77 Cornell (1995), 15. 
78 Cornell (1986b), 57, 75-6. 
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myth and tyrannical behavior.  Nevertheless, Cornell points to the general uniformity of historical 
tradition for the early years and, therefore, believes that later historians were constrained in the 
types and amount of fabrication that was acceptable in their genre. Where Forsythe argues for very 
early incorporation of state records, thereby establishing singular later traditions, Cornell sees an 
authoritative archival record that constrained later exaggeration, invention, and interpolation.79 
While Cornell’s approach is highly enticing for reconstructive efforts of Rome’s early history, it 
places excessive faith in the literary sources in the face of their centuries-long removal from events 
they describe. He necessarily places the burden of proof on discounting the literary tradition, while 
others have placed the burden on proving it.80 
 There are numerous other scholars who have contributed to this field, but whose arguments 
serve only to shade the meanings of those already presented. Otto Seeck envisioned events of 
historic importance attached directly to the published calendar.81 This would imply that Seeck also 
ascribes to 304 BCE as a likely beginning of serious annalistic endeavors. John Rich argues that 
yearly narratives in the first decade of Livy display a remarkable irregularity—citing this as 
evidence against state records for this period—but that this improves by Book X. He continues to 
suggest that no records of the Roman Senate exist before 300 BCE (and therefore sees this date 
also as a watershed moment).82 Dieter Timpe sees an intimate connection between magistrate lists 
and the calendar, linking the two through their common name, fasti. Events were recorded as they 
impacted sacred law, and thus events of historical significance were only kept incidentally.83 
Private information, outside of the religious sphere, had to be inserted later, and by the time these 
                                                 
79 Cornell (2005), 48-50. 
80 See Wiseman (1996) for a scathing review of this methodology, which includes the phrase “The Beginnings of 
Rome is a great work of creative reconstruction.” 
81 Seeck (1885), 61-4. 
82 Rich (2009), 128-30. 
83 Timpe (2011), 158. 
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records were collected and published, personal insertions and legitimate historical events were 
indistinguishable.84 James Richardson, arguing against accurate records based on narratives of 
Vestal Virgin trials, contends that inconsistent notices, especially during periods of political 
turmoil, are indications of fabrication. This is a bit perplexing, as it seems to indicate that unchaste 
behavior on the part of Vestal Virgins should occur on a regular basis.85 His final conclusions, 
however, that later historians did not make direct use of archival material, has been thoroughly 
confirmed by many historiographical studies. 
 Not only is the inception date of this archival material in question, but the content of the 
early records is consistently under discussion in modern scholarship as well. Andrea Mehl 
proposes that early annales must have been focused, if not exclusively, on prodigies and successful 
methods of expiation,86 echoing Wiseman above. Jyri Vaahtera argues for a more restricted 
purview of the annales maximi, arguing that the chief pontiffs would only have kept records about 
their own actions. Therefore, later historians must have used a variety of sources for their 
reconstructions.87 Hans Beck also believes these records were limited in scope, stating that early 
records maintained by pontiffs would only contain state actions as it pertained to divine will and 
displeasure.88 Following Von Ungern-Sternbeg, Beck also observes that annalistic structure in 
historical narratives does not necessarily equate to the authors’ use of annalist sources.89 
To summarize: despite a few scholars who argue for archival substructures beneath the 
early republican narrative, most modern positions place the advent of state records at the end of 
the fourth century with the publication of the calendar (304 BCE), the Ogulnian rogation (300 
                                                 
84 Timpe (2011), 164. 
85 Richardson (2011), 104. The argument concerning irregular notices is specifically used by Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-
2005), 43 as evidence against later insertion. 
86 Mehl (2011), 38. 
87 Vaahtera (2002), 100-7. 
88 Beck (2007), 262. 
89 Beck (2007), 265. 
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BCE), or later in the pontificate of Ti. Coruncanius (249 BCE). Earlier information, and much 
from the Late Republic, is likely to have been inserted by ambitious family members or overeager 
historians. The content of any earlier records, if they even existed, was largely focused on priestly 
affairs, with some scholars even arguing that only signals of divine will and subsequent priestly 
action were preserved. Magistrate lists were either kept separately or affixed directly to the priestly 
records, either in annales format or onto the calendar itself. Secular events may or may not have 
been associated with the record from early periods, and records of other priestly colleges or 
corporate bodies might also have supplemented this material. Frier has sufficiently disproven any 
republican collection and publication of these early documents, leaving the first generation of 
historians, Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus, the task of accessing this material directly 
and integrating it into their narratives. Later historians are constantly shown to have neglected 
consulting such records directly, if they continued to exist at all, suggesting their early and 
complete absorption into the tradition.   
 
Archival Material in the Second Pentad of Livy: The Data 
 
 Following the above review of scholarship surrounding early state records at Rome, it is 
therefore appropriate to ask if an excessive amount of pessimism has been attached to fourth 
century records. The appearance of Book VII does not differ dramatically from Book X; why must 
the year 300 BCE mark a watershed moment, when an arguably larger constitutional development 
occurs just over half a century earlier? The Leges Liciniae Sextiae of 367, by enlarging the pool of 
potential participants in the governmental system, must have influenced internal, bureaucratic 
structures and thus provided varied motivations for publication. Thus, by reclaiming the middle 
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decades of the fourth century under an assumption of historical reliability—one of the central aims 
of this study—Livy’s text permits an even earlier window onto the pivotal political and social 
events which occurred during this century.  
If the compromise of 367 led to a diffusion of governmental participation and, in the 
process, to an increase in archival record keeping, we should be able to see this trend in the 
surviving data, even as exiguous as it stands. It is therefore necessary to gather these potential 
annalistic notices available in Livy in order to observe any changes in the practice of their creation 
or preservation. As Livy represents just one potential endpoint of the various annalistic traditions 
derived from these original state records, it would also be illustrative to check notices in works 
supplemental to Livy. Thus, the related, but not identical, texts of Diodorus Siculus, the Fasti 
Consulares (FC),90 the Fasti Triumphales (FT)91 can be included in this calculation. Below is an 
extended table with a summary of the annalistic notices for the years contained in Books VI-X of 
Livy (Tab. 1), which shows a steady increase in frequency as the fourth century progresses (Tab. 
2). 
 The focus of information outlined in Table 1 is on action or events that happened at Rome 
which would have resulted in the production of an official record, either because it necessitated 
state action or enforcement. The tabulation, therefore, includes the result of votes, passing of laws, 
treaties, building (religious and secular) projects, court trials, suspension of business (iustitium), 
and senatus consulta and other senatorial action or advisement. To avoid artificially inflating the 
numbers of such data, complex but connected action has been condensed to single notices. Thus, 
the arrival of Campanian envoys in 343 BCE and the Senate’s acceptance of their deditio in fidem 
                                                 
90 Degrassi (1954), 42-51. 
91 Degrassi (1954), 94-97. 
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have been telescoped into a single notice for the purposes of this table.92 Similarly, two successive 
elections (because the first was invalidated for religious reasons) or two triumphs over the same 
enemy in the same year (and therefore from the same campaign) are considered as a single event. 
Conversely, those events which occur in sequence but require distinct action that presumably left 
distinct records, such as the acceptance of the Campanian deditio and the immediate dispatch of 
Roman envoys and then fetial priests to Samnium,93 have been separated into two events.  
For the purposes of isolating potential changes in domestic record keeping, the assembled 
list has also omitted a great deal of Livy’s narrative. For example, most information that was 
generated and conducted outside of Rome is excluded. The material excluded from Table 1 
includes battle narratives, the conduct of magistrates abroad, the internal conduct of foreign states, 
and (perhaps controversially) the provinciae of military tribunes with consular power, consuls, 
dictators, and pro-magistrates. These types of information were most susceptible to later 
interpolation and ancestral aggrandizement; indeed, the majority of disagreement that Livy reports 
among his sources for these decades concerns the provinciae of dictators and consuls (see next 
chapter).94 Actions that took place at Rome had a (presumably) much larger pool of witnesses and 
would (presumably) be more resistant to fabrication, at least in the immediate aftermath. 
Therefore, the elections of consuls and the appointments of dictators are noted as archival, but 
their actions when away from the city are not. Those activities, however, that are either directed 
from Rome, by senatorial decree or otherwise, or that require action taken at Rome, such as the 
death of a consul on campaign, are included.  
                                                 
92 Livy VII.30.1-31.2. 
93 Livy VII.30.1-32.1. 
94 Livy VII.42.3-7; VIII.40.1-5; IX.15.9-11. 
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The names of most magistrates are not included in this table, as they are generally uniform 
across Livy and the Fasti, especially after 367 BCE. The similarities between the content of these 
two sources, and the fact that they were composed nearly contemporaneously, suggests that they 
relate the same tradition. It will therefore only be noted in the table below when the Fasti provide 
information either missing or divergent from the account of Livy. Diodorus Siculus, on the other 
hand, seems to be working from a more remote tradition, and the irregularities that he introduces 
(marked with an asterisk in Table 1) are discussed below the table. Slight discrepancies in terms 
of magisterial names, such as a different praenomen (more common) or cognomen (less common 
but still regularly present), do not invalidate the notices of their election or actions. Events of a 
definitively etiological nature and those which occurred outside of Rome, such as the single 
combat which granted T. Manlius Torquatus95 and M. Valerius Corvus96 their cognomina, are 
easily omitted. Etiological events which occurred at Rome, however, are more difficult to assess. 
While it is easy to remove them from consideration as later literary insertions, an argument for 
increasing archival data in the period would suggest that they may in fact be based on historical 
events. However, in an effort to be conservative, unless clear state action is taken, these events 
have also been omitted. Thus, the unsuccessful trial of M. Manlius Imperiosus,97 used to 
characterize the austere Manlii, and the opening and closing of the Lacus Curtius in the Forum98 
are not included. The execution of M. Manlius Capitolinus,99 however, and the recall of Rome’s 
flute players from Tibur,100 are included as they allegedly involve positive governmental action. 
                                                 
95 Livy VII.10. 
96 Livy VII. 26.1-9. 
97 Livy VII. 4.1-5.7. 
98 Livy VII. 6.1-6. 
99 Livy VI.20. 
100 Livy IX. 30.5-10. 
34 
 
Thankfully, scenes of this nature are not very common at Rome in this century and would not 
significantly affect the impression of the data with or without their inclusion.   
 







389 6 tribunician prosecution of Q. Fabius (1.6); interregnum (1.8); elections for 
military tribunes (1.8, Diod. Sic. 15.22.1); Dictator with magister equitum 
(2.6); triumph over Volscians, Aequi, and Etruscans (4.1); Veientes, 
Capenates, and Falisci given citizenship (4.4) 
388 2 elections for military tribunes (4.7, Diod. Sic. 15.23.1); foundations of 
Capitol laid (4.12) 
387* 4 interregnum (5.6); elections for military tribunes (5.7, Diod. Sic. 15.24.1); 
Temple of Mars dedicated (5.8); Stellatine, Tromentine, Sabatine, 
Arniensis tribes added (5.8) 
386 2 elections for military tribunes (6.3, Diod. Sic. 15.25.1), iustitium (7.1) 
385* 6 elections for military tribunes (11.1, Diod. Sic. 15.28.1); Dictator with ME 
(11.10); triumph over Volscians (16.5); colonists sent to Satricum (16.6, 
Diod. Sic. 15.27.4 calls it “Sardinia”); M. Manlius freed ex senatus 
consulto (17.6); Latin and Hernician envoys expelled by denuntiatum 
senatus (17.8) 
384* 4 elections for military tribunes (18.1, Diod. Sic. 15.36.1); conviction of M. 
Manlius (20.11-12, Diod. Sic. 15.35.3), plague (20.15-16), grain shortage 
(21.1) 
383 4 elections for military tribunes (21.1, Diod. Sic. 15.38.1); patres… 
decreverunt a vote on war with Volscians (21.3); commission to divide 
Pomptine land (21.4); colony at Nepete (21.4) 
382 2 elections for military tribunes (22.1, Diod. Sic. 15.41.1); war with 
Praeneste ex senatus consulto populique iussu (22.4) 
381 3 elections for military tribunes (22.5, Diod. Sic. 15.48.1); Tusculan 
prisoners sent to Senate (25.5); peace treaty with and citizenship to 
Tusculans (26.8) 
380 4 elections for military tribunes (27.2, Diod. Sic. 15.50.1); censors elected, 
death of censor, religious flaw in second pair (27.4-6); Dictator with ME 
(28.3-4); statue of Jupiter Imperator dedicated on Capitol (29.8-9) 
379 2 elections for military tribunes (30.2, Diod. Sic. 15.51.1); colonists sent to 
Setia (30.9) 
378 4 elections for military tribunes (30.2, Diod. Sic. 15.57.1); censors elected 
(31.2); condiciones impositae patribus concerning debt (31.4); tax 
imposed to rebuild fortifications (32.1-2) 
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377* 2 elections for military tribunes (32.3, Diod. Sic. 15.61.1); tribunes of the 
plebs C. Licinius and L. Sextius elected (35.4) 
376 2 elections for military tribunes (Diod. Sic. 15.71.1); tribunes C. Licinius 
and L. Sextius veto elections until 370 (35.10) 
370 1 elections for military tribunes (36.3, Diod. Sic. 15.76.1) 
369 1 elections for military tribunes (36.6, Diod. Sic. 15.77.1) 
368 3 elections for military tribunes (38.2, Diod. Sic. 15.78.1); Dictator with ME 
resigns (38.4-9); Dictator with ME (39.3) 
367 6 law to appoint board of 10 to enact sacred laws (42.2); elections for 
military tribunes (42.3); Dictator with ME (42.4); triumph over Gauls 
(42.8); Licinian-Sextian rogations (42.9); Senate allows special ludi 
maximi (42.12) 
BOOK VII 
366 4 election of consuls (1.2-3, Diod. Sic. 15.82.1); election of praetor (1.3); 
election of aediles (1.3); election of censors (FC) 
365 2 election of consuls (1.7, Diod. Sic. 15.90.1); plague (1.7) 
364 3 election of consuls (2.1, Diod. Sic. 15.95.1); plague (2.1); lectisternium 
(2.2) 
363 3 election of consuls (3.3, Diod. Sic. 16.2.1); Dictator with ME for driving 
nail (3.4); election of censors (FC) 
362 5 election of consuls (4.1, Diod. Sic. 16.4.1); law for election of tribunes of 
the soldiers (5.9); fetial priests sent to Hernici (6.1); Dictator (6.12); 
iusitium indictum (6.12) 
361 5 election of consuls (9.1, Diod. Sic. 16.6.1); fetial priests sent to Tibur (9.2); 
Dictator with ME (9.3); triumph over Gauls (FT); triumph over Hernici 
(FT) 
360* 4 election of consuls (11.2, Diod. Sic. 16.9.1); Dictator with ME (11.4); 
triumph over Gauls and Tiburtines (11.9); ovation over Hernici (11.9) 
359 1 election of consuls (12.1, Diod. Sic. 16.15.1) 
358 7 election of consuls (12.6, Diod. Sic. 16.23.1); Dictator with ME (12.9); 
triumph over Hernici (12.9); triumph over Gauls (FT); Pomptine and 
Publilian tribes added (15.11); votive games, vowed by dictator M. Furius, 
held (15.11); first law against bribery (15.12) 
357 5 election of consuls (16.1, Diod. Sic, 16.28.1); law setting interest rates at 
1/12 per month (16.1); triumph over Privernates (16.6); law forbidding 
passing legislation away from Rome (16.7-8); prosecution of G. Licinius 
(16.9) 
356 3 election of consuls (17.1, Diod. Sic. 16.32.1); first plebeian Dictator with 
ME (17.6); triumph over Tusculans without Senatorial approval (17.9) 
355 2 interregnum (17.10-1); election of consuls (17.13, Diod. Sic. 16.37.1) 
354 3 election of consuls (18.10, Diod. Sic. 16.40.1); triumph over Tiburtines 
(19.2); ab senatu foedus in societatem given to Samnites (19.4) 
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353 5 election of consuls (19.6, Diod. Sic. 16.46.1); Dictator with ME (19.9-10), 
censuit senatus to fight the Etruscans and Volscians simultaneously (19.7); 
envoys from Caere rejected by Senate (20.3) and peace granted to Caere 
in senatus consultum (20.8); Temple of Apollo dedicated (20.9) 
352 4 interregnum (21.2); election of consuls (21.4, Diod. Sic. 16.52.1); board 
of 5 mensarii created to address debt (21.5); Dictator with ME appointed 
by senatus consultum (21.9) 
351 5 interregnum (22.2); election of consuls (22.3, Diod. Sic. 16.53.1); peace 
given to Faliscans and Tarquinians ab senato (22.5); election of censors 
(22.10); Dictator with ME (22.10-1) 
350 5 election of consuls (23.1, Diod. Sic. 16.56.1); provincia transferred to 
other consul extra ordinem (23.2); Senate enrolls army to guard Rome 
(23.4); triumph over Gauls (24.10); Dictator with ME for elections (24.11) 
349* 4 elections of consuls (24.11, Diod. Sic. 16.59.1); senatus iussit a levy 
(25.10); consul iussus ab senato to conduct war on the Campanian coast 
(26.10-1); Dictator with ME for elections (26.11-21) 
348 6 election of consuls (26.12-13, Diod. Sic. (from 347) 16.69.1); plague 
(27.1); board of 10 to consult Sibylline books by senatus imperatum 
(27.1); lectisternium (27.1); treaty renewed with Carthage (27.2); Dictator 
with ME for elections (FC) 
347 2 election of consuls (27.3, Diod. Sic. (from 346) 16.70.1); interest lowered 
to 1/24 per month (27.3-4) 
346 3 election of consuls (27.5, Diod. Sic. (from 345) 16.72.1); consul iussus to 
attack Volscians (27.5-6); triumph over Antiates, Volscians, and 
Satricians (27.8) 
345 4 election of consuls (28.1, Diod. Sic. (from 348) 16.66.1); Dictator with 
ME (28.2); iustitium (28.3); senatus iussit creation of board of 2 for 
building temple of Juno Moneta (28.5) 
344 3 election of consuls (28.6, Diod. Sic. 16.74.1); temple of Juno Moneta 
dedicated (28.6); senatus placuit the appointment of a Dictator with ME 
for religious expiation (28.7-8) 
343 8 interregnum (28.9); election of consuls (28.10, Diod. Sic. 16.77.1); 
Campanian envoys received by Senate and consul accepts deditio in fidem 
ex auctoritate senatus (30.1-31.2); envoys sent to Samnites (31.8) and 
fetial priests sent to Samnites (32.1); Senate approves and people vote on 
war with Samnites (32.1); Faliscans obtain treaty from Senate (38.1); both 
consuls celebrate triumph over Samnites (38.3); Campanians and 
Suessulani given winter garrison (38.4) 
342 5 election of consuls (38.8, Diod. Sic. 16.82.1, Dion. Hal. 15.3.1); Dictator 
with ME to deal with army mutiny (39.17); lex sacratae passed with 
military reforms (41.4); Genucian plebescites for interest and magisterial 
reform (42.1-2); Privernates destroy two Roman colonies (42.8)  




341 5 election of consuls (1.1, Diod. Sic. 16.84); envoys from destroyed colonies 
received in Senate (1.1); patres censuissent peace with Samnites (2.1); 
Senate rejects deditio in fidem from Sidicini (2.6); Samnite envoys return 
to Senate (2.9) 
340 9 interregnum (3.4-5); election of consuls (3.5, Diod. Sic. 16.89.1); Latin 
envoys received in Senate (5.1); Consensit senatus war against Latins 
(6.8); death of consul (9.9-12); land taken in Latium granted to plebs 
(11.13-4); tax imposed on Campanians (11.16); Dictator with ME to fight 
Antiates (12.2-3); triumph over Latins, Campanians, and Sidicini (FT) 
339 5 election of consuls (12.4, Diod. Sic. 16.91.1); triumph over Latins (12.9); 
triumph refused to delinquent consul patribus negantibus (12.10); senatus 
cupiens to terminate a consul's authority and commanded the naming of a 
Dictator with ME (12.13); Publilian laws on governmental reform passed 
(12.14-7) 
338 5 election of consuls (13.11, Diod. Sic. 17.2.1); both consuls celebrate 
triumph over Latins (13.9); differentiated peace treaties given to Latins 
(14.2-12); colonists sent to Velitrae (14.7); colonists sent to Antium (14.8) 
337* 5 election of consuls (15.1, Diod. Sic. (mistakenly placing a consul from 
336) 17.17.1); senatus iusserat consuls to defend Aurunci (15.3); infensus 
senatus iussit appointment of Dictator with ME (15.5-6); trial of Vestal 
Virgin (15.7-8); election of first plebeian praetor (15.9) 
336* 1 election of consuls (16.1, Diod. Sic. 17.29.1) 
335 3 election of consuls (16.4-5, Diod. Sic. 17.40.1); triumph over Cales ex 
senatus consulto(16.11); Dictator with ME for elections ex senatus 
consulto (16.12);  
334 4 election of consuls (16.12, Diod. Sic. 17.49.1); colonists sent to Cales 
(16.13); Dictator with ME created ex auctoritate senatus (17.3-4); plague 
(17.4) 
333 1 interregnum (17.4); first "dictator" year 
332 6 election of consuls (17.5, Diod. Sic. 17.62.1); Dictator with ME to fight 
Gauls (17.6); peace made with Alexander of Epirus (17.10); election of 
censors (17.11); Maecian and Scaptian tribes added (17.11); people of 
Acerrae given citizenship (17.12) 
331 3 election of consuls (18.1, Diod. Sic. 17.74.1); plague or poisoning at Rome 
(18.1-11); Dictator with ME for driving nail (18.13) 
330 5 election of consuls (19.1, Diod. Sic. 17.82.1); Volscian envoys received 
(19.1); envoys ab senato missi to Samnites (19.2-3); Samnite deditionem 
ab senato non acceptam (19.14); starting stalls installed at Circus 
Maximus (20.2) 
329 6 election of consuls (20.3); consuls iussi to depart immediately (20.3); 
senatus consultus on treatment of defeated Privernates (20.7-10); a 
triumph over Privernates (20.10, both consuls in FT); citizenship given to 
Privernum (21.10); colonists sent to Anxur (21.11) 
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328* 2 election of consuls (22.1, Diod. Sic. 17.87.1); colonists sent to Fregellae 
(22.1-2) 
327 6 election of consuls (22.8, Diod. Sic. 17.110.1); fetial priests sent to 
Palaeopolis (22.8); war declared on Palaeopolis ex auctoritate patrum 
(22.8); envoys sent to Samnites (23.3); consular prorogation of Q. 
Publilius Philo (23.11-2); Dictator with ME for holding elections (23.14-
6) 
326 6 election of consuls (23.17, Diod. Sic. 17.113.1); lectisternium (25.1); 
envoys sent to Samnites (25.2); triumph over Palaeopolis (26.7); treaty of 
friendship with Apulians and Lucanians (25.3); law against nexum (28.7-
9) 
325 4 election of consuls (29.2, Diod. Sic. 18.2.1); war ex auctoritate patrum on 
Vestini and Samnites (29.2-6); sick consul iussus to appoint Dictator with 
ME (29.9); prosecution of magister equitum (33.3-35.9) 
324 1 triumph over Samnites (37.1); second "dictator" year 
323 3 election of consuls (37.1, Diod. Sic. 18.26.1); dictator held elections iussu 
patrum (37.1); trial of Tusculans (37.8) 
322 4 election of consuls (38.1); Dictator with ME (38.1); Samnite envoys for 
peace refused (39.15); triumph over Samnites ex senato consulto(39.15, 
Livy claims a triumph for the dictator, but acknowledges an alternative 
tradition for two consular triumphs (40.1-5 and thusly in FT)) 
BOOK IX 
321 3 election of consuls (1.1); urban response to Caudine Peace, including a 
iustitium (7.6-10); Two successive dictators with ME for elections (7.13-
14) 
320* 7 interregnum (7.15); election of consuls (7.15, Diod. Sic. 18.44.1); consuls 
immediately take up office sic enim placuerat patribus (8.1); Caudine 
Peace trial (8.1-12.4); Dictator with ME for trial (dated in Livy to 314, 
FC); Dictator with ME against the Samnites (reported as alternative 
tradition in Livy 15.9-11); Dictator with ME possibly for elections (absent 
in Livy, FC)  
319 3 election of consuls (15.11, Diod. Sic. 18.58.1); triumph over Samnites 
(16.11); election of censors (FC) 
318 4 election of consuls (20.1, Diod. Sic. 19.2.1); Samnite envoys given two-
year truce (20.1); urban prefect sent to Capua (20.5); Ufentinan and 
Falernian tribes added (20.6) 
317 3 election of consuls (20.7, Diod. Sic. 19.17.1); treaty with Apulia (20.8); 
patroni give laws to Antium, permitted ab senatu(20.10) 
316 2 election of consuls (21.1, Diod. Sic. 19.55.1); Dictator with ME to fight 
Samnites (21.1-2) 
315 3 election of consuls (Diod. Sic. 19.66.1); Dictator with ME to fight 




314 5 election of consuls (24.1, Diod. Sic. 19.73.1); colonists sent to Luceria 
(26.5, Diod. Sic. 19.72.8); Dictator with ME for Campanian revolt (26.2, 
Diod. Sic. 19.76.1-5); trial of Dictator ab senatu mandata (26.20); triumph 
over Samnites (FT) 
313 4 election of consuls (28.2, Diod. Sic. 19.77.1); Dictator with ME against 
Samnites (28.2, Diod. Sic. 19.101.37 (with wrong name) or to drive nail 
28.6); colonists sent to Suessa and Pontiae (28.7); colonists sent to 
Interamna Sucasina by senatus consultum (28.8) 
312 6 election of consuls (28.8, Diod. Sic. 19.105.1); Dictator with ME 
appointed senatu auctore (29.3); election of censors and senatus lectio 
(29.5); Appian way and Aqua Appia built (29.6); gens Potitia removed 
from Ara Maxima ceremonies (29.9); triumph over Samnites and Sorans 
(FT) 
311 6 election of consuls (30.1, Diod. Sic. 20.3.1); consuls ignored censorial 
changes when enrolling Senate (30.2); law allowing tribunes of the 
soldiers to be elected (similar to law of 362) (30.3); appointment of two 
naval commanders (30.4); Senate requests return of flute players (30.5-
10); both consuls celebrate triumphs over Samnites (FT) 
310 7 election of consuls (33.1, Diod. Sic. 20.27.1); trial of Ap. Claudius (33.3-
34.26); Senate appoints and directs naval commander (38.2); Dictator with 
ME (38.9, not in FC); triumph over Samnites (40.15, listed for the next 
year in FT), triumph over Etruscans (40.20); Etruscan envoys sue for 
peace (40.20) 
309 0 third "dictator" year 
308 4 election of consuls (41.1, Diod. Sic. 20.37.1); envoys sent to consul to 
change provincia (41.12-3); Oriculum given treaty of friendship (41.20); 
prorogation of consulship (42.1-2) 
307 3 election of consuls (42.2, Diod. Sic. 20.45.1); Senate receives Hernician 
captives (42.9); election of censors (FC) 
306 8 election of consuls (42.10, Diod. Sic. 20.73.1); two armies enrolled by 
Senate (42.9); Samnite envoys sent to Senate to request peace (43.21); 
triumph over Anagnini and Hernici (43.22); election of censors (FC); 
censors begin construction of Temple of Salus and build roads (43.25); 
treaty renewed with Carthage (43.26); Dictator with ME for elections 
(44.1) 
305 4 election of consuls (44.2, Diod. Sic. 20.81); consul dies and is replaced 
(44.15); great statue of Hercules set up on Capitoline (44.16); triumph over 
Samnites (FT) 
304 8 election of consuls (45.1, Diod. Sic. 20.91.1); Samnite envoys given peace 
treaty (45.1-4); fetials sent to Aequi (45.6); both consuls celebrate 
triumphs over Aequi and Samnites (45.18); peace treaty with Marrucini, 
Marsi, Paeligni, and Frentani (45.18); civil laws and calendar published 





303 4 election of consuls (1.1, Diod. Sic. 20.102.1); colonists sent to Sora and 
Alba (1.1); citizenship extended to Arpinum and Trebula (1.3); Frusino 
penalized ex senatus consulto (1.3) 
302 9 election of consuls (1.7, Diod. Sic. 20.106.1); Dictator with ME to fight 
Aequi (1.8-9); triumph over Aequi (1.9); Temple of Salus dedicated (1.9); 
Dictator with ME to fight Etruscans (3.3-4, FC puts this in 301 with two 
ME); treaty with Vestini (3.1); iustitium (4.1); Dictator missus on 
campaign (4.3); Eruscan envoys arrive at Rome (5.12) 
301 1 fourth "dictator" year, triumph of dictator over Etruscans and Marsi (FT) 
300 4 election of consuls (5.13-4); renewal of treaty with Samnites (6.2); 
Ogulnian law allowing access to pontificate for plebeians (9.1-2); Valerian 
law of appeal (9.3) 
299 8 election of consuls (9.9); election of censors (9.14, FC for 300); Aniensian 
and Terentinan tribes added (9.14); election of aediles (9.10-3); treaty 
given to Picenum (10.12); death of consul with replacement (11.1-6); 
high-cost of grain (11.9); triumph over Samnites and Nequinates (FT) 
298 7 interregnum (11.10); election of consuls (11.10); Lucanian envoys receive 
alliance (11.11-12.1); fetials sent to Samnites (12.2); patres consuerunt 
war with Samnites (12.3); colonists sent to Carsoli (13.1); triumph over 
Samnites (13.1) 
297 2 election of consuls (13.13); trials over land ownership and use (13.14) 
296 6 election of consuls (15.12); both consulships from previous year extended 
(16.2); Senate initiated iustitium and conscription (21.3); command given 
to praetor (21.4); Senate begins day of thanksgiving and ends iustitium 
(21.6); colonists sent to Minturnae and Sinuessa (21.7-10) 
295 9 elections of consuls and praetor (22.9); consulship from previous year 
extended (22.9); senatus decrevit two days of prayer (23.1); tribunes place 
moneylenders on trial (23.11-2); aediles fine grazers (23.13); praetorship 
from previous year extended (25.11); death of consul (28.13); triumph 
over Gauls, Samnites, and Etruscans (30.8); adultery trials and fines (31.9) 
294 7 election of consuls (32.1); death of quaestor (32.9); Temple of Victory 
dedicated (33.9); Temple of Jupiter Stator vowed (36.11, 37.16); triumph 
over Etruscans and Samnites (FT, refused by Senate in Livy 36.19); 
Etruscans given 40-year peace treaty (37.4-5); triumph over Volsini and 
Samnites (FT, unauthorized by Senate in Livy 37.12) 
293 10 election of consuls (38.1, 39.1); four-day thanksgiving (45.1); allied 
envoys to Senate (45.4); fetials sent to Etruscans and Falerii (45.7); 
triumph over Samnites (46.2); dedicated Temple of Quirinus (46.7); 
triumph over Samnites and Etruscans (46.13); Temple of Fors Fortuna 
vowed (46.14); legate indicted by a tribune (46.16); election of censors 
(47.2) 
292 5 crowns for gallantry worn to games and palm branches given to winners 
(47.3); roads paved by aediles with fines (47.4); elections of consuls and 
praetor (47.5); plague (47.6); day of supplication held (47.7) 
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The five years of anarchy (375-371 BCE), where Livy does not attempt to retrieve or relate 
any information, should be removed from consideration.101 Further, evidence suggests that the so-
called “dictator years” of 333, 324, 309, and 301 should be removed from calculation, considering 
neither Livy nor Diodorus ever mention their existence, and they are included only from evidence 
in the FC.102 These mentions of anarchy and dictatorship are likely a very late addition to the 
annalistic tradition.103 If these years are omitted, the following table contains the notices per annum 
for Books VI through X: 
 
 









VI 18 58 3.22 
VII 25 101 4.04 
VIII 18 84 4.67 
IX 17 80 4.70 





The tables above show a slight increase in archival notices as the fourth century progresses. 
While the sparsity of data cannot amount to a level of statistical significance, nevertheless there 
are some visible developments. Book VII-IX experiences a nearly 30% increase in such notices 
over Book VI, or about one to one and a half per year. Even more significant, and following the 
                                                 
101 Livy VI.35.10. 
102 Drummond (1978), 551-2. Both these and the anarchy are removed from every scholarly reconstruction of the 
period since Beloch. See Chapter 2 for further discussion. 
103 Drummond (1978), 570-2. 
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consensus of the scholars listed above, Book X indicates an even greater jump in archival 
underpinning, almost doubling the notices for Book VI and increasing them by almost 50% for 
Books VII-IX. This suggests a trajectory of increasing state records as the fourth century 
progresses, with visible jumps beginning in Book VII and Book X. This data supports the 
suggestion that archival habits are changing at Rome in this time, and the governmental reforms 
of 367 are a strong candidate to spur this development: Rome is becoming more inclusive and this 
fact would have created a greater diversity of desire for the publication of state records, which I 
argue is reflected in the uptick of state records throughout the century. When set against the 
scholarly debate outlined above, this data appears to support those arguing a cautiously optimistic 
stance regarding fourth century material, such as Frier and Oakley. There does appear to be some 
documentation in the period prior to 367—although nothing on the scale that Cornell would like 
to see—and this trend increases as the century progresses.  The overly conservative 
reconstructions, which place the advent of state records at the end of the century, or even into the 
next, should therefore be reevaluated.  
From a preliminary survey of Table 1, there are several aspects that recommend the utility 
of this process in the study of long-term, archival in at Rome. First, it allows for the variability of 
historical significance from year to year. Some years are rife with action that would be recorded 
in archives, such as the first year after the Licinian-Sextian reorganization of the government in 
367 or the year following the Caudine Peace in 320. By looking for change over the course of an 
entire Book, and then from Book to Book, no specific years are given undue weight and the general 
trend of the availability of Livy’s sources can be observed. Additionally, this arrangement also 
provides flexibility for the way yearly events are recorded in Livy. Often events are presented in 
continuous account over a span of multiple years, suggesting that Livy sometimes prioritized the 
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narrative over strict annalistic divisions. Whether or not Livy felt beholden to record events within 
their proper year (or if he even found them thusly in his sources), will not affect the results of this 
study and all notices will be accurately accumulated within their Book. Thus, for example, it does 
not matter when Livy has anticipated the election of the censors of 301 by one year (which the FC 
record in 300). 
Second, this methodology accounts for the possibility that Livy and his sources have 
intentionally withheld information, either because it conflicted with other sources or the flow of 
the narrative that they wished to relate. Therefore, the data is not discouraged by any single missing 
piece of evidence, such as not treating the death of P. Decius Mus as a pontiff, which would reject 
the presence of pontifical records before 295 BCE (see discussion of Rüpke above, p. 24).  
Additionally, the fact that Livy does not relate the names of the consuls for 315 BCE can be read 
as a stylistic decision at the expense of (perceived) superfluous information. By not relying on the 
existence of specific information to confirm or deny our assumptions, but rather accumulating the 
general archival underpinning of the narrative, it becomes possible to recognize changing habits 
and practices after the mid-fourth century compromise. 
Third, the general trend of political and social development that is present here, when 
stripped of those areas most susceptible to later interpolation, is remarkably coherent. With regards 
to their access to government positions, after achieving the consulship in 366, plebeians attain the 
curule aedilship in 365, the dictatorship in 356, the censorship in 351, the praetorship in 337, and 
finally the pontificate in 300. Debt legislation gradually becomes more forgiving as well: the 
problem of debt is first addressed in 378, interest is lowered to 1/12 per month in 357, to 1/24 in 
347, lending at interest is forbidden in 342, and nexum is outlawed in 326. The coherence of this 
narrative is also reflected by the increasing authority of the Senate, the increasing ambit of their 
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control, and the ever-expanding alliances and colonial endeavors in which the city engages (see 
discussion in Chapter 5). When ignoring foreign affairs, and looking only at domestic reports, the 
plagues of 384, 365, 348, 331, and 292 are all met with significantly decreased activity. The 
plagues of 365 and 348, in particular, are followed by multiple years of relatively few archival 
notices, which may reflect a city grappling with a health crisis. Therefore, when all literary 
“superstructure” is peeled away, the coherence of the development of the city, gradually expanding 
and incorporating diverse interests into its highest offices, instills increased confidence that reliable 
records of state business actually do provide the foundation for these narratives. This evaluation 
of the nature of the remaining evidence will be expanded in the following chapters. 
 
The Tradition Culminating in Diodorus Siculus 
 
 To decide whether the annalistic notices recorded by Diodorus Siculus are worthwhile to 
consider in this discussion, we must identify the route by which this information arrived in his text. 
If he was relying the same chronological source or sources as Livy, which would make their 
accounts closely based on the same magistrate list, then it is a futile endeavor to set his text as a 
foil. Thus, the very close similarities between the Livy’s account and the Fasti Capitolini render 
any independent discussion of these texts a redundant exercise. For this reason, Table 1 only 
records the contents of the FC when Livy has made an omission which has survived 
epigraphically.104 The study of source texts for Diodorus Siculus have been extensively conducted 
for almost 200 years, and, unfortunately, no firm consensus has yet been reached. 
                                                 
104 There are some significant changes, however, such as the delineation of “dictator years,” which will be discussed 
at greater length in the following chapter. 
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 While the direct sources of Livy are often referenced and easily traced,105 Diodorus’ 
Roman content is very dubiously sourced. Mommsen set a very early and enduring thesis 
concerning this issue: Diodorus would have relied upon sources in Greek for his composition, as 
the Roman material was only incidental to his larger Greek narrative, and therefore would have 
utilized the first Roman historians, Fabius Pictor or Cincius Alimentus, both of whom wrote in his 
native tongue.106 This hypothesis gives great authority to the tradition of Diodorus, as he putatively 
based his material on the oldest possible sources (accepting that historians of the first century felt 
no impulse or necessity to consult actual primary sources107), and thus his tradition was elevated 
above Livy’s. While E. Meyer similarly identified a very early source, he could not provide any 
specific candidate.108 
 This contention is thoroughly rebuffed by Beloch, who mobilizes the few remaining 
fragments of Fabius Pictor to demonstrate that Diodorus’ chronology is not related. Fabius counts 
22 years from the Roman defeat at Allia,109 and Diodorus lists only 20 colleges; furthermore, he 
doubts that Fabius Pictor contained a complete list of magistrates, as this was not a feature of early 
historical writing.110 Beloch sets Diodorus’ source very late, arguing that names of Samnite 
commanders and battle descriptions are retrojections from the Social War, ultimately settling on 
the Sullan era historian, Claudius Quadrigarius.111 These are compellingly argued points, but there 
                                                 
105 Ogilvie (1965), 5-17. 
106 Mommsen (1878), 305-30, esp. 315-9. 
107 Richardson (2011), 104. 
108 Meyer (1882), 610-7. 
109 Gell. V.4.1-3=F31 in Cornell, ed. (2013), 102-3. It could also be added that Pictor’s date for the foundation of the 
city is ol. 8, 1 (748/7 BCE) (Dion Hal. I.74.1=F5), while Diodorus places it in ol. 7, 2 (751/0 BCE) (Diod. Sic. 
VII.5.1). 
110 Beloch (1926), 125. 
111 Beloch (1926), 127-32. 
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still remains no definitive evidence even for the language, let alone the era, of Diodorus’ sources,112 
and recent scholarship has not advanced this front.113  
 Although this dimension of the scholarship has encountered a seeming dead-end, 
significant progress has been made concerning the nature of the sources consulted. It has long been 
understood that Diodorus utilized two separate sources for his Roman material, one for his 
annalistic notices of eponymous magistrates and another for the sporadic, extended historical 
narratives. There are a several points that advocate for this argument: cognomina are regularly 
used in the annalistic passages, but never in the historical narratives and the compression of many 
multi-year events, such as the Gallic catastrophe and the siege of Veii, into a single year.114 Most 
strongly indicative is the occasional presence in Diodorus’ text of the dictator years. He never 
mentions years without chief magistrates in his list of consuls, much like Livy, but in his 
calculations of the passage of time, they are included. In 318 BCE, Diodorus claims that Rome 
was in its ninth year of the war with the Samnites, which began in 326. He thus must include the 
dictator year of 324 in his calculation.115 Similarly, he notes the signing of the peace treaty after 
22 years of fighting in 304, counting also the dictator year of 309.116 Drummond argues that the 
dictator years were not inserted into the tradition until Atticus’ liber annalis of 47 BCE, thus 
serving as another data point for a later source.117 Diodorus’ chronological listing of the consuls, 
however, like Livy’s, skips these years without mention of this constitutional abnormality. This 
                                                 
112 Klotz (1937), 222-4 similarly attacks the thesis of an early sourcing and settles on a later chronographer. 
113 Ridley (1980), 297. 
114 Perl (1957), 13-8. The issue of cognomina is important to our understanding of early archival records and will be 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 2. 
115 Diod. Sic. XIX.10.1. 
116 Diod. Sic. XX.101.5. 
117 Drummond (1978). 562-3, who ultimately concludes that these changes to the tradition were motivated by 
Caesar’s attempts to provide justification for his unconstitutional use of the dictatorship (569-572). Taylor (1951), 
77, however, sees the advent of this chronological change back even further at the time of Augustus.  
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dissonance between these two aspects of Diodorus’ work strongly suggests that there were two 
separate accounts from which he was working; this is currently the consensus scholarly opinion.118 
 The important question still remains, however, as to how close Diodorus’ source was to 
Livy’s and how independently we can view the authority of their respective magistrate lists. 
Unfortunately, Livy provides no calculations from which we could glean whether he, like 
Diodorus, included dictator years. It is highly doubtful, however, that Livy would pass by such a 
moment of constitutional extreme without mention. In fact, it is hard to believe that Piso, a 
potential source for his list of magistrates and an author who was very attentive to the fasti, would 
have also ignored these events.119 Thus, Drummond’s later dating of the advent of the dictator 
years, after Livy’s but before Diodorus’ sources, provides some grounds for daylight, however 
narrow, between the two accounts.   
Despite these obvious differences, some scholars have observed that certain episodes do 
share very similar qualities, such that they must share a source. Georg Sigwart has drawn attention 
to the similarities in the depiction of Cn. Flavius and Ap. Claudius Caecus,120 claiming that they 
must have stemmed from the same account,121 and Alfred Klotz points out a similar occurrence 
concerning an episode in 315 BCE during the Samnite wars.122 While these arguments do contain 
merit, it is not at all clear that Diodorus used only one source for his historic narrative, or that the 
source of his magistrates names ever provided other information. Indeed, at various points, 
Diodorus specifically relates that he is consulting more than one source: ὧν φασί τινες τῶν 
συγγραφέων (XI.53.6), ὡς δέ τινες (XIV.112.4), λέγουσι δέ τινες (XIV.116.9), and ἔνιοι δέ φασιν 
                                                 
118 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 106. 
119 Livy IX.44.3-4 for Livy’s surprise that Piso had omitted magistrates, even aediles, for the years 307 and 306. 
120 Livy IX.46.10-15; Diod. Sic. XX.36.1-6. 
121 Sigwart (1906), 373-5.  
122 Klotz (1938), 83-102 compares Livy IX.23.5 with Diod. Sic. XIX.72.6-9. 
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(XIV. 117.6).123 Furthermore, there are moments of departure or omission when compared to the 
text of Livy. He omits Canusium from the peace treaty in 318, neglects the victory at Luceria in 
314, but notes the subsequent colony foundation, and omits Atina from the conquests of 313.124 
While these might be simple abbreviations to narratives that are tangential to his main focus of 
Greek events, it is far from clear that Livy and Diodorus relied upon the same material. 
This is especially true when it comes to the source for the chronological list of magistrates. 
For the earlier period, half of the cognomina provided by Diodorus conflict with those in Livy, 
and although it is highly unlikely that such information was kept in the earliest records, this 
nevertheless points to different traditions of reconstruction.125 For period immediately preceding 
the compromise of 367 BCE, more relevant to the present discussion, Livy and Diodorus offer 
wildly differing numbers and names of the military tribunes with consular power, with the former 
providing standard colleges of six, and the latter often much fewer. The following table explains 
the relative sizes of the colleges in the period from 390 BCE – 367 BCE: 
 




389 6 8 - 
388 6 6 - 
387 5 6 - 
386 6 4 - 
385 5 4 - 
384 6 4 - 
383 6 4 - 
382 6 4 - 
381 6 6 - 
                                                 
123 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 107. 
124 318: Livy IX.20.4, Diod. Sic. XIX.10.1; 314: Livy IX.26.2, Diod. Sic. XIX.72.8; 313: Livy IX.28.3-6, Diod. Sic. 
XIX.101.3; These are discussed in Klotz (1937), 211-2. 
125 Cichorius (1887), 187-9. 
126 This list follows Beloch (1926), 254-5; Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 368. 
49 
 
380 6 8 9 
379 6 8 - 
378 6 4 - 
377 6 6 - 
376 - 4 - 
anarchy - - - 
370 6 4 6 
369 6 5 6 
368 6 3 6 
367 6 - 6 
 
 
Mommsen, who saw the chronology of Diodorus to be of superior merit to that of Livy, attempted 
to rationalize this occurrence by arguing that the lists from which Livy was drawing were rife with 
standardizing interpolations and additions; Diodorus’ lower count was in fact correct.127 This 
position is hard to support when comparing the standardization of Livy’s text, except for the names 
that drop out in 387 and 385, and the irregularity of Diodorus’ list: one would expect such rampant 
interpolation to leave more confusion, unless done at an incredibly early date.128 Considering Livy 
is not averse to reporting inconsistencies as he finds them in his sources, this seems an unlikely 
solution. After this period, Livy and Diodorus both consistently switch to naming two consuls per 
year. 
 When coupled with the issue of divergences in the magistrate names, this trend becomes 
much more apparent. The following list summarizes all inconsistencies between Livy’s second 
pentad and Diodorus’ account for the corresponding years. These conflicting records, shown in 





                                                 
127 Mommsen, vol. 2  (1864), 224-36. 
128 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 369. 
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387: Livy (VI. 5.7) L. Lucius Papirius  Diod. Sic. (15.24.1)  Λεύκιος Παπίριος  
   Cn. Sergius       Γάιος Σερουίλιος 
   L. Aemilius       Λεύκιος Κοΐνκτιος 
   Licinius Menenius      Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος 
 Lucius Valerius      Λεύκιος Οὐαλέριος  
Αὖλος Μάλλιος 
 
385: Livy (VI.11.1):  A. Manlius   Diod. Sic. (15.28.1) Λεύκιος Παπίριος  
   P. Cornelius       Μάρκος Πόπλιος 
   T. Quinctius       Τίτος Κορνήλιος 
   L. Quinctius       Κόιντος Λεύκιος 
   L. Papirius 
    
384: Livy (VI. 18.1) S. Cornelius   Diod. Sic. (15.36.1) Σερούιος Σουλπίκιος 
   P. Valerius       Λεύκιος Παπίριος 
   M. Furius       Τίτος Κοΐνκτιος 
   S. Sulpicius      (Fourth not given) 
   G. Papirius 
   T. Quinctius 
 
377: Livy (VI.23.3) L. Aemilius   Diod. Sic. (15.61.1)  Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος  
   P. Valerius       Γάιος Οὐεργίνιος 
   C. Veturius       Σερούιος Σουλπίκιος 
   S. Sulpicius       Λεύκιος Κοΐντιος 
   L. Quinctius       Γάιος Κορνήλιο 
   G. Quinctius       Γάιος Οὐαλέριος 
         
349: Livy (VII.24.11) L. Furius Camillus  Diod. Sic. (16.59.1) Μάρκος Αἰμίλιος  
   Ap. Claudius Crassus     Τίτος Κοΐνκτιος 
 
337: Livy (VII.24.11) C. Sulpicius Longus  Diod. Sic. (17.17.1) Γάιος Σουλπίκιος  
   P. Aelius Paetus      Λεύκιος Παπίριος 
 
336: Livy (VIII.16.1) L. Papirius Crassus  Diod. Sic. (17.29.1) Λεύκιος Παπίριος  
   K. Duillius       Καίσων Οὐαλλέριος  
 
328: Livy (VIII.22.1) P. Cornelius Scapula  Diod. Sic. (17.87.1) Πόπλιος Κορνήλιος  
   P. Plautius Proculus      Αὖλος Ποστούμιος 
 
320: Livy (VII.11.2) L. Papirius Cursor  Diod. Sic. (18.44.1)  Κόιντος Πόπλιος 
   Q. Publilius Philo      Κόιντος Ποπίλλιος 
 
Significant divergences occur in the period before the inclusion of the plebs into the highest 
magisterial office in 367 BCE. While other inconsistencies occur in the later list, these may be 
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understood as the result of carelessness on the part of Diodorus or his source and will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 2. Other issues also arise, such as a particular aversion to naming the 
Poetelii, which is universally changed to the (unhelpful) praenomen Πόπλιος (in 360, 346, 326, 
and 314). Nevertheless, the magnitude of inconsistencies appears to be a significantly reduced 
after the system of two consuls is (re)established.  
For Diodorus to be considered a valid point of comparison, these differences would have 
to be the result of threads of tradition, one culminating in Livy’s text and another in the text of 
Diodorus, that share a common source, at the latest, before the period of greatest annalistic 
embellishment in the first century BCE. Livy obviously utilized sources from a later period than 
this. It cannot be stated with certainty, however, that Diodorus did the same with his annalistic 
notices. Although there are scholars that would like to disregard any difference between these 
authors,129 there are nevertheless many indications that different sources were used, which allows 
us to tentatively place the magistrate records of Diodorus as a foil for those of Livy. 
The sudden increase in the consistency between these two sources of eponymous officials 
is therefore significant. What was a diffuse listing becomes closely harmonized, and while the fact 
that Diodorus only had to deal with two magistrates a year might have reduced the margin of error 
significantly, he still records the proper names in their proper order. Other inconsistencies or 
ambiguities, in both Livy’s and Dionysius’ lists, are minor and do not seriously threaten their 
reliability; these will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. For now, it is sufficient to observe 
that Diodorus likely culminates a divergent tradition for this information that is not closely related 
                                                 
129 Drummond (1978c), 87-94 argues that the order of presentation of consuls’ names in both texts is identical, and 
they are therefore products of a single source. This had been preemptively disproven by Giovanni Costa in 1910, 
who observed different listing orders of names in numerous years. Costa attributes this to differences in the way 




to Livy and therefore provides further reinforcement for the notion of a marked increase in the 
quality of archival sources for the second half of the fourth century BCE. 
 
The Form of History: Roman Encounters with Chronological Models 
 
 If the interpolation and reconstitution of archival records from fourth century Rome is to 
have any heuristic value, then it must be argued that chronological records of this sort were a likely 
medium of commemoration. If the notion of events, organized in chronological fashion and 
maintained for future reference, was not a common occurrence at this time, then this would be, ab 
initio, a fruitless endeavor. However, the XII Tables demonstrates a city legally advanced to the 
point of requiring a communal standard for the passage of time, and chronological lists, such as of 
yearly magistrates, would have served this purpose. Such calculation would have been necessary 
to determine, for instance, interest rates, rent dues, years of military service, or to measure the 
fulfillment of legal statutes or votes.130 Thus, a system to provide this function must have been 
present early in the Republic, and a list of eponymous magistrates, either recorded on tablets by 
the pontiffs or published for common use, is the most likely candidate.  
Romans looking to organize their legal and political life around a common chronological 
framework had ample example from the Greeks, who had been recording events in this style at 
least since the fifth century, and possibly much earlier. As Rome comes into increasing contact 
with the Greek world throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, they would have encountered 
record keeping styles of this type, and plausibly adapted them to the needs of their own state. 
Hippias of Elis, active at the end of the fifth century, tried to create a universal chronology using 
                                                 
130 De Sanctis (1907), 2. 
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the common cultural phenomenon of the Olympics and the list of victors in his historical works. 
The earliest extant inscription of the Athenian list of archons survives from the same period as 
Hippias, and Simon Hornblower sees a plausible connection between Hippias’ chronological work 
and the impulse to document the city’s own past.131 Although in the fifth century it was not used 
by Herodotus or Thucydides (Herodotus gives only one archon date, for the battle Salamis,132 and 
Thucydides states clearly his aversion to such dating systems133), it was fully compiled in the works 
of Demetrius of Phalerum at the beginning of the third century134 and utilized in historical works 
by the middle of the fourth century, as attested by its presence in the Athenaiôn Politeia.135 
Numerous other local dating systems based on lists of names have been attested throughout 
the Greek world. Thucydides dates the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War by using the name of 
the Ephor at Sparta (presumably because a list of kings would have lacked any regularity and 
precision) and the priestess of Hera at Argos,136 although the list of Ephors is notoriously fraught 
even in antiquity.137 Fragmentary lists of archons are known from Delos, of stephanophoroi from 
Miletus, Priene and Heraclea, and of other eponyms from Boeotia, Achaea, Delphi, Aetolia, and 
Thessaly.138 Greek historians, often confronting the daunting task of synchronizing the various 
dating systems across the Greek world, followed Hippias’ example and compiled lists of victors. 
Aristotle and Kallisthenes gave chronological lists from the Pythian games, and, closer to Rome, 
Timaeus of Tauromenion is thought to have gone through great pains to synchronize various 
chronologies together, to the ridicule of Polybius.139 
                                                 
131 Hornblower (1994), 23-4. Samuel (1972), 195. 
132 Herod. VIII.51.1 
133 Thuc. V.20.2 
134 Plut. Diog. Laert. 1.22 
135 Samuel (1972), 195. 
136 Thuc. II.2. 
137 See discussion in Plut. Lyc. 7 and Samuel (1972), 238. 
138  Clarke (2008), 20. 
139 Huxley (2008), 6. Polyb. 12.11.1. 
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It is clear that when the Romans needed a model for marking the passage of time in their 
city, they could observe numerous examples throughout the Greek world. Krister Hanell has 
argued that the magistrate list at Rome resembles the lists of the Spartan ephors, Athenian archons, 
Delphic archons, and the Milesian stephanophoroi in functioning as a means of keeping time in 
their respective polities.140 While this might explain the appearance of consuls and dictators in the 
above lists, Roman archives of the fourth century contained much more information, and this too 
is not without comparanda in the Greek world. Dating from the middle of the third century, the 
Marmor Parium, a stele found on Paros, contains an extensive list of historical events from the 
wider Greek world and synced by the Athenian archon list.141 Although this document is later than 
the period under current study, it does give some insight into the potential applications that such 
magistrate lists provide, namely that they can anchor disparate events together and facilitate the 
construction of historical documents. The Fasti Consulares, in a similar fashion, could have 
provided the basis by which all other historical information at Rome found a common chronology. 
This line of argumentation is open to criticism on the common and erroneous assumption 
that the Roman state needed Greek models in order to achieve political or cultural advancement. 
This is a legitimate a priori assumption to resist. However, the close ties between the early Roman 
historical works, written in Greek and in an annalistic style hewing closely to the chronographic 
style of the Greeks - even including the historic poetry of Ennius and Naevius142 - speaks to a close 
thematic and structural connection. At the very least, it is reassuring to note that societies in a 
                                                 
140 Hanell (1946), 71-8. Although in 89-94, he takes it a questionable step further and asserts that the Roman lists 
can also be tied to dating systems in the Mesopotamian world, such as the Sumerian King List, and the Lemmu List 
from Assyria. Hanell’s main thesis is that the system of eponymous dating began in 509 with the single praetor 
maximus, who served under the king, thus decoupling this date from the fate of the monarchy, which he argues 
ended in 451. There followed a transitional period with varying number of magistrates (consules or tribuni militum), 
which ended in 367 with the election of two consuls, who became the final eponymous magistrates. In other words, 
each period is characterized by the number of eponymous magistrates in office. 
141 Rotstein (2014), 5-6. 
142 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 22.  
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similar stage of their political maturation process have constructed very similar methods of 
determining the passage of time and marking important events. 
Now that the quantitative data supporting archival change has been demonstrated, we now 
must assess the qualitative merit of the collected notices. The next chapter confronts the content 
of these potential archives and addresses problems of internal consistency and implausibility of 










The Fasti of the Fourth Century: Increasing Frequency but Minimal Content 
 
 
The case for increased archival underpinning beginning in the middle of the fourth century 
must now turn to the content of the notices collected in the previous chapter. There is a 
demonstrable increase in the quantity of annalistic notices over Livy’s second pentad, but this 
would mean little if they also displayed slight internal consistency or correspondence with other 
fourth century records or developments. It is the goal of the present chapter to demonstrate that 
sources for the latter half of the fourth century BCE indeed present a credible and coherent picture 
of a polity undergoing intense socio-political upheaval and that resultant and emergent archival 
practices form the basis of later annalistic histories. 
While the narrative of socio-economic tension as elaborated in Livy’s Books VII-X (see 
discussion in Chapter 4), might seem tempting in its broad strokes, it nevertheless presents 
significant problems in its details. There is a confused jumble of extra magistrates, both dictators 
and interreges, appointed in the latter half of the fourth century without a clear tradition of their 
mandates. Many of these dictators (and all interreges) seem to be intended to stabilize elections 
for the following year or even to guarantee favorable outcomes. In many cases, Livy unfortunately 
seems aware of multiple, conflicting accounts for the assignment of consular provincia and 
dictatorial appointment, and the Fasti Capitolini (FC) and the Fasti Triumphales (FT) provide yet 
another, sometimes contradictory, testament to their duties.  There are a series of seeming legal 
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improbabilities: the election of all-patrician colleges of consuls even after such practice was 
forbidden in the compromise of 367, the passing of repeat laws, and so-called “dictator years” 
without any eponymous magistrate. Looming over all is the constant suspicion that social or 
economic turbulence, such as tribunician agitation and patrician ruthlessness, are in fact later 
occurrences, bleeding backwards into the narratives of earlier periods. 
It is no surprise, then, that numerous scholars have expressed serious concerns with the 
progression of material from the period covered in Books VII-X, such that skepticism is the 
dominant scholarly view today. The problem with this position, however, is that it expects too 
much from the archival sources of the fourth century, either in the material that it originally 
recorded or in its ability to survive intact for over a hundred years until Roman annalists of the 
second century copied it into new media. I argue that these records likely comprised nothing more 
than bare lists of magistrates, laws, religious observances, and (increasingly during this period) 
actions of the Senate, without the sorts of explanation or supplementary information that is needed 
to complete a full historical account.  
What probably remained for later consultation was a sequence of data points that left much 
to individual historians to connect and build into a seamless narrative; family records, didacticisms, 
and rhetorical flourish undoubtedly played a role in this process. The constitutional and social 
changes of the fourth century energized the impetus for the creation of these data points, such that 
later authors were increasingly constrained in their ability to extrapolate creatively. Despite this 
increase in frequency, survival was not perfect, and some archival records were lost, either due to 
physical corruption, copyist error, or purposeful omission.143 Simply because the lists do not record 
as comprehensively as we would expect, or some of the data points might not have survived, 
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however important to our reckoning they would be, does not mean that such archives did not exist 
or were later inventions.  
In order to demonstrate this growth of archival habit in the fourth century, we must now 
distill the record down to the putative content of the ancient fasti, pontifical tables, and (in Chapter 
5) Senate records. In the following discussion, I will show that this archival material presents a 
coherent and plausible accounting of this period, and that apparent inconsistencies or 
improbabilities must be reevaluated in the context of the early-mid Republic, which was less 
rigidly formalized and effected than its better documented, later version. This discussion will also 
seek to lower modern expectations for the contents of these archival records, demonstrating that 
they likely were little more than unembellished lists, and that apparent incongruities resulted from 
later attempts to integrate this framework into an historical narrative. 
 
List of Eponymous Magistrates 
 
 Stephen Oakley states unequivocally that, “Nothing induces more optimism in the study of 
Roman History from 366 to 293 BC than inspection of our sources for the names of the consuls.”144 
Only the harshest critics of the tradition of the fourth century contest that the list of eponymous 
magistrates in this period, reconstituted from the text of Livy and Diodorus Siculus, as well as the 
Fasti Capitolini, is not grounded largely in accurate and contemporary sources. Although some 
scholars contend that the entire tradition is the product of fanciful, theatrical, and/or intentional 
falsification,145 the widespread agreement between these sources should instill confidence in any 
historical reconstruction of the period. This list is not perfect, however, and legitimate questions 
                                                 
144 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 39. 
145 Such as Wiseman (1979), 13-6. 
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can be raised concerning the specifics of the names, gaps or “dictator years,” and consonance with 
the reported legislative action that was taken in the fourth century. This following discussion will 
propose reasons to maintain confidence in the eponymous list, areas that still induce skepticism, 
and potential solutions to the inconsistencies between the list and other archival material recorded 
in the historical tradition.  
 Even Beloch, who is so skeptical about all other features of the historical record for this 
period, admits to the reliability of this list. This is a significant admission, as Beloch spearheaded 
the heavily conservative approach to the fasti which survives in large part today. Although he 
admits to significant interpolations and corruption in the list for the earliest periods of the Republic, 
stemming from his firm belief that the presence of all plebeian names indicates material 
weaknesses in the record,146 Beloch nevertheless concedes the general reliability of the list after 
the compromise of 367 BCE. He finds only two colleges of magistrates to be suspicious: those that 
Livy acknowledges had been omitted by Piso in the years 307 and 306 BCE.147 Beloch believes 
that Piso was fastidious when recording the yearly magistrates and finds it suspicious that the same 
pairs of officials hold office again in 296 (for Ap. Claudius and L. Voluminius, cos. 307) and 288 
(Q. Marcius and P. Cornelius, cos. 306). He would like to omit these years altogether but cannot 
find good evidence to also discredit the censorship recorded for 307, and ultimately accepts these 
years intact. He states, “Otherwise, there is no objection to any consulships from the period 363-
302, and the same goes for the first two decades of the third century.”148 This is a major concession 
from Beloch, who finds almost nothing else about this century to be reliable. 
                                                 
146 Beloch (1926), 9-32. 
147 Livy IX.44.3-4. 
148 Beloch (1926), 34: “Sonst ist gegen kein Consulat aus der Zeit von 391-452 etwas einzuwenden, und dasselbe 
gilt für die beiden ersten Jahrzehnte des III. Jahrhunderts.” 
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 In fact, there appears to be very little controversy over these names as recorded by Livy 
and as they appear in the FC and related fasti. The most significant occurs in 354 BCE, when Livy 
records the consuls M. Fabius Ambustus and T. Quinctius but notes that certain annalists include 
M. Popilius in place of the latter.149 In 323, he also notes a variant tradition that substitutes Q. 
Aemilius with an Aulius,150 and in 319 a tradition which replaces Q. Aulius with L. Papirius 
Mugillanus.151 The rest of the inconsistencies concern only cognomina, which were unlikely to be 
recorded in the original list (see below, p. 75), and praenomina. Neither of these problems are very 
concerning, as they are easily explained as simple copyist errors and, therefore, should not 
compromise our confidence in the list presented in Livy.152 On the contrary, the fact that Livy feels 
the need to mention such instances, and that they are so few, should speak to the general unanimity 
of the remaining list. 
 The “dictator years” provide another source of consternation concerning the putative 
magistrate list from this period. Livy simply elides over the years of 333, 324, 309, and 301 as if 
he was not aware of their existence. Instead, he describes the events of each year as if it were in 
the previous and moves to the election of the consuls in the next. Further, Diodorus does not 
include magistrates for these years either, and it is likely that Piso omitted them as well, since Livy 
closely follows his reckoning. The dictator years are included, however, in the FC for 309 and 301 
with the statement [hoc an]no dictat(or) mag(ister) eq(uitum) sine co(n)s(ulibus) fuerunt, but the 
list does not survive for 333 and 324. The Fasti Triumphales, additionally, includes notices of 
triumphs in 324 and 309. Because Livy otherwise closely adheres to the FC and is generally not 
                                                 
149 Livy VII.28.10. Broughton (1951), 124. Oakley, vol. 2 (1995-2007), 195. 
150 Livy VIII.37.3. Broughton (1951), 149. 
151 Livy IX.15.11. Broughton (1951), 155. 
152 These instances include 351: Livy VII.22.3 (which Livy acknowledges variations in the praenomen if Quinctius) 




averse to listing inconsistencies in his sources, it is assumed that the interpolation of these years 
becomes part of the tradition between his writing and the installation of these Fasti.153 Beloch 
suspected that these years were inserted to provide enough time to backdate the Capitoline temple 
to 509 BCE, and he therefore omits them in his calculations.154 His suggestion could be used to 
support De Sanctis’ view above (p. 57) that there would have been names dropped out of the list 
for various reasons. In any case, either these years were very late extensions of the chronology or 
there was not a strong tendency to invent magistracies, as these would have been quickly filled. 
While one should hesitate to call any potential governmental occurrence, ancient or modern, a 
“constitutional absurdity” or “impossibility” (which is how these years are often characterized in 
modern scholarship),155 Livy’s and Diodorus’ combined ignorance suggest that these are late, 
synchronizing interpolations. Most importantly, the integrity of the fourth century narrative is not 
harmed by their deletion. 
 There are two further reasons for such assurance in the notices of eponymous magistrates 
after the compromise of 367 BCE: the correspondence between the Livian list (and the fasti) and 
Diodorus’ list, and between the changing legal limitations on holding the highest office and 
subsequent pattern of names recorded. We must now turn to analyze the merits of each of these 




                                                 
153 Drummond (1978), 551-2, who ultimately concludes that these changes to the tradition were motivated by Julius 
Caesar’s attempts to provide justification for his unconstitutional use of the dictatorship (569-572). Taylor (1951), 
77, however, pushes the advent of this chronological change forward even further to the time of Augustus. 
154 Beloch (1926), 35-7. 
155 Beloch (1926), 44. Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 43. Pinsent (1975), 5. 
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The magistrate list of Diodorus Siculus 
  We have already analyzed the potential annalistic and historical sources of Diodorus’ 
Roman material (see Chapter 1), concluding that, although no specific authors can be named, there 
are sufficient structural differences from Livy’s account for the early Republic to postulate a 
different tradition. In particular, Livy seems to be following the chronological listing of magistrates 
contained in Piso, as he seems surprised that Piso has omitted the years 307 and 306 BCE from his 
account.156 Diodorus, however, continues to name the consuls of these years without interruption, 
removing Piso as a potential point of overlap.157 Furthermore, the incongruities between the 
numbers and names in the final 18 colleges of the consular tribunes (see Table 3), speak to 
divergent threads of the fasti. From 389 to 367, Diodorus and Livy agree on the number of 
magistrates only three times and significantly disagree on the names of office holders for four 
colleges. This divergence ends abruptly, however, in 366 with the (re)introduction of the dual 
consulship. From this point to the end of Diodorus’ continuous narrative in 302 BCE, they agree 
on all but three (or four) colleges.  
While Diodorus sometimes fails to mention consuls in certain years (345, 329, 322, and 
321), nevertheless a strong synchronicity can be drawn for this period between these two lists. 
There are a number of significant discrepancies, though, that are worth addressing. That which 
appears first is also the most significant: in the year 349, Diodorus records a completely different 
and otherwise unattested college: M. Aemilius and T. Quinctius. While T. Quinctius is consul in 
354 and 351, M. Aemilius does not appear in the fasti (although considering the propensity of 
Diodorus or his source to commit careless errors, these praenomina are far from certain (cf. the 
                                                 
156 Livy IX.44.3-4. 
157 Beloch (1926), 125. Livy still ultimately provides the same names as Diodorus for the consuls of these years, and 
thus the possibility that Livy’s primary source is related to Diodorus is not completely discredited. See Chapter 1 for 
a fuller discussion of the potential relationship between these two accounts. 
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following paragraph).158 Other unknown consuls are also included, such as K. Valerius in 336 for 
K. Duillius, and A. Postumius for P. Plautius in 328.159 The fact that Livy does not flag any of 
these variations, even though he does in other instances, might indicate that he was unaware of 
these variant traditions (or that he was aware of them, but felt they were without credibility). 
There are also a number of minor inconsistencies in the list of fourth century consuls that 
speak less to divergent traditions, but rather to carelessness or negligence on the part of Diodorus 
or his source.160 He changes the praenomen of certain magistrates: in 358, C. Fabius becomes M. 
Fabius and in 350, L. Cornelius becomes C. Cornelius.161 The consuls of 345, M. Fabius and Ser. 
Sulpicius, are brought forward to 348, leaving none in their place.162 He pulls L. Papirius from 336 
and places him in 337, leaving out P. Aulius.163 A spelling error seems to lie behind the 
replacement in 318 of M. Folius with M. Fulvius.164 Finally, Diodorus or his source seems unaware 
of how to render the Roman nomen “Poetelius” in Greek; he universally replaces this with the 
praenomen Πόπλιος. This observation leads further to the conclusion that Diodorus’ source 
contained “Q. Poetelius” (Κόιντος Πόπλιος) in place of Livy’s “L. Papirius” for 320, perhaps 
representing the fourth significant divergence from Livy/FC.165 
Thus, the tradition which culminates in the text of Diodorus displays a few key features 
with respect to that of Livy/FC. Wide divergence, both in quantity and identifications, 
characterizes this comparison for the period before the reduction of eponymous magistrates to two 
in 367. A dramatic shift occurs in the remainder of Diodorus’ text, as he aligns very closely with 
                                                 
158 Diod. Sic. XVI.59.1 (cf. Livy VII.24.11, Cic. Sen. 41). Broughton (1951), 128. 
159 336: Diod. Sic. XVII.29.1 (cf. Livy VIII.16.1); 328: Diod. Sic. XVII.87.1 (cf. Livy VIII.22.1). 
160 Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 40 n.94. 
161 358: Diod. Sic. XVI.23.1 (cf. Livy VII.12.6); 350: Diod. Sic. XVI.56.1 (cf. Livy VII.23.1). 
162 Diod. Sic. XVI.72.1. 
163 Diod. Sic. 17.17.1 (cf. Livy VII.24.11 and VIII.16.1) 
164 Diod. Sic. 19.2.1 (cf. Livy IX.20.1). 
165 Diod. Sic. XIX.2.1 (cf. Livy IX.7.15). Despite Diodorus’ refusal to use the proper nomen, Dion. Hal. X.58.5 
records a Ποιτέλλιος as decemvir in 450. Diod. Sic. Uses Πόπλιος in this early instance as well: XII.24.1. 
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the main tradition in all but five years. These years, which cannot be explained by negligence or 
imprecision, can be viewed as strong corroborating evidence that Diodorus’ source is in fact distant 
from those of Livy. A close relationship of such lists would result in the sort of correspondence as 
between Livy and the FC, which agree on every name (for which the FC is extant). Punctuated 
moments of disagreement, such as those found between Livy and Diodorus, and especially those 
of such a fundamental nature that divergence likely occurred at a very early point, might 
demonstrate a distinction of source material and therefore induce confidence in those areas of 
widespread agreement.  
Such inconsistency (including Livy’s notices in 354, 328, and 319) might be disconcerting 
for the thesis that these lists ultimately stem from official archives from the fourth century. We 
should never imagine, however, that later editors or compilers of annalistic histories viewed such 
archives as underserving of any alteration. The argument still stands that increased archival 
material constricted the ability of later writers to manipulate, such that various traditions might 
contain limited points of distortion (two in the Livy’s and five in Diodorus’). Ultimately, Diodorus’ 
close, but not exact, correspondence with Livy/FC offers compelling evidence that there was a 
contemporary publication of eponymous magistrates that suffered only minor corruption in two 
divergent traditions, whenever their separation occurred. 
A few scholars would take issue with this conclusion, including A. Drummond, who 
believes that Livy and Diodorus were using the very same source, based on the consistency of the 
order in which the consul names are reported.166 This had been preemptively disproven by 
Giovanni Costa in 1910, who observed different orders of name presentations in numerous years. 
Costa attributes this difference to the way individuals would be inclined to read the inscription, 
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with Romans opting for a boustrophedon reading, and Greeks defaulting to a reading in 
columns.167 Also, Ronald T. Ridley, echoing the pessimism of such scholars as T. P. Wiseman, 
believes there is no reason to look for correspondence between Diodorus and Livy, as there were 
no contemporaneous sources recorded in the early Republic; all accounts were fabricated by 
boastful gentes.168 He musters statements by Livy to support this conclusion, including that there 
were many confused matters in the early Republic (Livy II.21.4), and his lamentation that there 
were no contemporaneous authors from this period (Livy VIII.40.5). Ridley, however, extrapolates 
too much from these quotes; the first is from the fifth century, extremely early in the Republic 
when certainty is not argued by any scholar, while the latter passage only laments the absence of 
a “writer” (scriptor). This does not imply, as Ridley seems to read, that there were no sources at 
all, just a lack of any annalistic historian. In any case, we know that Livy was averse to using 
primary sources directly, so this complaint is very inappropriately applied to archival records, 
which he felt no compulsion to consult anyways. Neither of these contentions can muster enough 
evidence to dislodge Diodorus as comparative source for Livy, who collects and relates a different, 
although a potentially distantly related, tradition. The strong correspondence of this account since 
the power sharing agreement provides a strong indication that early authors had reliable, but not 
perfect, primary sources from the middle of the fourth century BCE. 
 
Laws, inconsistencies, legal flexibility 
The second source of confidence in both Livy’s and Diodorus’ lists of eponymous 
magistrates concerns their apparent correlation to the legal developments of the fourth century. As 
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after the sixth century. 
168 Ridley (1980), 297-8. 
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will be discussed in Chapter 4, the historical context for the compromise recorded in 367 BCE is 
fraught with difficulty: the elongated period of anarchy, the doubled consulship of Camillus, and 
the repeated elections of tribunician colleagues with diametrically opposing agendas all speak to 
the confusion surrounding this event. What is not confused, however, is that the nature of the 
eponymous magistracy in Rome is permanently altered, and that new gentes achieved the highest 
office with regularity in the aftermath. On its face, this is strong evidence that legal statutes were 
implemented to guarantee redress of plebeian concerns and restrictions on the consulship were 
loosened. Nevertheless, there are seeming internal inconsistencies between the purported wording 
of these laws and the names on the eponymous fasti, such that scholars have seriously doubted 
either the validity of the legal notices, or the integrity of the magistrate lists. Again, this pessimism 
is based on an expectation of legal rigidity at Rome that is anachronistic for the early Republic. 
Considering the strength of the social and political unrest in the city (see Chapter 4), it would be 
very foolish to expect that the Roman state was a smoothly operating entity in this period. The 
inconsistencies that we encounter, therefore, are the predictable results of the socio-political 
struggles as they manifested in a system lacking any strict legal rigidity. 
 The source of modern scholarly pessimism concerning the eponymous magistrate list in 
the latter half of the fourth century stems from the discrepancies between the wording of the 
statutes of 367 and 342 BCE and the seemingly contradictory presence (or absence) of plebeian 
gentes in the fasti. To briefly outline the problem, Livy relates the wording of the compromise of 
367 (Leges Liciniae-Sextiae) thusly: “that one of the two consuls be elected from the plebs.”169 
The magistrate lists, however, contain all-patrician colleges in the years 355-3, 351, 349, 345, and 
                                                 
169 Livy VI.35.5: consulumque utique alter ex plebe crearetur. This legal stipulation is echoed in Val. Max. VIII.6.3: 
C. uero Licinius Stolo, cuius beneficio plebi petendi consulatus potestas facta est, Plut. Cam. 39.1: ὁ δῆμος 
ἐστασίαζε πρὸς τὴν σύγκλητον βιαζόμενος δυεῖν ὑπάτων καθισταμένων τὸν ἕτερον πάντως ἐκ δημοτῶν εἶναι καὶ μὴ 
συναμφοτέρους πατρικίους, and Flor. 17: ut plebei quoque magistratus crearentur. 
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343. Only after 343 does a plebeian occupy half of every consular college. The second compromise 
of 342 (Leges Genuciae) stipulates that “no one hold the same office within ten years, no one hold 
two offices simultaneously, and that it is lawful to elect both consulships from the plebs.170 Yet we 
find such iteration as soon as 330 (L. Publilius, cos. 337 and 330) and frequently in the 320s. 
Further, no dual plebeian consulship occurs until 173. All of these difficulties have caused much 
consternation in modern scholarship on the historiography of this century, usually involving a 
rejection of one of the two traditions: either the legal statutes are not accurately recorded, or the 
fasti contain fictitious notices.171 
Beloch employs a healthy skepticism of both traditions. While he does not take issue with 
the ascension of the first plebeian to the office in the 360s, he simply does not accept that a law 
was passed concerning the composition of consular colleges until the end of the fourth century. In 
fact, he identifies patrician-only colleges all the way until 321, despite the seeming certainty of 
Livy and the FC to the contrary. In order to accomplish this, he accepts the alternative consul 
provided by Diodorus for 328 (A. Postumius, instead of Livy’s P. Plautius) and assumes, unlike 
Mommsen before172 and most scholarship since, that the Veturia Calvina (cos. 334 and 321) was 
a patrician gens. For Beloch, this new law would correlate with the military disaster at the Caudine 
Forks (321 BCE) and thus provides context for a serious overhaul in the face of military 
                                                 
170 Livy VII.42.2: ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet neu duos magistratus uno anno gereret 
utique liceret consules ambos plebeios creari.  
171 An argument of this sort has raged over the presence of plebeian names in the early Republic before the 
compromise of 367 BCE. Scholars such as Beloch (1926), 9-32 reject most notices of plebeian consuls or consular 
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publication of official documents. Momigliano (1986), 182-8 suggests that there was an intermediary social class, 
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argument is followed by Cornell (1995), 338-9 and (1983), 112-4. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
172 Mommsen, vol. (1864-1879), 120. 
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deficiencies. Thus, the Licinian-Sextian law mandating the election of a plebeian consul is a 
retrojected law from the 310s.173  
 Positions of extreme hostility towards this tradition are best represented by John Pinsent, 
who seeks to eliminate any plebeian from the consulship before the Leges Genuciae of 342 BCE. 
He sees a strong connection between the Temple of Juno Moneta, dedicated in 344, as a repository 
for the libri lintei (which were plebeian documents) and the plebeian advocate T. Manlius (cos. 
344). He also accepts the alternate version of the military sedition from 342, in which C. Manlius 
was declared advocate for the soldiers’ efforts at economic redress. This confluence of events leads 
Pinsent to conclude that 342 was the landmark year in which the plebeians achieved the 
consulship.174 All of the previous notices of plebeians and their Manlian allies in the consulship 
prior to this date were interpolations by those seeking to give legitimacy to the lower order. Further, 
it is possible to reconstruct the original fasti by supplying the names of numerous patrician 
dictators and interreges which populate the tradition between 366 and 342.175 He also rejects the 
purported wording of the law of 342, which stipulated that both consuls could be elected from the 
plebs, arguing that because this does not actually occur until 173 BCE, this law is “hopelessly 
anachronistic.”176 Unfortunately, Pinsent makes the mistake of rejecting certain parts of the 
magisterial lists that do not conform to his theory, but readily accepting others that do. In a review 
of this work, Drummond sums up his critique by saying, “the fragility of ancient accounts is not 
demonstrated by the fertility of academic imagination.”177 
                                                 
173 Beloch (1926), 344-5. 
174 Pinsent (1975), 62. 
175 Pinsent (1975), 67-9. 
176 Pinsent (1975), 64. 
177 Drummond (1978b), 188. For another thorough rebuttal, see Develin (1979), 9-12. 
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 A monumental contribution to this discussion was offered by Jean-Claude Richard, who 
postulated a reconfiguration of the laws of 366 and 342 to better align with the information in the 
fasti, which he was loath to discard. Richard suggested that the wording of the first law, 
“consulumque utique alter ex plebe crearetur,” much better applied to the eponymous lists after 
the second, and he therefore assigned this provision to the Leges Genuciae of 342. Instead, the law 
of 366 just made this a possibility or a suggestion.178 Further, the stipulation that both consuls 
could be plebeian would have “remained a dead letter for more than a century and a half” and 
therefore must have been retrojected from a later point.179 This position is bolstered by the Lex 
Publilia of 339, which stipulates that one censor must be chosen from the plebs, which was 
possibly a direct consequence of a similar law concerning the consulship just three years prior.180 
This solution has become the standard interpretation of these inconsistencies and occupies prime 
placement in most modern discussions of this legal question.181 Richard Billows attempts to fine-
tune this argument by pinpointing the early second century as the likely point of generation for 
this Lex Genucia. He observes that it was only then that the fasti reflect a ban on iteration and a 
general atmosphere of political and legislative limitation. Thus, according to Billows, the 
provisions of this Lex Genucia are likely legitimizing retrojections from this period.182 
 There is a vein of scholarship that does not attempt to demolish and reconstruct aspects of 
the tradition but instead sees external variables forcing non-adherence to Rome’s legal statutes.  
The most important external variable is the military requirements of the state at the end of the 
fourth century. Robert Develin argues that the Senate took a leading role in assuring that suitable 
                                                 
178 Richard (1979), 72-5. 
179 Richard (1979), 73: “qui devait rester lettre morte ... plus d'un siecle et demi.” 
180 Livy VIII.12.14-6. 
181 Scullard (1980), 479 n.6. Cornell (1995), 337-8. Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 654. Brennan, vol. 1 (2000), 66.  
182 Billows (1989), 120-5. He is followed in this placement by Rosenstein (1993), 316-7 and n.7. 
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candidates with records of experience and success were put forward during moments of crisis.183 
Thus, P. Decius Mus, successful consul in 312, was chosen to meet the threats in 308, 297, and 
295. Develin states, “it was in times of crisis that access to the consulship became restrictive and 
the governing order took a hand.”184 While this does envision the Senate as a permanent, 
deliberative body capable of directing important issues of the state (see Chapter 5), there is almost 
annual warfare and threats in the fourth century and this argument could therefore be made for 
nearly every year in this period. If there really was such a “governing order” driving the election 
of experienced generals, it strains reason to think the period from 340-331, and the threats from 
revolting Latin cities among others, could have seen only three iterating consuls. In fact, there does 
not appear to be any correlation between periods of intense warfare and an increased frequency of 
iteration. Particularly effective generals might have received preference in the face of a particularly 
grave threat, but the Roman electorate, which was also its soldiery, would have recognized this; 
there would have been no need for a “governing order.” Military success was a candidate’s most 
impressive credential. In any case, the appointment of a dictator could have ensured that the 
appropriate leadership was always deployable, regardless of magisterial status.  
 This line of study is not restricted to Develin. F. E. Adcock tries to explain the presence of 
all-patrician consular colleges in the 350s and 340s as resultant from the lack of experienced 
plebeians.185 This too is hard to accept, as it assumes that leadership experience could only be 
gained from serving as consul and disregards the possibility the wealthy plebeians were just as 
present on the battlefield and in a general’s retinue. Hölkeskamp argues that both the 
(re)introduction of the consulship and the reduction of the highest offices from six to only two 
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induced heavy patrician-plebeian conflict that came to a head in the 350s. The patricians succeeded 
at this point in wresting the second office from the plebs as their constant aristocratic rivalry 
intensified.186 Further, the Leges Genuciae were a turning point for the plebeian cause, as iteration 
now became the exception and dispensation had to be sought in order to bypass this new 
limitation.187 The most effective explanation for the problems of iteration after 342 has been 
presented by Corey Brennan, who sees a much more limited statute than normally recognized. He 
argues that this law only applied to plebeians and was only operative for the following ten years, 
meaning 341-32.188 C. Plautius’ iterative consulship in 341 would not have counted, as he held the 
office previously in 347, before this law was enacted. Otherwise, no plebeian breaks this ten-year 
rule before its putative expiry and not until 327 (or 328, for this problematic year, see above, p. 
63). Iteration was common among the plebs after this. 
 This final group of theories, although having their own flaws, have the merit of not 
selectively discarding pieces of the literary tradition in order to justify their own reconstructions. 
At the heart of this scholarly consternation concerning the discrepancies in the legal notices and 
consular fasti is the assumption that laws in early Rome were as binding on the state and its 
constituent members as in the later period. Indeed, Billows states this explicitly: “The only way in 
which one can in strict logic and sound method accept both the literary tradition and the evidence 
of the fasti is by arguing that the Romans really passed the laws reported by Livy, but then simply 
ignored them in practice.” Yet this is not such an implausible circumstance as Billows makes it 
sound. While some laws recorded in the XII Tables accompany set punishments, in general there 
are no definitive consequences for transgressions against most laws.189 The ability of the lower 
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classes to protect their interests through legal statute is very questionable in the early period. There 
are records of leges being passed multiple times, suggesting that enforcement is far from 
guaranteed. These defunct laws persist even into the better evidenced periods of the second 
century: Ti. Gracchus complains that the land limitation law has been constantly ignored and thus 
finds legal basis for his agitation.190 Moreover, the extent to which patricians felt beholden to a 
law of which they did not approve is an open question; at least in terms of plebiscites, the plebs 
had to repeatedly pass legislation to make it binding on the whole state.191 Livy himself says in 
relation to the most recent lex de provocatione192 passed in 300, “The reason for renewing it so 
often, I think, was none other than because the wealth of the few was more powerful than the 
liberty of the plebs.”193 Repassing these laws, therefore, is not a trope of the patrician-plebeian 
historical tradition, but a memory of imperfect enactment and enforcement that survived in the 
legal records of the state. 
 The absence of an absolute standard of legal applicability in the early history of Rome has 
been explored by Develin and, more recently, by Hölkeskamp. They both echo the argument that 
statutes, rights, mandates, and magisterial restrictions are not simply observed a priori. Rather, 
these take time to sink into the consciousness of society and, in time, become mos. It is not the 
leges that are binding to the Roman people at this time, but the legitimization provided by 
precedent and prolonged observance.194 If this view of the early Roman constitution is adopted, 
then the “inconsistencies” between legal notices and the pattern of names in the fasti are fully 
                                                 
190 Plut. Ti. Gracch. 8.3-4. 
191 The law binding plebiscites on the whole citizenry is passed in 449, 339, and finally in 287, with differences. 
Scholars often view the implications of this law as formally ending the “Struggle of the Orders.” 
192 The lex de provocatione appears to be passed in 509, 449, and again in 300. The historicity of the early laws is 
justifiably questioned, however. See Develin (1978): 45-9.   
193 Livy X.9.4: causam renouandae saepius haud aliam fuisse reor quam quod plus paucorum opes quam libertas 
plebis poterat. 
194 Develin (1986), 336-8. Hölkeskamp (2010), 25-6. 
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explained: this period of high political and social tension is also accompanied by brazen disregard 
of a previously passed statute which mandated one plebeian college per year. Like the other laws 
fundamental to plebeian rights that patricians found inconvenient, this took repeated reassertion in 
order to surpass the threshold from lex to mos, and the further compromise of 342 BCE can be 
seen as just such a reassertion. The wording of these specific laws, therefore, is not as crucial as 
societal pressure to conform, and this can explain the seeming incongruity between the letter of 
the law and the conduct of the Roman state in the 350s and 300s. This alternate approach does not 
require that the tradition of the Leges Liciniae-Sextiae and Leges Genuciae be accurate; the 
reconstructions by Richard and Brennan are highly plausible and convincing. But we should 
nevertheless be open to the possibility that the Roman state operated in the early Republic at a 
much lower level of legal rigidity than the highly legalized late Republic and Imperial periods 
would suggest. 
  
The content of the eponymous magistrate list 
 While certain irregularities of the archival lists stem from an over-expectation of legal 
observance and enforcement in the early Roman period, so too should we lower our expectation 
of the contents of such early records. The vast majority of the inconsistencies that Livy reports 
among his sources concern consular province and, when compared with the fasti, the cognomina 
of magistrates. The evidence suggests that early eponymous lists contained no such information 
and was therefore a venue for elaboration by later Roman annalists.  
 Mommsen first suggested that cognomina were not a feature of early state documents until, 
he argues, the Sullan period. He notes that early state proclamations, such as the senatus consultum 
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de Bacchanalibus and a contract from Puteoli of 105 BCE,195 did not contain any cognomina.196 
A survey of early monuments and documents which may have survived into the historical period 
and are marked by the lack of cognomina produces the following results: Captioline Temple by 
M. Horatius (Dion. Hal. V.35.5), the temple of Saturn (Dion. Hal. VI.1.4), the Latin Treaty with 
Sp. Cassius and Post. Cominius (Cic. Balb. 53), the temple of Fortuna by Verginius (Dion. Hal. 
VIII.55.5), the statue of Ceres by the Cassii (Livy II.41.11), the law of Pinarius and Furius 
(Macrob. Sat. I.13.21), the temple of Fides by Postumius (Dion. Hal. IX.60.8), and the statue of 
Minucius (Plin. NH. 34.21).197 Further, the fragments of early historians similarly omit such 
names: no cognomina appear in Fabius Pictor (although only one fragment carries a Roman 
name),198 and Piso, with a bigger base of evidence, does not relate one until the year 299.199 They 
are similarly lacking from Claudius Quadrigarius (in notices of consuls in 385 and 367) and 
Valerias Antias (in notices of consuls in 464 and 434 but begin to be incorporated in 249). They 
are present, however, in early notices in Licinius Macer.200 
 In fact, cognomina represent a large portion of the discrepancies between the fasti as 
reconstructed from the text of Livy, the FC, and Diodorus. As was stated in Chapter 1, in notices 
from the fifth century, Livy and Diodorus disagree on half of these names.201 Fundamental 
discrepancies between historical accounts as to cognomina occur in 364, 361, 360, 347, 341, 334, 
328, 326, and 319. Moreover, after 427, Diodorus only relates seven cognomina until his text 
                                                 
195 SC de Bacchanalibus: CIL i2 581 = ILLRP 511; Puteoli: CIL X 1781. 
196 Mommsen, vol. 1 (1864-1879), 46. 
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breaks off in 302. Beloch, ever a critical reader of the text, argues that the full tria nomina was not 
a part of official records until the end of the fourth century,202 which would account for its 
emergence in Piso’s text after 299 and the cessation of inconsistencies in the surviving sources in 
319 BCE. The earlier section of the magistrate list, as it was recorded at least from the middle of 
the fourth century, likely did not contain any accompanying cognomina; therefore, such 
disagreement in our sources was the result of different reconstructive efforts conducted (possibly, 
considering their absence in the works of early first century annalists) in the middle of the first 
century. Most of the names would have been easily recoverable (or obvious possibilities logically 
postulated and therefore independently reconstructed), and this would explain the general 
agreement in the sources, albeit with punctuated moments of divergence. Thus, inconsistently 
appearing cognomina cannot be used to discredit contemporaneously recorded archives in the 
fourth century.203 
 The second area for potential concern are the statements concerning consular province. 
There are a number of highly contradictory episodes and conflicting accounts throughout Books 
VII-X, which could call into question the accuracy of source material. This issue is often 
compounded by the highly problematic list of dictators and the Fasti Triumphales (FT), which will 
be discussed in the next two sections. In short, there is fundamental confusion for the years 355, 
                                                 
202 Beloch (1926), 49-52. 
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335, 329, 322, 320, 316, 315, 313, 312, 305, 304, 302, 298, 295, and 294.204 A couple of examples 
will suffice to demonstrate the problem.  
 In 305 Livy records that two consular armies were dispatched to confront two Samnite 
threats, led respectively by L. Postumius and Ti. Minucius. Although initially separate, they 
eventually come together for two great victories and took Bovianum in a siege. Both consuls return 
in triumph.205 This narrative is largely echoed by Diodorus who records two battles over the 
Samnites by a combined force and the surrender of the town of Βῶλα, which could be a misspelling 
of Bovianum.206 Dionysius, however, states that the Romans also fought the Paelignians 
(Παλιγνοὺς) in this year, something which is not attested elsewhere. Furthermore, Livy records 
another tradition entirely: Ti. Minucius died in battle and the suffect consul M. Fulvius achieved 
the victory and was awarded the sole triumph,207 which is supported by the FT. On the strength of 
the inscriptional evidence, Beloch sides strongly with Livy’s alternate version.208 
 In 304 Livy assigns the continuation of the war in Samnium to P. Sempronius, who found 
no hostility in the region and facilitated the signing of a peace treaty. The other consul, P. Sulpicius, 
conducted a successful campaign and celebrated a triumph over the Aequi.209 The notices for the 
FT, however, reverse the provinces of the consuls and record a triumph over the Samnites, whom 
Livy claims were treated peaceably. Diodorus suggests that there was no fighting in Samnium and 
that Sempronius conducted a successful a campaign over the Aequi.210 Thus, the three different 
versions present three mutually exclusive accounts of the activities of the consuls in this year. 
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Oakley states that, based on the list of conflicting accounts of consular activities, “for some 
years during the period the of Samnite Wars no clear record survived as to which magistrate fought 
where.”211 I would suggest a step further: for very few years during this period does there survive 
an accurate record of provincial assignments, which were not a part of the early eponymous 
magistrate list. Besides the issues described above, numerous indications speak to the veracity of 
this narrower claim. First, as duties performed while in office did not impact the eponymous value 
of the magistracy itself, there would have been no need to record such activities in the actual 
magistrate list itself. If not here, there would have been no other appropriate venue for 
documentation of this sort. Unless something went catastrophically wrong or triumphantly well, 
provincial assignments would not have been a matter for religious records aimed at documenting 
expiatory procedures.212 Senate records, in whatever nascent form they existed in the fourth 
century (see Chapter 5), were not likely occupied with the conduct of elected magistrates except 
only as needed, should they have provided advisement for military activity or the appointment of 
a dictator. Further, as has been stated before, the activity of consuls away from Rome was 
incredibly susceptible to later manipulation by family records, as military exploits were the 
currency of aristocratic pride. Therefore, the overwhelming tendency to transfer glory and co-opt 
successes would have overridden any potential memory of such provinces recorded in religious or 
Senatorial accounts.  
It could also be the case that modern scholarship has an overly rigid notion of what 
consisted of consular provinciae during Rome’s initial wave of expansion within Italy. Klotz 
argues that battle narratives describing consuls as combining their forces are too long for a single 
summer campaign, therefore concluding that generals must have had separately operating 
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commands; indeed, the consular tribunate had been originally imposed to field multiple armies at 
different locations.213 Harris, too, sees a rigidity to the distribution of consular provinces.214 Both 
of these contentions put too much stock in the narratives of military campaigns, which have already 
been argued as prone to familial and annalistic fabrication. Such accounts, I believe, are also 
conditioned by observation of later periods, when Rome’s enemies are remote and well-delineated. 
It also envisions a world where the Romans are operating with perfect information and can foresee 
the theaters of war at the beginning of the campaign season. The immediate, threat-rich, and 
unpredictable environment of the fourth century requires a reevaluation of this thesis.   
During this period, Latium was surrounded by belligerents, hostile to the region’s emerging 
power and seeming expansionist tendencies: the Etruscans to the north, Samnites to the west and 
south-west, and Campanians immediately to the south. Gallic invasions were an ever-present fear, 
not to mention potential rebellion among the tenuous alliances created with those polities in the 
immediate vicinity. The sources show Rome preparing to fight on multiple fronts in many years, 
and the decade from 361-351 alone is illustrative: 361, 360, and 358 (campaigns against the Gauls 
and Hernici), 357 (Falerii and Prevernum), 356 (Falerii and Tibur), 355 (Tarquinii and Tibur), 353 
(Tarquinii, Volsci, and Caere), 351 (Tarquinii and Falerii).215 While these campaign narratives 
should not be accepted in toto, if even a fraction of this breadth of military activity is reflective of 
a preserved memory, then the Romans could not afford to limit the operational abilities of their 
commanders in the field. Further, Rome is not shown to be operating with the best intelligence 
about the movement of its enemies, and as a result, often overreacted to reports of danger. Thus in 
352 and 332, a Gallic coalition never materialized to threaten the city, despite the appointment of 
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a dictator.216 It is highly unlikely that such a dynamic and unpredictable environment would have 
prompted the same sort of provincial rigidity that the Roman state enjoyed in the Middle-Late 
Republic, despite this being the lens through which our sources inevitably processed these 
reports.217 It is even more unlikely, therefore, that such fixed provinciae would have existed, much 
less been recorded, on the eponymous magistrate lists. 
We therefore need to lower our expectations for the contents of these magisterial lists, 
keeping ever in mind the potential reasons for documentation and the logical limitations this would 
have had on its content. Provincial assignment was not critical to the function of an eponymous 
list, and we should not hope for the presence of superfluous information, especially when the state 
of the historical tradition militates against its primacy. This feature of archival minimalism, 
coupled with the legal fluidity described above, does not resemble Rome of the late Republic. This 
observation might be another indicator of the validity of this approach: we should not expect three 
hundred years of political and legal development to result in a city identical to its fourth century 
iteration. Despite this minimalist view of the contents of this record, however, the fact that it 
appears with improved reliability in the middle of the fourth century should now be considered 
beyond doubt. Correspondence with the legal tradition, itself a likely product of the social and 
economic issues of the first half of this century, and with the alternatively sourced text of Diodorus 
Siculus, all recommend the existence and increased authority of an eponymous list. Although not 
without later intrusion and corruption, it nevertheless constitutes a firm foundation to our historical 
understanding of this otherwise opaque century. 
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It would be helpful here to consider the recent work of Uwe Walter, who postulates a 
remarkable flexibility in the functioning of the Roman state, despite the seemingly firm structure 
of its statutes. Walter posits that the long-term efficacy of the Rome was its ability to balance the 
priorities of centralized power with the autonomy of its individual agents. While the mos maiorum 
was central principle in the operation of the state, a high degree of flexibility was built-in to allow 
for generals and politicians to excel and confront a changing range of challenges.218 This was 
especially the case for the Middle Republic, where the challenges were more immediately pressing 
and state structures still evolving into more stable forms. Thus, the flexibility that Walter describes 
in the political and legal norms would explain resultant inconsistencies in the recording of events. 
Adherence to laws, at least in their early years, and the assignment of provinces might have been 
prone to just this type of structural flexibility and therefore leave a legacy that was inconsistent 
and misunderstood by later annalists who encountered it. 
 
Dictatores and Interreges  
 
 The same hesitancy with which one approaches the consular list must also apply to the 
putative list of dictators, with the additional acknowledgment that dictators did not serve the 
eponymous function as consuls did. Therefore, the names that appear on this list are not rigidly 
tied to a strict chronology and are then more prone to variation within the tradition. Because the 
dictatorship was just as prestigious as the consulship and unanchored to a strict chronology, the 
danger of later interpolation is more severe than with the consular list. There are good reasons, 
however, to view many of these notices as accurate, despite the contention of certain scholars. 
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 Beloch finds very little to be redeemed in the surviving list of dictators. Of the 38 recorded 
dictatorships between Livy, the FC, and Diodorus, Beloch would like to reject 23.219 He maintains 
a very pessimistic approach to the historical tradition surrounding this office, often using any 
available excuse to dismiss notices. For example, T. Manlius, appointed dictator in 353 to fight 
Caere, succeeded only in scaring them into signing a peace treaty, and Beloch wonders why this 
feat could not have been accomplished by one of the presiding consuls.220 L. Papirius Cursor, 
dictator in 310 and triumphans over the Samnites, is also excluded because his son of the same 
name celebrated the same honor while occupying the same magistracy in 293.221 Further, he finds 
a priori fictitious any appointment of a non-consular dictator, citing strict adherence to this rule in 
the third century, or any appointment not strictly rei gerundae causa.  
Here, Beloch is overestimating our certainty of the state of Roman society and politics in 
the fourth century. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, there are only two processes that occur with 
absolute certainty: increased military exertion and sociopolitical change. Both factors can be 
mobilized to explain these notices in the historical tradition.  
Due to the scope of Rome’s military endeavors, it is logical to expect consuls to be absent 
from Rome on an increasing basis. The electoral and religious duties of the consul, or whatever 
the chief magistrate(s) were called in the very early Republic, did not evolve to be performed 
remotely. Another individual who could wield the same imperium and enjoy the same auspicia 
would have been needed on an ad hoc basis to perform certain rites, such as the annual hammering 
of the nail into the side of Capitoline Temple; thus the notice that dictators were appointed clavi 
figendae causa in 363, 331, and 313.222 This action is usually necessitated by a plague, and Livy 
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cites an old law that was resurrected and executed.223 Fritz Bandel, although usually skeptical 
about early dictatorships, sees a reliable historical basis to this story.224 Even Beloch thinks that 
the nail-driving ceremony continued until 300 BCE; indeed, this is how Cn. Flavius constructed 
his calendar and calculated the age of the Republic.225 Beloch contends, nevertheless, that this duty 
was reserved for consuls and therefore does not think a dictatorial appointment appropriate.226 
Whether or not this was conducted annually or only in the face of expiatory need,227 it is likely 
that the consul would have found himself away from the city and therefore unable to perform this 
rite.  
Simple consular absence could explain the appearance of numerous officials specifically 
for the holding of elections, another ritual which required the presence of the polity’s highest 
magistrate. The Roman tradition allowed for more flexibility in this instance, as both dictators 
(appointed comitiorum habendorum causa) and interreges could be appointed to fulfill this role.228 
Upon the of the death of both consuls or the expiration of their tenure without holding elections, 
the state usually reverted to an interrex, who is commonly thought to have had extraordinary 
powers to push through an election,229 although this has been debunked in more recent 
scholarship.230 Instead, the interrex served for only five days at a time and acted as a transferring 
vessel for the auspicia publica until the next consular election.231 This position is always held by 
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a patrician, however, and could be seen as an acceptable vehicle to actualize patrician goals during 
elections. 
Aside from the appearance of many interreges, there are several such dictators appointed 
in 350s, which, Livy tells us, were intended to steer the election in a favorable direction, namely 
towards the election of patricians.232 Thus, these magistracies are rejected by Beloch, who does 
not see valid motivation in this explanation.233 This dismissal does not, however, take into 
consideration the political and social strains in which the city found itself at this time. Elections, 
and closely associated levies, had been both the venue where the plebs had exerted their power 
most effectively and the means by which they achieved the compromise of the 367 BCE (see 
Chapter 4). It is no surprise that elections were still a tense events on the Roman religious calendar 
nor that patricians would attempt to stymie such further efforts by the lower class to assert their 
power. Further, Livy records efforts by dictators attempting to hold elections outside of their 
appointed mandate, such as C. Marcius in 356, the first plebeian dictator, who was stopped in fear 
that he would manipulate the elections, and T. Manlius in 353, who threatened to abolish the 
consulship entirely rather than allow a plebeian to be elected.234 There is an open question, 
however, about the extent to which a presiding magistrate could affect the electoral process, and 
it is true that this period precisely aligns with fluctuations in the enforcement of the Leges Liciniae-
Sextiae, which was discussed in the previous section. Rolf Rilinger, in weighing the options for 
both sides, ultimately concludes that such ability was limited, such that it could not have been a 
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consistent or reliable strategy to override the popular vote. The majority of Rilinger’s evidence, 
however, comes from the late Republic, and its applicability to the early period can be doubted.235 
The question therefore arises as to whether the mandate of a dictator, like that of a consul, 
was established and published along with the magistrate’s name. While there is assuredly a fixed 
structure to the notices of dictatorial appointment in the FC, this is not necessarily reflected in the 
text of Livy, who does not relate such formulaic language. Perhaps here too, expectations on the 
rigidity of the system, conditioned by the fixity as they appear in the FC, should be interrogated. 
Many dictators in the fourth century appear to be performing a variety of tasks: L. Manlius (363) 
is supposed to be appointed to drive the nail, but ends up conducting a levy to meet an external 
threat; C. Marcius (356), T. Manlius (353), C. Iulius (352), and L. Papirius (325) are appointed to 
meet external threats but attempt to hold elections; and Q. Publilius (339) is appointed to deal with 
rebelling allies and ends up passing populist legislation. Like the consuls in this period, they may 
have been required to fill multiple roles on multiple fronts, and it inhibits our understanding of the 
dictator’s fourth century functions to pigeon-hole them in the way that the later fasti do. 
De Sanctis has noted that our sources often underreport the frequency with which consuls 
were forced from office, through death or the loss of their soldiers’ confidence.236 The dictatorship 
could have been a suitable stop gap in such situations for which an interrex was lacking 
constitutional authority. The consistency of Rome’s external wars in this period (multiple dangers 
faced on many fronts) and potential social unrest at home could explain the uptick in dictatorial 
appointment in the mid-to-late fourth century, even if we cannot be certain about the mandate or 
action of each individual magistrate. Many dictatorships, however, are initiated by requests of the 
Senate and/or carry a religious component to their duties, such as hammering the nail, not to 
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mention the maintenance of the auspicia. It is possible therefore that documentation relating more 
than just a name, year, and magister equitum was contained in the pontifical tables or Senate 
records. 
What cannot stand is Beloch’s rejection of most dictatorships based on a presumed 
weakness or interpolated aspect of the notice. If such was the case, then we would expect an even 
distribution of such additions throughout the text and far more conflicting reports. While Livy does 
report some disagreement about the presence or absence of a dictator in a given narrative (which 
is included above with the conflicts in consular provinces), these are relatively rare considering 
the plethora of officeholders in the fourth century. Further Oakley demonstrates that there are 
concentrated clusters of dictatorial appointments: 15 dictators between 366 and 341, while there 
were four from 420-390, and six from 389-367.237 This trend seems to correspond closely with the 
shrunken body of imperium-wielding magistrates and the expanding threats facing the city, both 
from external foes and internal dissension, therefore providing a strong indication of need-based 
decision making, rather than self-aggrandizing forgers.  
Here, like the eponymous lists, we are envisioning a stable, reliable document from the 
middle of the fourth century, which reflects the realities of the changing Roman world and the 
trends witnessed in other putatively contemporaneous archival sources. The dictator list, as we 
have it, is not a pristine document safe from later corruption, but it can be understood as being 
rooted in early versions of records housed among Senate or pontifical archives, as it derives 
authority from both of these spheres. This observation is not necessarily all positive news, 
however, as this entails a level of rejection of other features of the list, most notably the animating 
mandate of each holder. An interrex list is harder to imagine in a fourth century context, unless 
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one subscribes to Beloch’s notion that, because interreges represented consuls, they too would 
have been included in the eponymous lists.238 While this is possible, it seems to undermine the 
calendrical purpose of such a document, as one could hardly track the passage of time through 
five-day intervals. It seems much more likely that these names were also housed, if they were at 
all, within the pontifical records, because this office represented a safe, but very temporary, 
repository of the auspicia. These names of interreges, however, can be easily reconstructed from 
the consul list in surrounding years by interpolators,239 so there is little concrete evidence to 
recommend their fourth century authority. 
 
Pontifical Tables and the Fasti Triumphales  
 
The purported contents of any early list of triumphs and the pontifical tables are some of 
the most fraught topics in the quellenkritik of the fourth century. The main difficulty stems from 
the testimonia of later Romans, who considered with great skepticism the contents of these 
documents. Concerning the pontifical tables Cato states, “It is not fitting to write what is in the 
tablets of the pontifex maximus, how often there was a grain shortage, or how often darkness or 
something else covered the light of the moon or the sun.”240 This is not a strong endorsement of 
the historical value of this text, regardless of its legibility when it finally came into the hands of 
later annalists.  
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 Yet the pontifical tables are often considered the oldest kept at Rome and, according to 
many scholars, the only document kept there until the third century.241 Livy records a great deal of 
the sorts of information that would have been contained in this record, if it is as Cato describes, 
and therefore it is likely that it existed in the fourth century, if not earlier. Ogilvie and Oakley 
compile a thorough list of such plagues and food shortages in the early Republic that all have 
probable origins in a pontifical archive,242 and Wissowa provides notices of all vows or dedications 
of temples.243 The purpose of this list was to create a reliable repertoire of religious knowledge, 
from which understanding of and expiation procedures for future divine discontent could be 
obtained.244 Therefore, the maintenance and consultation of such archival material would have 
been a crucial feature of proper religious worship in Rome, as the documents themselves could 
have been considered sacred. 
 The origins of these documents in the period prior to the fourth century is not universally 
accepted, however, although the reasons for this position are tenuous. Beloch argues that the 
pontifical lists could not predate the early third century, using Cicero’s mention of the eclipse dated 
to 288 BCE,245 and claiming that earlier records were calculated backwards.246 This position only 
works if the original pontifical record survived intact for Ennius to consult, and that he recorded 
every eclipse he found. While the latter is unknowable, the former has been strongly doubted by 
modern scholarship.247 In any case, arguments based on missing information, from a document 
and period where the vast majority of our information is already lost, rest on shaky ground. 
Similarly, Jörg Rüpke argues that the presence of priest names, which were also likely contents of 
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this list, is entirely inconsistent with a structured document of the sort postulated for the early 
Republic.248 The death of P. Decius Mus has not been treated by Livy as the death of a pontiff, and 
thus Livy was not consulting documents that treated him as such.249 Again, this argument relies on 
an absence of information that Rüpke would otherwise expect to exist; we should, however, have 
no doubt that many pieces of information from the fifth and fourth centuries have not survived to 
the present, and no significant theory can be based on the omission of any one. 
  Despite Cato’s skepticism, this sort of information can nevertheless provide a firm 
structure or framework around which a credible historical reconstruction can be built. The final 
notice of food shortage, once a very common occurrence in the fifth century, is 383 BCE in Livy’s 
text,250 four years after the large settlement of citizens on the ager Veientinus. While pestilence 
continues to be noted, it seems that food shortages are no longer a pressing concern for the city, 
which is a logical and beneficial result of the addition of farmland brought under Roman control. 
If this information was simply interpolated, we would expect to see continued use of food shortages 
to explain societal pressures and plebeian motivation in the literary record. Thus, much like the 
correspondence of the eponymous magistrate list to the larger societal pressures of the early to 
mid-fourth century, the putative pontifical records also reflect the logical realities of the Roman 
state in this period.  
Furthermore, the admission of the plebs to the pontifical college of the duumviri sacris 
faciundis (afterwards the decemviri) in 368, who were tasked with consulting the sacred Sibylline 
Books, forms an important watershed in access to religious knowledge. Mommsen, however, 
thought that this was the first priesthood to pass to the plebeians because it was inferior to the 
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pontiffs and the augurs, based on its connection to foreign practices.251 In reality, the duumviri, not 
foreign priests, were the major sources of expiatory procedures (along with the haruspices in later 
times), despite the fact that the Sibylline Books were written in Greek. It is more likely that this 
priesthood was first opened to the plebs because it did not interact with the auspicia, an important 
defining characteristic of both the higher priestly colleges and the consulship, all perceived to be 
the sole purview of the patricians. Susan Satterfield has argued that this college was the primary 
means for religious obstruction in the state, as the actions of the higher magistrates could be 
blocked by perceived interference from observed prodigies.252 Expanding the number of members 
and admitted plebeians, therefore, was a way to diffuse the authority of the body and make 
obstruction much less feasible.253  
The expiatory procedures, however, were precisely the contents of the pontifical tables, 
and plebeians now had access to and aided in the creation of this material. In this way, an important 
body of information concerning divine will and how to steer it was now opened to a wider group 
of consumers. Religious knowledge of this sort was incredibly powerful, and it should be no 
surprise that aristocratic plebeians, who were not privy to it previously and therefore at a severe 
informational disadvantage with their patrician peers who did, would seek access to the pontifical 
tables first and ensure that such knowledge was not tightly constricted to a small group of 
consumers. These records contained information on sources of gods approval and disapproval, 
what led to Roman successes in the past and what led to failure; they were powerful tools for the 
decision-making process at the highest levels of the state, and plebeians would likely have viewed 
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their newfound access as essential progress in their long-term pursuit of political and military 
legitimization. 
Whatever the state of the pontifical tables prior to this point—and it is likely that they were 
maintained and stored at an earlier period—in the mid-fourth century they became the purview of 
a wider group of people and their publishing became a matter of security and leverage for the 
newly enfranchised members of the plebs. When combined with the eponymous magistrate list, 
which we have already seen to have been highly credible for the latter half of the fourth century, 
this source of documentation can form the strong foundation of reliable information on which later 
annalistic history was plausibly based. 
While the presence of these pontifical tables is reassuring, the current state of the Fasti 
Triumphales are not. In a famous passage, Cicero states,  
The history of our state, however, is made falser by these laudations. For much has been 
written in them which did not occur: fake triumphs, exaggerated consulships, false 
genealogy, and even conversions to the plebs, as men of lower rank are confused with 
another of the same name.254  
 
This pessimism is compounded by a statement of Livy from the second pentad:  
I believe that our memory has been corrupted by these funeral eulogies and busts with false 
honors, as each family collects for themselves the glory of accomplishments and offices by 
deceitful lies. From this, both the feats of great men and the public memory of events is 
certainly confused.255 
 
On their face, these appear to be damning statements about the condition of the historical record 
as it existed in the late Republic, especially considering the fact that Livy’s quote comes from the 
period under present study. While the eponymous magistrate list is more (but by no means fully) 
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secure, based on the calendrical function it would have provided to fourth century Rome and the 
large concordance between it and concurrent legal developments, nevertheless the list of triumphs 
was most prone to corruption of the sort in the passages quoted above. 
 There can be little doubt, when observing the religious implications of the triumph, that it 
would have been appropriate for memorial among the pontifical tables. There is a strong 
connection between the triumphator and the personification of Jupiter: numerous ancient sources 
refer to the garb of the god as part of the triumphal procession.256 Moreover, the triumphal route 
itself concluded at the Capitoline Temple, at which point an offering was made to Jupiter Optimus 
Maximus. Although there has been some scholarly debate as to whether the imagery of the 
triumphator was intended to make him a god for a day, or just stems from old imagery of Etruscan 
kingship,257 current scholarly consensus was set by H. S. Versnel, who argued that these two sets 
of insignia were largely coterminous and mutually developed.258  
 Even if there was not such a ritual connection to the Capitoline Temple, a triumph still 
represents a significant Roman victory, itself a sign of divine approval. The date, context, and 
relevant religious observances associated with this event, therefore, would have formed a point of 
further scrutinization with the intent to replicate. Triumphs, then, likely formed an important part 
of the pontifical tables.  In addition, before the destruction of the Capitoline temple in 83 BCE, 
dedications and offerings might have provided testimony to triumphant generals of the past, much 
like dedicatory offerings at Delphi were used as demonstration of historical events.259 
Contemporaneous documentation, therefore, was likely high for these momentous events. 
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 Beloch considered most triumph notices interpolated before 300 BCE because they would 
have been recorded in the pontifical tables, which he argues were not regularly composed until 
after 300.260 It has been argued here, however, that this position is flawed, and that records do exist 
from earlier, both based on putative content found in Livy and contextual elements of the mid-
fourth century. It stands to reason, then, that Beloch is wrong about the triumphal lists as well. The 
concerning features about the state of the Fasti Triumphales, however, stem from the observations 
by ancient sources, quoted above, and the demonstrably late date of composition. 
 There is undoubtedly a great deal of accurate information listed in the triumph lists as they 
are preserved in Livy and, in large part, the Fasti as well. We should not, as Ridley does, take the 
statements by Cicero and Livy as condemnation of the entire notion of early records.261 The 
keeping of contemporaneous records by religious officials and the later exaggeration of families 
in their pursuit of glory are not mutually exclusive occurrences, they just necessitate a hesitation 
to accept the tradition where such fictions are likely to intrude. The lists of triumphs, much like a 
potential list of dictators, is one such venue where interpolation could not be checked by 
eponymous function. Further, the Fasti Triumphales show deviation from Livy in significant 
instances, such as those described above, both in the identity of the triumphator and in the enemy 
over which he had triumphed. While the latter should not a priori exclude the notice, as Beloch 
often argues, because the province of any general was unlikely to be recorded, the former is more 
troubling and could indicate later corruption. Most indicative of the delayed date of the FT is the 
presence of the “dictator years,” which have been shown to be a very late insertion into the 
chronology of the fourth century and do not appear in the texts of Livy or the magistrate lists of 
Diodorus. Thus, the triumphs listed in 324, 309 (twice), and 301 have definitely been, at the very 
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least, rearranged at the end of the first century BCE.262 Further, the consular years omitted by Piso, 
who was generally considered very assiduous in his attention paid to the magistrate list, also 
contain a triumph in 306, which is confirmed by Livy and was apparently commemorated by the 
erection of a statue and inscription.263 
 Thus, the information on the Fasti Triumphales pushes conclusions in two opposite 
directions. In the first, the strongly propitious nature of the triumph made it a likely candidate to 
be included in the religious recordings of the early Republic, and therefore made available for 
consultation in the middle of the fourth century. Physical monuments, too, were likely left to 
evidence the event, such as dedications on the Capitoline itself and statues, inscriptions, or other 
permanent commemorative markers.264 Such secure triumphs, however, must accompany those 
that have been inserted at a later date, following the accusations of Cicero and Livy. There was 
assuredly some manipulation of the dates assigned to the triumphs as they appeared in the FT, 
since there is no clear correspondence to the names or locations between the FT and the lists 
generated from Livy. These indications, as well as the political capital that can be gained from 
falsi triumphi, point to a highly confused tradition about these events and advocate for cautious 
acceptance. In general, however, the lists produced by Livy show, at least, one fewer layer of 
manipulation than that of the Augustan Fasti Triumphales.  
 
Conclusions: Better archives, sparser records 
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 While we may have modern expectations about the types and comprehensiveness of the 
records a state “should” keep in order to be fully self-archiving, this standard cannot possibly be 
maintained for a polity engaging in the nascent steps of this process. In accounting for this variety 
of potential state documentation, we must always keep two groups in mind: those who are actively 
publishing and those who are consuming the published material. As Rome loosens the limitations 
on participants in the highest political and religious offices, those publishing began operating on a 
correspondingly wider set of motivations: with a history of disenfranchisement and lack of access 
to the divine understandings of the successes and failures of the state, concretizing plebeian 
progress and building a common depository of historical knowledge would have seemed crucial 
to establishing themselves as power-sharing members of the ruling class. Access to public records 
would have offset the disadvantage that plebeians faced in their competition with the high patrician 
houses, who maintained their own private sources of information. If “information is power,” the 
fourth century begins to equalize the playing field.   
  What should not be overemphasized, however, are the needs of the common consumers, 
which would have necessarily dictated the nature of early source materials. They likely had 
humbler goals: a common reckoning of the passage of time with which they could calculate their 
obligations to others and the state as well as a religious chronicle that allowed them to strategize 
for immediate and long-term goals in accordance with divine will. These requirements, for 
example, did not dictate that magisterial provinces be recorded. The citizens of the day were also 
soldiers and likely lived, bled, and wore the scars of their campaigns; they would have remembered 
who gave the order to march and who signed their checks. There likely was no need to keep such 
contemporaneous records. The moment that those campaigns and enemies were forgotten is the 
same moment they were susceptible to reconstruction by ambitious gentes. And thus, our record 
95 
 
presents a largely consistent picture of military affairs from this period, however punctuated by 
moments of extreme confusion. Such is the state of narratives based on highly schematic and 
compressed points of fact. If events were extremely notable to the point of requiring pontifical 
attention, then these too would be recorded and integrated into a more complete understanding of 
the workings of the world.  
Although still leaving ample room for later historians to extrapolate creatively, there is a 
demonstrable increase in the cohesion of historical narratives and fasti evidence for the latter half 
of the fourth century. The growth of record keeping was likely driven by a loosening of the 
restrictive qualities of governmental and religious access and the impact this political 
transformation had on the production and maintenance of official documents, which were no 
longer the strict purview of a small class of people. This archival effort is likely incited by the 
social and political changes occurring at the end of the fifth century and proceeding into the 
beginning of the next. This trend of archival improvement, however, does not completely 
illuminate the period in question and likely involved a number of frustrating gaps right from their 
outset. The conclusions to this survey, therefore, are both encouraging and disheartening: although 
these archives are increasing in scope, availability, and reliability, they by no means represented a 
comprehensive picture of the fourth century. There was substantial distance to be connected 




Discrepancies in the tradition: a compilation problem? 
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  The increased presence of archival notices in the fourth century present another potential 
complication to the formation of a cohesive narrative: the troubles associated with the compilation 
of disparate archives from different sources. So far in this chapter, we have identified two 
(potentially three) distinct archives where information was likely stored, and, in Chapter 5, Senate 
records will be considered. This means that there were multiple repositories of state information 
covering hundreds of years; the potential difficulties of aligning such archives could explain the 
confused nature of many years’ reports. This is compounded by the problem that these records 
were likely composed by dozens of different individuals, from the Pontifex Maximus and other 
priestly scribes, to the Senate note-taker. Without any rigid regulations on the form, coverage, or 
depth of their work, it is likely that a vast array of archives was created over the years, even if by 
a single institution or for the same purpose. We are again reminded of the flexibility of the Roman 
political and legal spheres that is described by Uwe Walter and the impact this could have had on 
the operation of the state, the variation with which it was therefore recorded, and how this would 
have appeared to later annalists expecting consistency. 
 Thus, a severe compilation dilemma likely confronted the first Roman annalists seeking to 
integrate this information into their historical narratives. Not even considering the issues of 
legibility of 200-year-old documents, those that made a first attempt to smooth the inconsistencies, 
likely Greek historians, Fabius Pictor, Cincius Alimentus, and even Calpurnius Piso, assuredly had 
to make many decisions on the priority given to any conflicting notices found. Their conclusions 
in this task could result in the sometimes confused and contradictory narrative that Livy reports. 
In this way various threads of narrative, differing in certain specifics, could have been created by 
different solutions to these archival discrepancies: the traditions culminating in Diodorus, and 
Livy’s various sources could have all originated in this fashion. 
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The most consistently controversial matters—triumph assignation, provinciae, dictatorial 
duty, and interreges—are all episodes that 1) could have been recorded in multiple archives for 
different reasons and 2) did not form the basic chronological marker for the state, the eponymous 
magistrate (some of this information might not have been recorded at all, such as cognomina). 
Therefore, the convention in the recording of this information is likely ad hoc and varied not just 
with the type of information, but what each recorder thought worthy of commemoration.  
  This again leads to a slightly depressing conclusion: the presence of more records does not 
necessarily equate to better documented events. With the infusion of more people to positions of 
power, and thus a diffusion of the responsibility in the keeping of archives, the potential for 
incompatibilities and inconsistencies might have been increased. That the record is at all cohesive 










The Partiality and Integrity of Livy’s Second Pentad 
 
We have already seen how an early focus on chronology without any centralized authority 
could explain the errors and discrepancies apparent in the historical tradition of the fourth century. 
The presence of such problems, therefore, cannot force a rejection of the narrative by itself. Its 
acceptance by historians and scholars, however, has been impeded by another perceived feature of 
the tradition: distortions arising from any biases or programmatic approaches on the part of Livy 
or his immediate sources. As the Struggle of the Orders presents a record of intense political and 
social upheaval, conflicts that were indeed still pertinent in one way or another during the time of 
Livy and especially in the time his sources, such partiality is capable of seriously compromising 
any portrayal of this period. It is true that characterization and moralizing were an important part 
of any ancient historical endeavor: the fruit of such inquiry was intended to edify its listeners in 
moral and intellectual matters as much as inform of past events. Indeed, history without 
moralization would have been far less useful to historians, whose main objectives were often the 
contemporary application of historical example.  
Livy himself states explicitly that his history is a means to an end, to remind the Roman 
people of the degradation of their culture and morality.265 Herodotus conveyed to his Greek 
audience the value of their institutions, and he conveyed to all the mutability of fortune and the 
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danger of hubristic overreach. Thucydides transmits timeless messages concerning the interaction 
of fear, greed, and the pursuit of international politics. The concept of historical objectivity, as 
encapsulated by Leopold von Ranke’s 19th century pursuit of wie es eigentlich gewesen, played no 
role in these endeavors. Thus, didacticism and its attendant features of characterization and 
moralization are an integral part of Rome’s historical tradition.   
This chapter will show that such aspects, inescapable in any ancient historical text, also 
play a strong role in Livy’s construction of Rome’s past as well. This does not mean, however, 
that Livy suborned historical evidence in service of these didactic goals. In what follows, Livy’s 
key portrayals of both patrician and plebeian actors from the first decade will be analyzed to 
illustrate the breadth and diversity of his characterization. This will be followed by Livy’s 
treatment of the systemic development of the Roman state during the second pentad, with 
particular focus on the lack of interest the historian shows in key developmental moments during 
the Struggle of the Orders. It will emerge from this discussion that Livy was intensely interested 
in the personalities of these episodes but showed little interest in moralizing or politicizing the 
historical events behind them. Thus, like so much else of the narrative of the second pentad, certain 
key features, which in this case comprise individual motivation, personality, and political rivalry, 
seem to have been grafted onto an increasingly definite historical structure. 
 
A Compromised Narrative? 
 
 Post-modernism has long shed the notion, popular in nineteenth-century Romantic German 
theory founded by von Ranke named above, that bias can be an irrelevant factor in an historian’s 
recounting of the past. While one can strive to produce a dispassionate approximation of the truth, 
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based on a best-fit reconstruction of the evidence, the landscape of historical cause, connection, 
and significance will never be devoid of the historian’s own experiences in his or her own context. 
This is especially true of Roman historians of their early history, who not only brought these 
subconscious biases to their reproductions, but often actively strove to drive their retellings 
towards one or more meta-historical themes, such as overwhelming patriotism and the moral 
superiority of ancestors. Early Roman history was a perfect venue for such practice, as the archival 
and family records left much space to creatively hash out discrepancies and insert thematic 
agendas. 
 Livy and his Roman forbearers have been thought to be particularly guilty of this practice, 
and a long tradition of scholarship has highlighted many of the ways they shaped content and filled 
gaps with their particular methodological and thematic goals. Very thorough and compelling 
studies have been completed on the programmatic tendencies of Livy over the last 60 years, 
including the seminal works of P. G. Walsh in 1961 and T. J. Luce in 1977. Walsh highlights the 
moral aspects of Livy’s presentation of Roman history, stating that it was driven to present the 
superiority of earlier generations in devoutness, valor, good faith, moderation, and chastity.266 
Luce, on the other hand, argues that Livy dictated the very organization of his work based on the 
two main thematic threads of his composition: Rome grew steadily in its early years and suffered 
a steep moral decline beginning in the second century BCE.267 In Luce’s reading, the very selection 
and organization of Livy’s material was in service of these two goals.268 Numerous works have 
since followed which further nuanced these arguments since their original publication.269  
                                                 
266 Walsh (1961), 80. For a more extended discussion of Walsh’s arguments on this topic see Walsh (1974).  
267 Luce (1977), 232-251. 
268 Luce (1977), xix. 
269 Important studies on this topic include Ogilvie (1965) and more recently Feldherr  (1997), 136-157 highlight how 
Livy establishes an image of the Roman state during the first pentad. Feldherr (1998) describes how Livy is driven 
to create civic identity in his own day through the literary presentation of historical spectacle. Jaegar (1997) 
describes how monumenta in Livy’s narrative both inform and transport his audience through their recognition of 
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 It is not the contention of the present study that these analyses of Livy’s methodological or 
thematic goals are incorrect for the second pentad; indeed, even as the archival record during the 
fourth century gradually grew more robust, there was still much room to compose original 
speeches, justify and rationalize external conflicts, and tease out didactic elements of the narrative. 
While these by no means preclude the emerging archival habit, they nevertheless cannot aid our 
endeavor to understand it. They are the “flesh” on the “bones” of the historical material of the 
fourth century, and it is the bones that are of concern here.  
 This authorial imposition, however, must be considered if and when it causes alterations to 
the baseline material beneath it.270 This could be a particularly pernicious possibility for the second 
pentad, as it deals with social issues of class that still roiled hotly in the time of Livy’s main sources 
in the second and first centuries BCE. Did the literary license of Rome’s historians subvert any 
historical information that might have been transmitted through archival sources? Could the 
economic and social issues that surrounded the period of the Gracchi in the latter half of the second 
century have weighed so heavily on the narrative for previous periods that a specific lens was 
created, through which historical information was hopelessly distorted? This has certainly been 
contended in the past and currently remains the preferred position of many scholars of Livy’s text. 
He was so affected by the populist activities of Tiberius Gracchus and Julius Caesar, argues 
Wilhelm Hoffman, which he would have perceived as moving far from the ideal of the res publica, 
that Livy throws all his sympathies towards the Senate and aristocratic classes, levying heavy 
condemnation on tribunes throughout his text. Although Livy is muted in overt criticism, Hoffman 
                                                 
their own civic space. Chaplin (2000) highlights the construction of didactic scenes within Livy’s narrative which 
instructed on matters both patriotic and moral. Lushkov (2015) looks for the values and tensions of later republican 
Italy within the actions and words of historical presentations of magistrates. 
270 As occurred frequently and intentionally according (cynically) to such scholars as Wiseman (see Chapter 1). 
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nevertheless sees a strong patrician bias permeating his work.271 Most recently, Hans Beck has 
highlighted an impartiality towards senatorial elite in Fabius Pictor’s attempt at creating coherence 
from the scattered fragments of the city’s early history. This was a formative moment in Roman 
historical narrative and slanted the works of all subsequent authors, including Livy.272 It is the goal 
of the remaining chapter to demonstrate how such skepticism disregards basic operating 
parameters of ancient historical writing, which included a level of moralizing as a basic genre 
feature, and the specific lack of bias in the presentation of political, legal, or social development. 
 
Debilitating Bias or Predictable Characterization? 
 
The events comprising Livy’s second pentad are particularly vulnerable to the intrusion of 
class and political bias. Continuous social tensions, recalcitrant political postures, and hard-fought 
compromises are fertile ground for sewing the biases of historians. Many scholars, such as 
Hoffman mentioned above, certainly saw Livy’s characterizations of historical figures and events 
as strongly pro-patrician. While Livy certainly presents historical actors or groups of actors in 
predictable stereotypes, the diversity of his presentation militates against such strong skepticism 
in the underlying source material; the historian is simply fulfilling the main purpose of the genre 
with didactic exempla. 
 
 
                                                 
271 Hoffman (1967), 85: Das Schicksal, das Tiberius Gracchus traf, der mit seinem Anträgen an die 
Volksversammlung die große revolutionäre Bewegung einleitete, ersheint ihm ebenso gerechtfertigt wie Caesars 
Ende, der sich in seinem Tun am weitsten von der alten res publica entfernen sollte. Diese hier angedeutete Linie 
läßsich noch weiter führen. So sehr nämlich Livius jede ausgesprochene Tendenze vermeidet: dem Senat und den 
alten regierenden Schichten gehören bereits in den frühen Perioden der römischen Geschichte seine eigentlichen 
Sympathien, die Tribunen aber trifft nicht selten bittere Kritik. 
272 Beck (2003), 73-92. 
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Characterizations of patricians 
In order to assess the impact any potential class bias might have had on Livy’s historical 
narrative, it is important to establish the characterizations which are attached to various groups of 
actors. At many points during the first decade, Livy certainly presents patricians in a favorable 
manner. In the second year of the Republic, as he introduces the conflicts between the lower and 
upper orders of Roman society, he reveals his approach to the debate: “and no one afterwards was 
so popular through evil means than the entire Senate was at that time through good governance.”273 
The use of popularis here, characterized by their mala ars, indicates what Livy thought of 
demagogic, popular leaders in the coming centuries. In the succeeding books, Livy continually 
constructs noble portrayals of patricians and their actions, even when they domineer through fear 
and intimidation. Bands of aristocratic youths proved terrifying for plebeians at many times, but 
nevertheless Livy chooses to describe the situation thusly: 
The youths, mostly those who were of Caeso’s band, grew in their anger against the plebs, 
and did not shrink in their courage: but they then conducted themselves mostly in such a 
way that they greatly moderated their attacks…In the intervening days when the tribunes 
did not agitate on behalf of the law (to codify the laws), nothing was more gentle or quiet 
than these very youths. They kindly saluted and addressed plebeian men, they invited them 
to their home, assisted them in the forum, and allowed the tribunes themselves to hold other 
meetings without interruption, there was never any violence either in public or private, 
except when debate about the law ensued; at other times the youths were for the people. 
With not even an unkind word, much less any force, they mollified the plebs little by little 
through kindness and blandishment.274 
 
This passage typifies Livy’s tendency to characterize the aristocracy, even the passionate and 
sometimes violent youth among them, as governed by a sense of moderation and camaraderie.  
                                                 
273 Livy II.9.8: nec quisquam unus malis artibus postea tam popularis esset quam tum bene imperando universus 
senatus fuit. 
274 Livy II.14.3-5: iuniores, id maxime quod Caesonis sodalium fuit, auxere iras in plebem, non minuerunt animos; 
sed ibi plurimum profectum est quod modo quodam temperavere impetus suos…Mediis diebus quibus tribuni de lege 
non agerent, nihil eisdem illis placidius aut quietius erat. Benigne salutare, adloqui plebis homines, domum invitare, 
adesse in foro, tribunos ipsos cetera pati sine interpellatione concilia habere, nunquam ulli neque publice neque 
privatim truces esse, nisi cum de lege agi coeptum esset; alibi popularis iuventus erat. Ne voce quidem incommoda, 
nedum ut ulla vis fieret, paulatim permulcendo tractandoque mansuefecerant plebem. 
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 Patricians are also shown to be a cohesive force in the state, often in the face of plebeian 
agitators bent on discord and obstruction. In Book III, the tribune C. Terentius Harsa agitated for 
codification of the law and gives a very short speech on the tyranny of the consuls, whom he asserts 
are like two kings instead of the one they drove out, who wielded unimpeachable power to terrorize 
the plebeians.275 In opposition, Q. Fabius, a prefect of the city, upbraided Harsa for raising this 
issue with the consuls absent and reminds him that he is to serve the public good, not communal 
destruction.276  
 A lengthier debate occurred on the eve of the reforms of 367 BCE, as the tribunes Licinius 
and Sextius served their ninth consecutive term in office. They deliver a feeble appeal to the 
patricians, imploring them to maintain the progress made by the plebeians, instead of hindering it. 
Appearing more as a statement of defeat, they threaten to quit their post should their demands 
continue to be ignored.277 Against this, Appius Claudius Crassus, in the tradition of his family, 
delivers a very lengthy and passionate rebuttal, condemning the tribunes for their nine-year 
chokehold on the office. The main thrust of his counter argument is religious in nature: only 
patricians can hold the auspices, under which the Roman state grew prosperous and remains 
secure. By depriving the patricians of offices holding the auspices, they threaten to deprive the city 
of them entirely, driving it into danger and uncertainty.278  
   Despite these positive portrayals, the patricians are nevertheless sometimes characterized 
with violent arrogance towards the will of the people and the tribunes, to the extent that their 
behavior flouts and undermines the law. As L. Furius and C. Manlius are brought to trial by an 
unnamed tribune for their obstinance in the face of a land-redistribution bill, the Senate began to 
                                                 
275 Livy III.9.2-5. Bleicken (1955), 15-6. 
276 Livy III.9.6-12. 
277 Livy IV. 39.5-12. 
278 Livy VI. 41.4-12. 
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meet in secret, determined to effect an acquittal by any means necessary.279 On the day of the trial, 
the prosecuting tribune was found dead in his house, and the senators, not at all fearing justice, 
began to brag of the deed: “and no one repented of the guilt to such a degree that even the innocent 
wished to be seen to have committed it, and it was openly held that tribunician power needed to 
be tamed by misdeed.”280 Livy concludes that this proved how ineffectual the laws were that 
granted sacrosanctity to the tribunes in the face of the arrogance of the patricians and the plebs 
were justly roused to anger.281 
 Mention has already been made of the bands of aristocratic youths who terrorized the lower 
class with unpredictable violence in public. Although, as discussed above, Livy has characterized 
this phenomenon on one occasion as inducing goodwill between the orders, they are much more 
often seen as a disruptive and extra-legal civil force. During the tyrannical extension of the second 
decemvirate, such a band of youths was used to terrify Appius Claudius’ opponents, even helping 
him maintain control during the intense turmoil following the death of Verginia (for which the 
crowd blamed him entirely).282 They reappear with Appius Claudius after he was ousted from his 
unlawful office and as he is formally charged with enslaving the free-born Verginia, again 
inspiring terror in the plebeians.283 Violent patrician youths cause further trouble in 447 BCE: 
during a period of relative peace at home and abroad, the youths began to insult the plebs, assault 
the tribunes, and thoroughly depress the lower order.284 In a disheartening admission, the elder 
patricians, “although they believed their youths to be too fierce, thus preferred, if moderation must 
                                                 
279 Livy II.54.7. 
280 Livy II.54.10: adeoque neminem noxiae paenitebat, ut etiam insontes fecisse videri vellent, palamque ferretur 
malo domandam tribuniciam potestatem. 
281 Livy II.54.9; 55.2. 
282 Livy III. 49.1-4. 
283 Livy III.56.2. 
284 Livy III.65.7-9. 
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be forgotten, that overweening courage be on their side, rather than with their enemies.”285 Livy 
concludes this scene with the fatalistic observation that civil security appears to be zero-sum: as 
one looks to rid himself of fear he becomes fearful to others, and as one looks to avoid injury, he 
becomes injurious to his countrymen.286 
 Livy also describes patrician joy at Roman setbacks on the battlefield.  As the tribune 
Canuleius advocated for his reforms, the Senate rejoiced to hear of the revolt in Ardea, that the 
Veientes were ravaging the Roman countryside, and that the Volsci and the Aequi were threatening 
Verrugo.287 The patricians cynically saw these threats as opportunities to quash the ambitions of 
the tribunes by fierce imposition of the levy. Similarly, on the failure of the first campaign 
conducted by a plebeian consul, L. Genucius, Livy describes the taunts of the patricians, as if they 
enjoyed the misfortune of the Roman army, in order to validate their claims of superiority.288 It is 
hard to imagine Livy, in his patriotism and knowing that plebeians would soon demonstrate great 
capacity in warfare, approving of such treasonous displays. 
  At other times, Livy highlights the dishonesty of the patrician order. In 457 BCE, as the 
tribunes secure the increase of their number to ten in the face of an imminent Sabine threat, they 
demand that elections be held immediately, “lest this promise too be empty after the war, as at 
other times.”289 The consuls are elsewhere accused of trumping up foreign threats in order to 
suppress domestic upheaval, even going so far as inventing enemy armies and declaring war on 
innocent peoples.290 At the end of the fifth century, the patricians were desperate to monopolize 
the consular tribunate. They set up a trick (artem), by putting up lowly candidates to confound the 
                                                 
285 Livy III.65.10: Seniores contra patrum ut nimis feroces suos credere iuvenes, ita malle, si modus excedendus 
esset, suis quam adversariis superesse animos. 
286 Livy II.56.11. 
287 Livy IV.1.4. 
288 Livy VII.6.10-1. 
289 Livy III.30.6: Tribunicia comitia, ne id quoque post bellum ut cetera vanum esset, extemplo habita. 
290 Livy III.10.10-14. 
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electorate and drive voters to the patricians.291 At the beginning of the fourth century, they not 
only nominated their most august members, but also contrived a plan based on phony religious 
scruple, and thus terrified the populace into voting for those who held the ancient auspices. By 
these scurrilous means, they secured the entirety of the college.292  
  
Characterization of the plebs 
It is clear that there is no systematic program to elevate the patrician cause to a position of 
moral superiority. He appears to treat each situation individually, casting characters to support the 
overriding lesson he is trying to construct. What then can be said about Livy’s characterization of 
the plebeian causes and those that champion them? True to his patriotic interests, he finds strong 
condemnation in anything which jeopardizes Rome’s ability to muster its troops and effectively 
wage war. He conveys harsh criticism of both soldiers who prove themselves to be lacking military 
discipline and tribunes who obstruct the levy. This is especially true in times of imminent danger. 
He often characterizes the masses as lazy, licentious, and sometimes violent, and their leaders as 
self-serving rabble-rousers.  
Concerning an early instance of the conflict over debt, debtors are painted as “an inflamed, 
lawless mob standing around every day” and participating in an insurrection.293 Worse than this 
open seditio, they engaged in secret and secluded meetings, which Livy calls “more pernicious by 
far.”294 These nightly meetings seem to have bothered Livy’s sensibilities about the proper conduct 
of government debate, as he states that the consuls were indeed correct to assume the lower classes 
                                                 
291 Livy IV.56.3. 
292 Livy V.14.1-5. 
293 Livy II.27.12: Cum circumstaret cotidiana multitudo licentia accensa, [consul] arripi unum insignem ducem 
seditionum iussit. 
294 Livy II.27.13: Crescere inde malum in dies, non clamoribus modo apertis sed, quod multo perniciosius erat, 
secessione occultisque conloquiis. 
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were destructive to society.295 More than once, Livy characterizes the plebs as indolent,296 
violent,297 and favoring emotion and sentiment rather than law, a quality which he describes as 
setting the worst example in Book V.298  
 Perhaps the harshest condemnation of the plebs and their tactics is leveled against their 
conduct when external threats loomed over the city. Enemies, usually the Volscians, Aequians, 
and Etruscans in the fifth century, were often sensitive to the internal schisms of the Roman state 
and timed their attacks accordingly. Livy says that plebeians, through their agitation for debt relief, 
land reform, and codification of the laws, often incited foreign attacks.299 On campaign, 
insurrection was even more dangerous, and Livy expresses strong disdain for the practice. In 480 
BCE, the pitch of rhetoric had reached such an elevation that, despite the usual practice of leaving 
civil discord at home, “now the custom of disobeying the magistrates followed the Roman soldiery 
also into camp...by consensus, the army handed victory over to the defeated Aequians, deserted 
their standards, left the commander on the lines, and returned against orders to the camp.”300 Livy 
shares the horror of the consuls, who began to fear both armies in the field. Nine years later, under 
the particularly cruel command of Appius Claudius, the army again conducted itself “sluggishly, 
lazily, neglectfully, and stubbornly.” Claudius accused the centurions of contaminating the minds 
                                                 
295 Livy II.28.2: Eam rem consules rati, ut erat, perniciosam. 
296 Livy II.28.5: otio lascivire plebem; II.52.2: Ex copia deinde otioque lascivire rursus animi et pristina mala. 
297 Livy II.63.2: Non ultra videbatur latura plebes dilationem agrariae legis, ultimaque vis parabatur. 
298 Livy II.7.5: Consuli deinde qui superfuerat, ut sunt mutabiles volgi animi, ex favore non invidia modo sed 
suspicio etiam cum atroci crimine orta.; II. 42.6: Sollicitati et eo anno sunt dulcedine agrariae legis animi plebis.; 
V.29.7-8: Vicit tamen gratiam senatus plebis ira et pessimo exemplo innoxii denis milibus gravis aeris condemnati 
sunt. 
299 Livy II. 42.3: Eo infestior facta plebes seditione domestica bellum externum excivit. The inciting factor in this 
case was agrarian legislation. 
300 Livy II.44.10-11: iam non parendi magistratibus morem in castra quoque Romanum militem sequi…consensu 




of the soldiers, who cursed him as he passed.301 Claudius might have deserved this treatment, and 
Livy is certainly not sympathetic to him in this scene, but this behavior roused the spirits of the 
opposing Volscians, resulting in increased loss of Roman life and territory. To cap Livy’s disgust 
at this episode, he accuses the soldiery of “rejoicing at their own slaughter and ignominy.”302 
Whatever his sympathies with respect to class, this treasonous act seemingly offended his patriotic 
sensibilities. 
 In later books, Livy shifts most of his criticism towards the architects of plebeian 
discontent: the tribunes of the plebs. Both in his own words and through the speech of his 
characters, the historian often constructs disdainful occupants of this office, the tactics of its 
holders, and the effect it has on the Roman lower classes. The harshest criticism of the tribunes 
usually emerges from the mouths of Livy’s main characters, who are often at loggerheads with the 
plebeian magistrates, and one such powerful speech from Book III is put into the mouth of the 
hero Cincinnatus, a figure who evokes strong associations of moderation and patriotism. His words 
should carry weight, despite his personal animosity against the tribunes for driving his son from 
Rome and reducing his estate to poverty.303 In fact, Livy seems sympathetic to Cincinnatus’ anger 
at the plebs, characterizing his exiled son as “great in spirit” (magnitudine animi). Thus, his 
condemnation of the tribunes is harsh: “the tribunes of the plebs, now a permanent body, ruled like 
a king by crimes and demagoguery, not as in the Roman Republic, but as in a ruined 
household…talkative, seditious, seeds of discord, tribunes twice and thrice elected by the basest 
                                                 
301 Livy II.58.7-9: Segniter, otiose, neglegenter, contumaciter omnia agere; nec pudor nec metus coercebat…Omni 
nequiquam acerbitate prompta, nihil iam cum militibus agere; a centurionibus corruptum exercitum dicere; 
tribunos plebei cavillans interdum et Volerones vocare. 
302 Livy II.59.3: alioqui gaudere sua clade atque ignominia. 
303 Livy III.13.8-91. 
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practices live with regal abandon.”304 The image of tribunes acting without appeal or oversight, 
like the ancient kings, is often repeated throughout Livy’s work. The author’s own sympathies are 
made clear as even the plebs are moved by Cincinnatus’ words, and the tribunes mockingly 
(cavillarorum) resist the consul’s levy with religious technicality (exsolvere religione velle).305 
Finally, Livy claims that Cincinnatus was victorious because “there had not yet come about this 
disrespect of the gods which now holds this generation.”306 Thus, Livy reinforces the approbation 
of the mores of earlier Romans, while simultaneously denigrating both the morals of his own day 
and the office of the tribunate in one succinct statement. 
 Another such speech of condemnation is found at the beginning of Book V and issued from 
Appius Claudius in response to tribunician complaints about the length of military service during 
the war with Veii. Again, Livy couches this episode in terms exceedingly favorable to the 
patricians, saying “He not only was ready in his intellect, but also trained in its use,”307 and 
characterizing the other side as merely tribunician seditions (tribunicias seditiones).308 The 
massive length of the speech, one of the longest of the first decade, is surely also a sign of its 
prominence in expressing Livy’s desired morality and themes. Appius Claudius claims that the 
tribunes are “really like some shameless doctors seeking a job, since they always wish there to be 
some sickness in the Republic, so that there could be something to which they could administer a 
cure.”309 They fail not just in patriotism, but in basic humanity, by encouraging discord between 
                                                 
304 Livy III.19.4-5: perpetui iam tribuni plebis, non ut in re publica populi Romani sed ut in perdita domo lingua 
criminibusque regnarent…loquaces, seditiosos, semina discordiarum, iterum ac tertium tribunos, pessimis artibus, 
regia licentia vivere. 
305 Livy III.20.1; 20.4. 
306 Livy III.20.5: Sed nondum haec quae nunc tenet saeculum neglegentia deum venerat. 
307 Livy V.3.1. 
308 Livy V.2.13. 
309 Livy V.3.6: Sic hercule, tamquam artifices improbi, opus quaerunt quippe semper aegri aliquid esse in re 
publica volunt, ut sit ad cuius curationem a vobis adhibeantur. Livy revisits this metaphor of tribunes profiting from 
“sickness” in society again at V.5.12. 
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the patricians and the plebeians.310 While the force of these accusations may be tempered by the 
fiery characterizations of the Appii Claudii throughout the work, they nevertheless reflect the 
general sense Livy provides of the disadvantages of tribunician authority. 
 A very common complaint about the behavior of tribunes is their propensity to rabble-
rouse and inject madness into the political discourse. Although not as fiery as the language of 
Appius Claudius and their intentional perpetuation of a disease, nevertheless senseless incitation 
to violence occurs frequently. In 460 BCE, “the tribunes strove to make the plebs suspicious of 
[the consuls] through incrimination: a conspiracy was formed, Caeso was at Rome, a plan was 
hatched to kill the tribunes and massacre the plebs.”311 They goaded (instigabant) the plebs312 and 
incited riots (auctores turbarum).313 He characterized their usual method for agitation (land-
distribution legislation) as a poison (venenum)314 which caused them to enter a frenzy (furebat).315  
 The great tribunes of the middle of the fourth century, C. Licinius and L. Sextius, who 
came to an initial power-sharing compromise in 367 BCE, are also accused of being manipulators 
of public sentiment: “contrivers through so many years of managing the minds of the plebs.”316 
Livy here uses the same word, artifices, with which he reproaches the tribunes in the speech of 
Appius Claudius in Book V. These are not the only great plebeian champions who receive 
pejorative descriptions in the text, as the Ogulnii brothers, Quintus and Gnaeus, whose advocacy 
on behalf of the plebs opened the pontifical college to them in 300 BCE, are also painted with this 
same brush. Despite the peace brought about by recent colonization, the Ogulnii injected 
                                                 
310 Livy V.3.9. 
311 Livy III.15.2-33: tribuni tendebant ut plebi suspectos eos criminando facerent: coniurationem factam; Caesonem 
Romae esse; interficiendorum tribunorum, trucidandae plebis consilia inita 
312 Livy III.22.2. 
313 Livy V.18.8. 
314 Livy II.52.3: Tribuni plebem agitare suo veneno, agraria lege. 
315 Livy II.54.2: Agrariae legis tribuniciis stimulis plebs furebat. 
316 Livy. VI.36.10: artifices iam tot annorum usu tractandi animos plebis. Mommsen, vol. 2  (1887-1888), 312-3. 
112 
 
disagreement into the top men of the state, both patrician and plebeian, after failing to incriminate 
the patricians and otherwise incite unrest.317 The trope of tribunes looking for any means necessary 
to create a wedge within society, and therefore justify their office or seek glory, is persistent, 
appearing throughout Books II-X and obviously forming a key pillar of Livy’s portrayal men 
occupying the tribunate. 
 The agency of this manipulation can be diffuse, and Livy sees the plebeian-tribune 
relationship as a bilateral avenue of dissention and agitation. “The tribunes, as they nearly always 
are ruled by the masses more than they rule them, conceded to the greedy plebs as they listened, 
so that Scaptius might say what he wished.”318 The image of either the people or the tribunes ruling 
(regere) does not evoke a healthy system of dialogue or compromise and forms for Livy a severe 
weakness in the functioning of the Roman state. 
 Tribunes and other activists on behalf of the plebs are also shown to act incredibly selfishly, 
even to the point of risking the security of the Republic in the face of external threats, not to 
mention subverting the laws. In 339 BCE, the Senate was disgusted with the greed (cupiditate) of 
Ti. Aemilius Mamercinus, who left his campaign before its conclusion, to celebrate a triumph. He 
thereafter conducted his consulship like a seditious tribune (seditiosis tribunatibus similem) and 
attacked the patricians at every opportunity while meeting no resistance from his colleague, who 
was of the plebeian order.319 The patricians believed that great damage was done to the state during 
this year.320 Equating the personal grudges of Aemilius in this scene to the normal conduct of 
tribunes certainly reveals Livy’s attitudes towards the latter. 
                                                 
317 Livy X.6.3-4: Tamen ne undique tranquillae res essent, certamen iniectum inter primores civitatis, patricios 
plebeiosque, ab tribunis plebis Q. et Cn. Ogulniis, qui undique criminandorum patrum apud plebem occasionibus 
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In much the same way that Livy views disobedience among the soldiers as a pernicious 
threat to Rome’s safety, the tribunes’ antagonistic use of the levy meets with the same 
condemnation. In 481 BCE, the tribune Spurius Licinius prevented the levy in the face of a double 
invasion of Latium from the Aequi and Veientines, in order to take the opportunity to press for 
land redistribution. However, he garnered all the hatred which was attached to plebeian power and 
was opposed as much by the other tribunes as the consuls.321 The tribunes again were turned 
against each other in the next year, concerning the levy in the face of a unified Etruscan threat. 
Three tribunes were convinced of the public necessity and therefore used their powers for the well-
being of the state.322 When a group of Sabines, exiles, and slaves, under the leadership of Appius 
Hardonius, took possession of the Capitoline in 460 BCE, Livy implies that the tribunes took 
advantage of the upheaval to engender further infighting. They forbade the people from aiding the 
consuls’ attack on the hill, prompting P. Valerius to issue a forceful accusation that they were 
treasonous and aiding the enemy.323 Clearly, Livy conceived of the great dangers which could arise 
from the interruption of standard military practice, whether stemming from insubordination of the 
soldiers or subversion of the process at the outset by the tribunes.   
While the evidence above might seem abundant, these observations are not enough to 
confirm Hoffman’s argument of a pervasive pro-patrician bias: Livy creates just as many 
praiseworthy characters from the lower order and positive characterizations of the plebeian pursuit 
of land, debt relief, and access to public office that typify their efforts during the first decade of 
his history. Through an analysis of these contrasting episodes, I will demonstrate that Livy was 
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not beholden to any patrician partiality in the composition of his history and therefore not prone 
to emphasis the class struggles in a way that compromised the surviving narrative.  
 Livy heaps the most praise on plebeians when they evince moderation and peaceful 
behavior. He approves of the temperate behavior during the first secession of the plebs as “not 
causing or receiving any harm.”324 The second secession is also characterized by this moderate 
behavior, both in their march out of town and in its merciful resolution.325 Leniency in legal matters 
is often highlighted, including the trial of Sempronius, which was dropped voluntarily by the 
tribune Hortensius, and the trial of Ti. Menenius.326 The tribunes of 384 BCE intercede in 
cooperation with the Senate in the indictment of M. Manlius, thus winning approbation for ending 
this treasonous push towards regnum.327 Livy deems praiseworthy many plebeians from the fourth 
century, including P. Sempronius, tribune in 310, who won general approval for attempting to 
enforce the lex Aemilia and force Appius Claudius from his elongated censorship, and C. Maenius, 
who as dictator eloquently defended himself against unfair charges and was wonderfully acquitted 
(egregie absolvuntur).328  The tribune M. Duillius, who is singled out on multiple occasions for 
his moderation, succeeds in unifying the patricians and the plebs in praise as he eloquently checks 
the power of his colleagues, elects new tribunes, and relinquishes his seat.329 
 The controversy over admitting plebeians to the pontificate in 300 BCE occasioned Livy’s 
last surviving debate on the topic of the Struggle of the Orders. Again, the patrician speaker is an 
Appius Claudius, but simply regurgitates the sentiments of his ancestor in 367 BCE. Focus is given 
to P. Decius Mus, who begins by invoking his father, the famous consul who saved the Roman 
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army by dedicating himself to the gods. Does this not grant him the ability to consult the gods and 
conduct the rites as well as a patrician? Have plebeians proven themselves to any lesser degree in 
leadership, custody of the auspices, and in triumphs?330 Plebeians have access to every other honor 
and now seek the priesthood as well, “not to strike you, Appius, from your place, but so that 
plebeian men can help you also in the administration of divine matters just as they help in other 
human affairs as far as their strength allows.”331 In the following year, Decius’ sentiments carried 
the discussion and he was elected to the first board of plebeian pontiffs. Livy did recognize and 
convey the justice of plebeian causes as well as the ability of plebeian leaders to effectively 
advocate for them. 
 Perhaps the subject about which Livy shows the greatest sympathy for the plebeians is the 
issue of debt. To frame this for his audience, Livy composes three highly emotional scenes 
depicting the injustice of debt bondage and torture. The emphasis in these extended passages is on 
the patriotism of the defaulting citizens, their youth or sacrifices in war, and the pitiable state in 
which their indebtedness has rendered them.332 Fearing legislation to curb their profit, money 
lenders are described as frustrating both orders through great artfulness and influence.333 Livy 
admits that there was a great accumulation of debt owing to rebuilding efforts after the Gallic sack, 
which affected even the rich.334 Tribunes accused the Senate of refusing to elect censors in 380 
BCE to avoid the calculation of the extent to which the plebs were oppressed by their debt,335 and 
even the leaders of the plebeians were crippled by interest and effectively ceded all political gains 
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back to the patricians.336 Even though interest had been capped at one percent in 353 BCE, the 
poorest still found it insurmountable.337 Nevertheless, the debt commission appointed the next year 
and consisting of three plebeians receives incredibly high praise for their efficacy and fairness, 
resolving a great deal of the crisis without complaint from either side.338 Thus, it appears that Livy 
commiserates with this aspect of the plebeian struggle throughout the first decade of his history. 
 The same is not true of the issue of land distribution. As mentioned above, Livy attributes 
much sedition to passions inflamed by tribunes promising equitable distribution of public land. It 
should be expected that land would prove a particularly salient issue to Livy’s main body of 
sources, as these historians were writing under the influence of Gracchan and post-Gracchan land 
reform programs in the second and first centuries. Livy makes some powerful statements about 
the abuses of the patricians in this respect: he claims that patricians held public land unlawfully 
(per iniuriam) and by force, and would not allocate even the unused sections.339 Agrarian 
legislation proposed in the next year, however, is characterized by Livy as stirring up sedition, 
undercutting his previous condemnation. Tribunes accuse patricians of forcibly seizing public land 
but cannot generate enough incentive to mobilize the masses.340 Thus, in both cases, Livy qualifies 
the threat that land shortages posed to the livelihood of the plebs. 
 It is clear from this survey that Livy considered plebeians to be just as capable of 
accomplishment as the patricians, and the upper order just as prone to condemnation as the lower. 
Praiseworthy speeches are generated by members of both groups in nearly equal numbers; both 
form the protagonists and antagonists of Livy’s many moral lessons. The patricians evince 
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negative traits of greed and dishonesty, the plebeians of sloth and lawlessness, and both of violence 
and feeling treasonous joy at the defeat of their political rivals at the hands of enemies. Livy has 
serious moral problems with the obstruction of the levy in times of threat, as well as the subjugation 
of the lower classes to debt bondage. In short, Livy displays no pervasive tendency to prioritize a 
narrative favorable to either group. He is much more likely to approach each individual, episode, 
and topic on its own merits (or simply convey the approach that he found pre-existing in his sources 
who did moderate). What can be said with confidence, however, is that Livy constructed moral 
and ethical lessons from each individual episode that he treated. In some, the patricians represented 
the exemplum sequendum, in others, this role was filled by plebeians. There was no need to distort 
the historical facts as Livy found them; his interest was in creating didactic moments through the 
characteristics of the protagonists, not in the progression of historical events.  
 A similar conclusion is reached by Walsh in his overview of the historian: “Livy steers a 
reasonably impartial course. Politically speaking, he clearly favoured an aristocratic government, 
with statesmen motivated by Roman virtus rather than Platonic philosophy, and he is fully aware 
of mob rule,” concluding that the only explicit anti-plebeian characterization deals with the 
agitation for land distribution, which this survey of the first decade has demonstrated.341  T. J. 
Cornell also notes that both pro-patrician and pro-plebeian sections are present within the 
narrative, making the case that Livy was perfectly capable of mediating a middle ground even 
through biased source material.342 Thus when evaluating the narrative of early Rome’s history for 
accuracy, we can rule out any Livian distortion of potential archival material by class bias. 
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Livy’s true bias: Concordia Ordinum 
   In what direction then, can we expect Livy to shade his narrative, what themes was he 
eager to highlight, and what messages about the past can we expect him to impart to his audience? 
The answer lies throughout the preceding survey of his discussions of the Struggle of Orders: he 
condemns the early Romans’ tendencies towards civil strife, in whatever form they took (resisting 
the levy, oppressive debt, etc.), and he praises their moderation. R. M. Ogilvie states that “Livy’s 
concern for peace and concord, however naïve and unrealistic, permeates his writing.”343 In 
particular, Ogilvie highlights the speech of Ti. Quinctius in Book III, who claimed that success 
depends on concordia, and that concordia is only achievable if everyone subverts their ambitions 
to the needs of the city.344 Ogilvie also points to Livy’s own life as a potentially motivating factor, 
highlighting the civil conflict that would have surrounded his hometown of Patavia in his youth.345 
Walsh shares this vision of Livy’s thematic goals: “Livy’s emphasis on the civic virtue of 
concordia can be seen especially in his portrayal of the Struggle of the Orders in the early books. 
Every possible opportunity is seized of praising the measures which advanced such concord, and 
of condemning the selfishness of sectional interests.”346  
 The advantages of concordia are made abundantly clear throughout the text. In the year 
preceding the first secession of the plebs, when class tensions were reaching a boiling point and a 
combined army of Volsci, Sabines, and Aequi threatened the city, the Senate and consuls made 
the moderate decision to appoint M. Valerius as dictator. Since Valerius’ father had granted the 
plebs the right of appeal, they trusted him immediately and did not refuse to attend the levy. “Never 
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before was the army so large; ten legions were created.”347 Rome won this war on all fronts. The 
implication is clear: when moderation is employed, and antagonism avoided, Rome’s military 
ability is limitless. This is, in fact, stated explicitly later in Book II, during another period of civil 
concord: “against this great harmony of general and army, the Aequi did not dare to offer 
themselves; they suffered their enemy to roam and devastate their fields.” This war yielded the 
largest prize to date.348 In the fourth century, patrician youths, once such a terror to the lower class, 
voluntarily agreed to celebrate the power sharing compromise of 367 BCE by funding the ludi 
maximi; the entire state paid them thanks.349 
 Social disunity created vulnerabilities on the battlefield. The perils of disobedient soldiers 
and overbearing generals has already been discussed above, but Livy articulates his point of view 
more directly: 
For a long time, this evil had been endured, partly by the good advice of the Senate, partly 
by the patience of the plebs, but now it had come to a head. Two states had been created 
from one; each side had its own magistrates, each its own laws. First, they were accustomed 
to raging against the levies, but nevertheless in war, these same men obeyed the generals. 
In whatever state the city found itself, it had been possible to hold out with military 
discipline intact: now, the custom of disobeying the magistrates follows the Roman 
soldiery even to camp.350 
 
Thus, the benefits of the presence of concord, and the potential dangers of its absence, are clearly 
articulated throughout Livy’s narrative. 
 While specific characteristics of the social orders seem to exacerbate the social discord of 
the state (discussed above), Livy also repeatedly and explicitly elucidates the endemic problems 
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of human nature that diminish concordia. The most pernicious seems to be self-interest: as Appius 
Claudius demands to be made dictator, an act threatening to social harmony, Livy states that “but 
because of factionalism and a regard for private affairs, which always thwarts and will always 
thwart public considerations, Appius won the debate and he himself was very nearly appointed 
dictator.”351 Livy articulates the incompatibility of self-interest and public harmony to great and 
tragic effect throughout the first decade, and this is taken by Ridley as programmatic for Livy’s 
entire approach to the topic of civil strife.352 Usury is explicitly stated in Book VII to be a threat 
to concordia, as are the selfishness of the tribunes, and secret meetings, both by the lower classes 
and the upper.353 The moments when early Romans resist such tendencies are singled out for praise 
by the historian, such as when the tribune Publilius Volero set aside personal enmities, treated the 
consuls fairly, and nearly won important legislation concerning the election of tribunes in the 
comitia tributa.354 On this same issue, two years later, the Senate argued “that they wished the 
majesty of the consulship to be as great as was possible for social harmony.”355 They then allowed 
the tribunes to be elected at the comitia tributa, demonstrating the capacity to avert disaster should 
moderation and harmony be prioritized.356 
 Livy perhaps expresses his ideal state most coherently during the period when social 
harmony seemed most distant: during the first secession of the plebs, a time when there was “no 
hope left except in the concord of the citizens,”357 Menenius Agrippa delivers a speech to the plebs 
on the Sacred Mount that conjures the image of a healthy body, relying on the unequal, but equally 
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important, services rendered by its belly, hands, mouth, and teeth. His speech won over the anger 
of the plebs, and immediately there was movement towards harmony.358 Livy’s obituary for 
Menenius calls him a mediator (interpres) and arbiter of civil concord (arbitor concordia civium), 
further highlighting the regard with which he held this man and his service to the state.359 In this 
way, we can see in Menenius, and in the words given to him by Livy, a programmatic statement 
of the way the historian conceived of the ideal harmony in a state. 
 Thus, the arguments maintained by Walsh and Ogilvie are borne out by a close reading of 
the first decade. Livy often focuses on providing positive examples of maintaining social harmony 
and harsh condemnation of the opposite. This, more than any other consideration of class bias or 
partiality, is the thematic centerpiece of his narrative. Livy would therefore not need to tamper 
with the bones of the narrative, the underlying archival notices, in order to conform to his 
programmatic or thematic goals. 
 
The Struggle of the Orders as an organizing topos 
 Thus far, I have shown that Livy did not apply any wholesale bias to his presentation of 
the class conflicts prominent in the second pentad of his work. The characterization which he 
regularly employed was individualized to the scene and to the particular lesson he was trying to 
convey, often towards a theme of patriotism and cohesion. The threat still remains, however, that 
such a goal prompted the historian to manipulate the structure of his narrative in order to skew 
focus towards developments which he thought important, relevant, and/or interconnected.  If he 
saw the social developments of the second pentad to be a particularly important set-piece of Roman 
history, he might have been at pains to bring this narrative to the fore, overemphasize its impact, 
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and deemphasize events that did not, to his mind, specifically stem from it. This potential structural 
bias is another potential hindrance to accepting the basic narrative of the fourth century and is 
particularly hard to detect without another outside source with which a comparison can be made. 
 A compelling thesis against this possibility was argued by Ronald Ridley in 1990. Opposed 
to the notion that he was obsessed with the Struggle of the Orders and spent great care crafting 
highly illustrative scenes, Ridley argues that Livy was manifestly uninterested in many of the most 
important developments. The proximate causes for the election and vehemence of Licinius and 
Sextius, the tribunes who brought about the first compromise in 367 BCE, were trivialized in the 
form of insecurities of Licinius’s wife. A member of the gens Fabia, she began to resent her 
husband’s plebeian status, was mocked by her sister, and thereby spurred him into seeking the 
highest offices.360 If Livy was interested in focusing great attention on socio-political change, this 
forms a certainly anecdotal beginning to such a putatively watershed moment.  
 When the consulship was eventually opened to the plebeians in 366, Ridley sees 
significance in the fact that he does not name which consul was plebeian and which patrician until 
352 BCE, and thus Livy seems uninterested in the achievement of the power accord or was unsure 
which hailed from which order.361 The latter seems highly unlikely, as the names are quite 
recognizably plebeian (Genucius in 365, 363, 362; Licinius in 364, 361; Poetelius in 360; Popilius 
in 359, 356; Plautius in 358; Marcius in 357). It is far more probable that Livy expected his 
audience to recognize such prominent plebeian names from the city’s history, or, at worst, the 
archival material and/or Livy’s source did not make a notation to this effect, and he did not add 
one. Ridley overreaches with this claim again with respect to consuls after the year 342 BCE.362 
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What is most likely is that the status of the consuls simply did not have the organizational 
importance for the history that Livy was writing. 
Much more telling, however, is the appointment of the first plebeian dictator in 356 BCE, 
and Ridley is right to point out that absolutely no discussion is held concerning this monumental 
appointment: no record of any debate held in the Senate, no controversy at the naming, and no 
mention of who appointed him363 (although the plebeian consul of that year, M. Popilius Laenas 
is the likely candidate). Again, such an important development in this tradition is glossed over 
without much concern or treatment. 
 The admission to the consulship then became a hotly contested issue every year, with the 
patricians emerging victorious more times than not (two patricians held the seat in 355, 354, 353—
although Livy’s sources disagree here—and 349). Ridley observes that the following consulships, 
from 348-343 BCE, alternate between the groups without any mention from Livy. This crucial 
time, before the 343 BCE legislation mandating permanent power sharing, passes without 
comment or explanation, further undermining the claim that the Struggle of the Orders was Livy’s 
main concern in his domestic coverage.364 
 Ridley also notes that Livy’s interest in debt, a very serious issue for the early Republic, is 
oftentimes seriously lacking. He does not introduce any developments with regard to usury 
between Books II and VI, even though debt is described as incredibly serious and threatening in 
both. The laws of 357 and 342 BCE, which first set interest rates at one percent and subsequently 
abolished them entirely, are mentioned only in passing by Livy and not given the proper focus one 
would expect for such important legislation.365 Ridley then makes the baffling argument that the 
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law for 326 BCE, which forbade nexum also passed by unadorned. But Livy devotes a whole 
chapter to its passage, including a heart-wrenching scene of debt-induced torture, and a declaration 
that “In that year another beginning of freedom was created for the Roman plebs.”366 Although 
Ridley acknowledges this chapter, he still calls the law “without elaboration.” 
 One area of omission from Livy’s presentation of the political and social development of 
the fourth century is any sort of cohesive treatment of the auspicia publica, the auspices which 
consular magistrates held and passed onto their successors. They were conceived to be under sole 
control of the patricians and formed the backbone of patrician resistance to allowing plebeians into 
the highest offices.367 This concept clearly formed a strong narrative of patrician privilege, evoked 
whenever the plebeians aspired to equality and were seen to threaten the very safety of the city.368 
The reforms of 367 BCE, although framed by Appius Claudius to throw the auspices into turmoil, 
nevertheless must have entailed a compromise which Livy omits entirely. There is absolutely no 
mention of how the auspices were to be henceforth shared and, what was unimaginable earlier, to 
be in the possession of a plebeian.369 Other compromises, such as the introduction of the praetor, 
are discussed and justified. Jerzy Linderski admirably attempts to solve this problem for Livy in 
his extensive work on Roman religion.370 He argues that the plebeian occupied the lesser 
partnership to his patrician colleague, who officially held the auspices, and was just in temporary 
possession of them.371 This is an admirable solution, until 356 BCE, when the first plebeian 
dictator had no senior colleague. Again, Livy is silent about this appointment and does not attempt 
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to relate how the auspices could have remained under the sole purview of the patricians, yet been 
bestowed in their entirety on a plebeian dictator. Indeed, until very late in the Republic, only 
patricians were appointed to the interrex, a position considered the repository for the auspices until 
proper elections could be held.  
Perhaps the solution to this dilemma lies in the praetorship, the holder of which was, Livy 
says, elected under the same auspices (iisdem auspiciis) as the consuls.372 As the patricians initially 
had sole access to this office, perhaps they viewed it as a safe and reliable repository for the 
auspices, even in the event of a plebeian dictator or the death of the senior, patrician consul. This 
might explain why the first plebeian praetor, Publilius Philo in 336 BCE, met such stiff resistance 
from the patrician consul, who would not even accept his name as a candidate, while the first 
plebeian dictator slipped through without issue. The senate however, which must have had several 
plebeian members by this point, advocated for his candidacy.373  
Thus it is shown that Livy displays a marked apathy towards pivotal moments in the 
Struggle of the Orders, from anecdotal incitation to conflicts, unacknowledged moments of 
significance, or a complete failure to relate the details of compromise. It could be that Livy 
expected the reader to follow the major plebeian successes in this century,374 but not to pause and 
reflect on momentous “firsts” is not in keeping with the theme of the work, which was to trace the 
characterizing developments of the Roman people. Were Livy to be structuring his narrative 
around these crucial developments in the fourth century, we would expect much more elaboration, 
emphasis, and focus. Instead, Livy seems at times to betray the unadorned notices of his archival 
sources, relaying flatly such things as consul names and laws passed, and glossing over with 
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brevity those things which would not have found extended exposition in the yearly notices. Thus, 
Livy’s treatment of the Struggle of the Orders recommends more the notion of an increased 
archival habit throughout the fourth century than a distortion of the narrative based on any 
structural or thematic bias. 
 
Potential Bias in Livy’s Sources 
 
 The previous section has argued against Livy’s alteration of historical material through any 
sort of partialities, either for the causes of any social class or in service to any didactic or thematic 
agenda. While he was certainly capable of such manipulation, he nevertheless presents a balanced 
picture of political upheaval, condemning both patricians and plebeians as he sees fit and not 
shackling his narrative to any structural program. What if, however, such biases and distortions 
were already endemic to the text before Livy receives it? What if, despite his overall equanimity 
of treatment, the narrative was already tainted? 
 Such questions can only be answered by diving into the fragmenta and testimonia of Livy’s 
direct sources, exiguous as they are. Huge volumes of scholarship have been devoted to the 
relatively few surviving lines and entire family histories constructed, complete with the logically 
accompanying biases. Walsh states unequivocally that Livy must navigate “such biased source 
material.”375 Is this reflective of the state of the evidence? This study will stay conservative with 
its approach, grounded in the surviving words and the potential conclusions that can be drawn 
therefrom. It is also assumed that Livy did not have access to better sources than his predecessors, 
or, more probably, that he did not consider it worthwhile to even seek them out.376  
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 None of Livy’s sources has garnered such a negative reputation as Valerius Antias. 
Constantly criticized by Livy for numerous deviations from other sources, Antias has been 
recognized as a principal fabricator of Rome’s early history. Livy certainly finds fault with his 
account quite frequently, especially with respect to his reports of casualty figures and spoils.377 
Based on this characterization, scholars have attempted to assume the most flagrant kinds of 
inventions in his work. T. P. Wiseman has gone to great lengths to illuminate twelve episodes in 
which a Valerius has a prominent role, describing all as wanton invention, despite not a single 
fragment interacting with these stories. Further, Wiseman claims that these were assuredly 
composed by a single person, who had a distinct rhetorical flair, despite the testimonium of Fronto, 
who says Antias wrote “without charm” (invenuste).378 Wiseman continues his accusations by 
attributing the negative stories concerning the gens Claudia, traditional rivals of the Valerii, to 
Antias as well,379 another claim that finds no support in the extant fragments. 
 With such a reputation, it is no surprise that scholars view with extreme skepticism any 
sections of Livy’s text that are thought to stem from Antias. Working on the principle that sources 
are only mentioned by name when they deviate from the standard or prevalent version, Antias 
certainly does seem to present conflicting narratives, especially concerning the traditions of regal 
Rome and concerning the Scipiones in the first three decades of the second century BCE. While 
regal Rome was a relative blank slate, open for authorial creativity, the changes Antias records 
concerning the Scipiones, however, seem to be both positive (F27a, F34) and negative (F29, F46, 
F49, F51, F52, F53). The balance falls towards more negative portrayals, including a long-term 
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scheme of embezzlement, conviction, fines, and exile. This issue comprises three of the six 
negative deviations in the extant fragments. There are no other explicitly pro-patrician passages 
and only one which makes special mention of a member of his own gens, describing the unusual 
honor of having a front door swing outward (F21).   
 There can be no doubt that Antias instilled no confidence in Livy when he conveyed 
casualty figures, but we should be skeptical when we find such information in ancient sources 
regardless. Beyond transmitting a long story about the crimes of a Scipio, he is otherwise even-
handed in his treatment of that gens. There does not appear to be any directed agenda of self-
aggrandizement through ancestor glorification (despite Wiseman’s claims) or any particular class 
bias to his surviving fragments. Furthermore, Livy does not cite him once during the second 
pentad; although this does not mean that he did not use Antias as a source, it implies that if he did, 
the narrative did not derivate enough from others to warrant specific mention. While it is certainly 
possible to see his text in the manner of Oakley, who suggests that Antias fabricated events and 
inserted them into his narrative, 380 there is also no good evidence that he did so consistently or 
with any agenda. It is also impossible to know whether he had his own sources or not.381 
 
C. Licinius Macer 
 In much the same way as it is tempting to see a member of the gens Valeria as being 
sympathetic to the patricians, it is just as tempting to see Licinius Macer as partial to the plebeian 
cause. In fact, Livy himself advocates this notion: “the praise sought for his own family makes 
Licinius an authority of less weight.”382 This seems to be damning testimony, especially in the 
                                                 
380 For Oakley’s scathing reading of Antias see Oakley, vol. 1 (1997-2005), 89-92. 
381 This conclusion is also reached by Cornell (1986b), 56.  
382 Livy VII.9.5: quaesita ea propriae familiae laus leviorem auctorem Licinium facit. =T2. 
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center of the second pentad, when the gens Licinia is at the heart of the social and political 
compromises. This assertion is convincing for Mommsen and, more recently, Wiseman.383 Macer 
is also known for his use of the libri lintei, a collection of mysterious, old (and fictitious?) 
documents, which were consulted by very few other authors, an exclusivity that purportedly lent 
increased authority to his accounts. These linen books, however, cease to provide information after 
428 BCE, and therefore do not impact his or Livy’s narrative during the second pentad. The 
quotation from Livy which attaches to the skepticism of Macer indeed relates a version which 
glorifies his ancestor (F22): as consul, Macer claims that Licinius appointed a dictator to hold 
elections and thwart the ambitions of his patrician colleague. Livy dismisses this account, as no 
other historian transmits it.384 Concerning the aedile Cn. Flavius, Livy claims that Macer, unlike 
other authorities, augments his credentials and qualifications for the post, transforming the 
plebeian from a lowly scribe to a tribune and twice triumvir.385  
 There are not many fragments surviving from Licinius Macer and even fewer if the 
questionable authority of the libri lintei are removed. Nevertheless, two fragments concern 
augmentation of a plebeian, one of which is explicitly jettisoned by Livy due to familial bias. Even 
though we are not considering the contextual features of his life, such as his service as a tribune, 
naming his son Calvus after leading plebeian agitators, and even his speech in Sallust,386 it is 
probable that Macer demonstrated a pro-plebeian predilection.  
There is no evidence, however, that Macer’s bias led to a distortion of the archival sources. 
His potential inventions all involve material that would not have been transmitted through any 
fourth century archives: the identity of the consul who appoints a dictator and that dictator’s 
                                                 
383 Mommsen (1859); Wiseman (2009), 18-23. 
384 Livy VII.9.5-6. 
385 Livy IX.46.3-4=F24. 
386 All described by Oakley (2013), 327-8. 
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provincia (F22), and the yearly names of tribunes and each group of triumvirs (F24) (see Chapter 
2 for a proposed hypothesis on the contents of fourth century archives). The single fragment which 
might misrepresent such archives is the name of the curule aedile in 299 BCE; however, Macer 
relates this scene to compliment a patrician’s, Q. Fabius’, moderation and foresight (F25) as well 
as his diligence in dealing with a grain shortage (F26). The discrepancy is also excused by Livy as 
a potential confusion between the similarities of cognomina in the presiding consuls.387 
Nevertheless, Macer proves himself to be an unreliable source with respect to issues of plebeian 
agitation, forcing caution, not just in Livy’s use of his narrative, but in our acceptance of Livy’s 
text where Macer might a dominant source. 
 
Aelius Tubero 
 Even less survives of the history of Tubero than of Macer, and it is accordingly very 
difficult to determine political bias or thematic agenda. It is even uncertain which Aelius brother, 
Lucius or Quintus, is really the historian.388 He refers to the libri lintei on one occasion, but it is 
unclear whether he consulted them independently or pulled the information from Licinius Macer 
himself. Tubero is characterized by Livy as not overly eager to take an authoritative stance in the 
face of conflicting information, even though Macer’s beliefs are made clear.389 Such practice, 
allowing the reader to see the sources and make up their own mind, is characteristic of a cautious 
historian and signals that Livy might have had access to many sources, without prejudicial 
censorship, through Tubero.  
                                                 
387 Livy X.9.12-13. 
388 For this discussion see Oakley (2013), 363-4. 
389 Livy IV.23.2-3=F8: Tubero et Macer libros linteos auctores profitentur; neuter tribunos militum eo anno fuisse 
traditum a scriptoribus antiquis dissimulat. Licinio libros haud dubie sequi linteos placet: Tubero incertus veri est. 
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 Despite this, he seems to have been prone to relating fantastical events, such as the consul 
Atilius Regulus’ epic duel with a 120-foot snake during the First Punic War,390 and the particulars 
of Regulus’ unusual torture at the hands of the Carthaginians.391 These are peculiar stories, making 
it difficult to formulate a potential source or purpose to them. In perhaps a philosophical or didactic 
moment, Tubero states that “one should not get angry in a hostile fashion”; whether this could 
signal the precursor to Livy’s focus on concordia ordinum, however, is impossible to know at this 
point.392 Needless to say, there is simply not enough surviving of Tubero’s account to make even 
preliminary decisions concerning potential compromises. 
 
Claudius Quadrigarius 
 Quadrigarius is unique in among Livy’s sources in that he did not extend his history back 
to the foundations of Rome, but rather to the Gallic sack. If Livy’s statement about the quality of 
sources for before 390 BCE is to be believed, perhaps Quadrigarius, like Thucydides, decided to 
leave the myths and legends to the poets.393 Because Claudius was recognized for his style and 
language (T6, T7), he is very often quoted by later antiquarians and grammarians, often leading to 
fragments of useless historical value but of surprising philosophical insight. His histories can be 
read as patriotic, anti-Marian, and pro-Fabian, thus hinting at a slight pro-patrician bias. They are 
also not without historical errors. 
 Various sections of Quadrigarius’ fragments, preserved by chance for their literary value 
or intrigue, capture some of his philosophical statements. Like Livy, he seemed to perceive the 
                                                 
390 F11=Gell.7.3. 
391 F12=Gell 7.4 cap., 2-3; In its transparency with, but non-commitment to, its sources, and the inclusion of these 
fantastical stories, it is interesting to consider how similar Tubero’s work was to Herodotus’. 
392 F6=Charis. 262: inimiciter irascendum non est. 
393 Livy VI.1.1-3. 
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dangers of excessive leisure (F30), the mutability of fortune (F51), and the vices of excessive 
luxury (F10). In a fragment from a speech or particularly fatalistic interjection, he exclaims, “For 
this unfairness of the gods often comes about that the worse are safe and they do not allow any of 
the best among us to last long,” revealing a somber tone to this section of his work (F26). In a 
passage of didactic patriotism, Quadrigarius provides the text of letter sent from the Roman consuls 
to King Pyrrhus. Having received and turned down an offer by a close friend of King Pyrrhus to 
assassinate him, the consuls reveal all to the King, demonstrating both Roman determination to act 
in an upright manner and not use deception, even against an enemy (F41). This scene evokes the 
image of Camillus sending the seditious schoolmaster back into Falerii, who had failed to betray 
his city and transfer his students into the possession of the besieging Roman general.394 
 The political leanings which are revealed by the fragments are few and tenuous. 
Quadrigarius presents a negative view of Marius, although this could have been a speech delivered 
by an anti-Marian (F86). Likewise, harsh criticism is leveled at an unnamed person, whom John 
Briscoe (through some logic he does not reveal) suggests is Sulla. But this too can be just a speech 
given by an anti-Sullan.395 Praise is unequivocally given to the Fabii, who are shown to place 
patriotism over even filial piety396 These examples of political bias are incredibly tenuous and do 
not allow any conclusions to be drawn as to Quadrigarius’ sympathies. 
 Briscoe, however, notes a few errors in his fragments, suggesting that he did not prove to 
be a very reliable source for Livy. For example, the Fabius in question from the above example is 
identified as proconsul, but Livy describes him as a mere legatus.397 He gives significantly higher 
casualty figures than Antias (F67), a definite sign of exaggeration. These and other errors (F64, 
                                                 
394 Livy V.27.1-9. 
395 F90; Briscoe (2013, vol. 1), 291. 
396 F57=Gell.2.2.13. 
397 Livy XXIV.44.9-10. 
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F69) should induce serious hesitation in any consideration of Quadrigarius as a desirable source 
for Livy’s second pentad. 
 As most of Quadrigarius’ fragments are transmitted for linguistic quirks rather than their 
content, it is very difficult to pinpoint any partiality in his narrative. Statements of a political nature 
are completely devoid of context, rendering their attribution impossible. His thematic elements, 
seemingly captured at random, nevertheless display some similarities to Livy. 
 
L. Calpurnius Piso 
 A historian who was writing somewhat earlier than the other four, but only sparingly cited 
by Livy, Piso represents a critical component for Livy’s inclusion of archival material in his work. 
As an author earlier than the above named sources, and characterized in the testimonia as relating 
an unadorned list of dates, persons, places, and events,398 Piso might have formed an integral 
bridge between the archives themselves and first century historians. Livy seems to have relied on 
the him for some basic annalistic notices, remarking in Book IX, when Piso omits a college of 
consuls.399 In Book X, Livy attempts to correct even more minute detail contained in Piso’s text: 
the names of the curule aediles.400 The fact that Livy feels the need to rationalize a discrepancy in 
Piso’s list, not in a list of consuls, but in lower magistrates, signals that he might depend on the 
structure provided by this “unadorned” presentation. Unfortunately, however, there is not enough 
surviving material from Piso’s annales to make a firm decision on the structure and content of his 
work.  
                                                 
398 T1=Cic. De orat. 2.51-3. 
399 F28=Livy IX.44.2-4. 
400 F30=Livy X.9.12-3. 
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 It is a standard expectation that authors had increased latitude in their compositions of regal 
and archaic Rome, as the archives provided no guardrails and the urge to create etiology so strong. 
Accordingly, one would also expect a streamlining of such exposition in subsequent centuries. 
Indeed, Piso’s identifiable quotes from this later period do become sparser and more 
straightforward: seven of the 14 fragments after 308 BCE are simple statements of magistrates or 
other basic archival material. Prodigies, which would also have been conveyed in the archives, are 
also described in later fragments: General Marcius is blessed with a combusting head401 and a palm 
tree, then a fig-tree spring up, unplanted, on the altar of Jupiter at Rome.402 Thus, nine of the 14 
fragments can be thought to derive directly from archival notices. This is not universal, of course, 
and certain episodes of moral significance are still elaborated at length, such as the bravery of Cn. 
Flavius in the face of strong class prejudice,403 C. Furius Cresimus and his highly successful 
farm,404 and the introduction of foreign luxuries after the conquest of Asia.405 Nevertheless, the 
trend is clear: Piso’s content mirrors the developments of the expected data set of the fourth 
century. 
 Besides the mention of the courageous conduct of Cn. Flavius, there is no discernible 
political bend in Piso’s writing, which would be in keeping with his “unadorned” style. Piso can 
be shown, however, to fulfill a classic tapering pattern, with large embellishments at the beginning 
of his work, as the lack of archival material provides no strict guidance, and a streamlined narrative 
closer to his own day, as he needed to conform to the archival sources that gradually must be 
incorporated. Piso is an early compiler of this material and thus might not have the accumulation 
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402 F40=Pliny nat. 17.244. 
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405 F36=Pliny nat.34.14. 
135 
 
of subsequent treatments of events, such as Valerius Antias or Licinius Macer, to overburden and 
skew his narrative. Thus, the fact that Livy not only used, but relied upon, the consistent and 
cohesive presentation of annalistic treatment found in Piso’s work, recommends the notion that 




 This chapter has endeavored to demonstrate that Livy is not subject to programmatic 
agendas in manipulating the material that could have been transmitted from fourth century archival 
sources. Isolating moments where Livy relates demonstrably pro-patrician sentiments does not 
prove significantly more fruitful than isolating similar moments of plebeian partiality. While Livy 
can characterize individual scenes with partiality towards one of the orders, he cannot be shown 
to maintain this prejudice consistently, much less warp his larger narrative to its service. Instead, 
Livy seems concerned to emphasize the concordia ordinum, often transforming scenes into 
didactic examples of the benefits of civil harmony and the dangers of discord. This interest does 
not represent a particular partisanship, and therefore does not threaten the structure of a tradition 
already rife with lessons from social and political upheaval. Further, Livy is uninterested with 
regard to seemingly pivotal moments in this period of emerging power-sharing compromises. 
Issues such as the appointment of the first plebeian dictator and the distribution of auspicia publica 
do not warrant specific treatment, undermining the notion that Livy was allowed the focus and 
emphasis of his narrative to be dominated by such considerations. 
 What is consistently visible throughout the first decade of Livy’s work is a repeated effort 
to characterize individuals and events in a didactic manner. This follows well the genre 
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expectations for an ancient historical work, which finds meaning only in the lessons it bears to the 
present day. In this way, many characters or groups of characters fall into predictable categories: 
many tribunes are seen as obstructionist and agitators, the plebs is often indolent and prone to 
emotion, and the Appii Claudii are arrogant, overly ambitious, and fiery rhetoricians.  In much the 
same way that Thucydides’ Athenians were rash and intemperate and his Spartans circumspect 
and sluggish, Livy constructs complex characterizations as examples to follow or avoid. This in 
no way requires a distortion of the historical material as he found it. There was sufficient 
opportunity among the many political disagreements, court cases, and wars of the fourth century 
to situate the moral and ethical lessons which the historian wanted to convey. In the space of the 
speeches alone, which are likely complete creations of the author, Livy had the freedom to cover 
any issue and espouse any message. To expect that he needed to invent or suppress historical events 
to accomplish his didactic goals is to severely underestimate Livy’s capacity to moralize within 
the material already available. 
 Finally, a study of Livy’s primary sources (plus Piso) proves too tenuous to make reliable 
conclusions as to their potential compromises with respect to agenda or bias. What can be easily 
demonstrated, however, is that modern scholarship has severely overestimated the information that 
can be extracted from the scanty fragmenta. Any claim to strong bias, in either direction, is simply 
not firmly grounded in source evidence. While Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius might 
have skewed towards patrician sympathies, Licinius Macer likely swung in the other direction. 
And Piso, with his unadorned account, likely provided a valuable resource from which the 








Rome Ripe for ‘Revolution’ 
 
In order to demonstrate that archival records accompanied a movement of political 
inclusivity at Rome in the fourth century, it is necessary to understand the environment that would 
have produced such a development. What were the conditions at Rome that necessitated the 
inclusion of previously excluded families and the easing of economic burdens for poor citizens? 
Why did it happen at this moment and concurrently with the vast project of military expansion 
which begins at the end of the fifth century (although not with any real success until the middle of 
the fourth)? The first expressions of this transformational climate, as related by the literary 
tradition, are in the power sharing and economic concessions made to two tribuni plebis, C. 
Licinius and L. Sextius, in 367 BCE, in what was later known as the leges Liciniae or the leges 
Liciniae Sextiae. The specifics of this compromise are not entirely secure, and the tradition that 
culminates in Livy’s narrative presents a number of historiographic difficulties over the ten-year 
period that this compromise was negotiated.406 Nevertheless this, and especially a second 
concession of 342, coincide with a fundamental change in the names recorded in the fasti and 
represent a major shift in the inclusivity of the Roman government. Participation was still restricted 
                                                 
406 Such as the constant reelection in the same assembly of tribunes who propose the same bill AND tribunes who 
will veto it, as well as the five-year period of anarchy, in which the tribunes continually veto any higher magistrates: 
Fritz (1950), 9-10.  
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to the wealthiest of citizens who could afford the costs of campaigning and public service, but birth 
and status were no longer operative prerequisites. 
Aside from addressing this magisterial exclusivity by replacing the election of military 
tribunes with consular power (consular tribunes) with two consuls407 and stipulating that one of 
these be elected from among the plebs, it also confronted serious plebeian concerns of land use 
and debt.408 In return for this, Livy explains, the patricians added three urban offices to be filled 
from their ranks exclusively: a praetor and two curule aediles (the latter of which lasted a single 
year before alternating between the two orders). While the power sharing agreement was initially 
observed until 355, the following 13 colleges of consuls contained six pairs of patricians, 
seemingly in direct contravention of the previous law. In 342, however, this compromise was 
purportedly reimplemented and the consulship thereafter permanently shared. Over this period, the 
plebeians gradually extended their rights to hold office, achieving the dictatorship in 356, 
censorship in 351, the praetorship in 332, and finally the highest priesthoods in 300. 
While this narrative might seem straightforward in its broad strokes, it nevertheless 
presents significant problems in its details, as was discussed in Chapter 2. The purpose of the 
present discussion will be to isolate those factors characterizing the beginning of the fourth century 
that prompted substantial changes in the conception of governmental participation and eligibility. 
The literary tradition is woefully uncritical concerning the mechanisms that led to these 
developments, and it is clear that the Romans themselves likely had little idea about the conditions 
                                                 
407 According to Livy’s sources, there was an increasing number of consular tribunes elected since their inception in 
444 BCE, beginning with three but regularizing with six by the fourth century. Twenty colleges of consuls were 
elected intermittently before 367, but none after 392. At times, Livy and Diodorus present as many as eight names 
for consular tribunes, but Beloch (1926), 78-80 ingeniously interprets this as the presence of censorial names 
recorded together with the tribunes. The stated reason for the institution of the consular tribunate was to allow 
plebeian access to the highest office (Livy IV.6-7) but only two are elected before 400 BCE; this and other potential 
geneses of this institution are explained in Adcock (1957), 9-11 and Staveley (1953), 30-6. 
408 Livy VI.35.5: consulumque utique alter ex plebe crearetur. 
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that occasioned the power negotiations of this century. By understanding the deep and systemic 
issues that beset the Roman state and undermined the traditional oligarchy and their claim to near 
exclusivity the highest magisterial positions, we might accept that these democratizing changes 
seeped down even to the archival habit itself. 
In other words, if we are to accept the documentary developments of the second half of the 
fourth century, then we need to accept that the polity of Rome was poised to undergo the process 
of political, social, and economic conditions that triggered them. It would be a circular and hollow 
argument indeed to use archival sources alone to demonstrate the increased presence of archival 
sources. If, however, the socio-political climate at Rome can be shown, independently of 
magisterial lists and embellished narratives of historians, to be positioned for such structural 
developments and, further, that these changes were likely to occur, then this would be strong 
corroboration for the claim that a period of significant political concessions took place which also 
increased the archival habit at Rome.  
  The notion that a political landscape could be primed for such a fundamental 
transformation is articulated well by Hölkeskamp. Polities will entertain and discuss only those 
topics which are currently palatable to the constituent party groupings. What is palatable—that is, 
“the concrete issues that could be put on the political agenda”—are constantly shifting, however; 
the movements or desires of individuals within these groupings, the relative abilities of these 
groups to exert their will within the community, and external circumstances all force political 
debates to evolve continuously. If sufficient dynamics are achieved, the political system itself can 
be brought under systematic review and subjected to fundamental changes.409 The political climate 
at Rome was such that governmental change at this time was a likely outcome, and that the 
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resulting breadth of magisterial inclusion realigned the interests of those in power toward 
producing and publishing archival information. To put it another way, Rome may have arrived at 
“something like a revolutionary moment.”410 
 
The Tradition of the Licinian-Sextian Laws 
 
According to Livy, the political and social upheaval that initiated 70 years of reform started 
because of a dispute between sisters. One, married to the plebeian C. Licinius, became jealous at 
the honors of her sister’s husband, a patrician and consular tribune, Ser. Sulpicius. Her agitation 
and father’s assistance eventually propelled the plebeians into the office of consul in 367 and 
Licinius himself in 364.411 This story is ridiculous: not only are plebeians, according to Livy’s own 
tradition, able to be consular tribunes, thus allowing Licinius to reach the same position as his 
brother-in-law,412 it assigns completely anecdotal causation to a dense and long-lasting cluster of 
societal problems that eventually take decades to resolve.413 Again, later Roman ignorance about 
the causes of this slow-moving revolution is palpable. 
 Despite this lack of critical theorization, the magistrate lists after the passage of the 
Licinian-Sextian laws were nevertheless fundamentally changed in character: military tribunes 
with consular powers were never again elected, and a steady stream of plebeian gentes were 
admitted to the consulship, with one elected every year after 342. Scholars are in great 
                                                 
410 Adcock (1957), 11. He follows Jones and Last (1928), 524-8 who use much milder language. 
411 Livy VI.34.5-11. 
412 von Fritz (1950), 7. 
413 Although Pellam (2014), 280-92 sees internal consistency in the narration of Livy, and therefore increased 
historical validity. I find this connection difficult to justify, as narrative coherence can be, and often is, easily formed 
from complete fiction. 
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disagreement, however, over the causes and scope of these changes to the Roman political system, 
and therefore over the validity of the underlying archival material itself. 
 The most hostile position with regards to this tradition is represented by John Pinsent 
(discussed above, p. 68), who seeks to eliminate any plebeian from the consulship until the 
Genucian laws of 342 BCE, and rejects all colleges which contain a member of the plebs until this 
date. He also rejects the purported wording of the law of 342, which stipulated that both consuls 
could be elected from the plebs, arguing that because this does not actually occur until 172 BCE, 
this law is “hopelessly anachronistic.”414 Pinsent’s argument is undermined by his handling of 
magisterial lists, rejecting or accepting entries without consistent criteria. 
 Most scholarly arguments about this event have been more sympathetic and can be 
separated into three distinct thrusts: those who follow the tradition and view it as a sweeping 
victory for a disenfranchised lower class, those who see only technical, administrative changes, 
and those who focus on its military implications.  
Karl Julius Beloch falls into the first group. He is very quick to reject all potential archival 
notices from this period except the list of eponymous magistrates (discussed in Chapter 2), which 
he sees as largely reliable.415  Although not believing in any formalized laws at this time, he 
nevertheless sees 367 BCE as a compromise where power was wrested from patricians by wealthy 
and ambitions plebeians, who would not long be denied proper honors.416 This victory is even 
more significant when one considers that Beloch does not accept any non-patrician names among 
the fasti for previous consular tribunes, thus making 367 the first access to imperium enjoyed by 
non-patricians.417 Beloch simply does not accept that a law was passed concerning the composition 
                                                 
414 Pinsent (1975), 64-9. For a thorough rebuttal, see Develin (1979), 9-12. 
415 Beloch (1926) 34-5, 61-2. 
416 Beloch (1926) 340-1. 
417 Beloch (1926) 250-3. 
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of consular colleges until the end of the fourth century, relying on the presence of patrician-only 
colleges after this date. In fact, he identifies patrician colleges all the way until 321(see above, p. 
67). 
 Mommsen did not reject the plebeian names among the consular tribunes but saw an 
increasing divide between the patrician and plebeian nobility over limited access to magistracies 
and unaddressed economic hardships. The plebeian nobles eventually coupled themselves to the 
lower classes by advocating for land and debt relief and thereby achieving significant solutions to 
both groups’ issues.418 Tim Cornell attempts to make sense of the tradition by complicating the 
issue. He argues that the non-patrician names among the consular tribunes were also non-plebeian, 
and thus the Licinian-Sextian laws abolished discrimination at Rome towards the lowest social 
order.419 While the concept of a middle group of citizens has been long debated, no adequate 
argument or evidence has arisen to sufficiently demonstrate its presence in the social landscape of 
the early Republic. While quite good at explaining the nature of the debate and the significant 
changes in the gentes recorded in the fasti, this approach falls into the same trap as the literary 
tradition on which it is based: it is not able to sufficiently answer why there was a need to change 
the format of the magisterial offices at all.420 
 The second approach to this question emphasizes the administrative reform of 367 BCE 
and the specialization that occurred in transitioning from six consular tribunes to diversified 
magistrates with more defined jurisdiction. Kurt von Fritz argues that Rome would have been 
recovering from the Gallic catastrophe at this period, the landscape and city itself in ruins; extra 
                                                 
418 Mommsen, vol. 1 (1864-1879), 298-300. 
419 Cornell (1995), 338-9. 
420 Other adherents of this approach are Jones and Last (1928), 524-531; Münzer  (1920) 8-11; Oakley, vol. 1  
(1997-2005), 649-54; and (surprisingly) Wiseman (1995), 106-7. Adcock (1957), 13 claims that this compromise 
was the result of the “statesmanlike desire” of the patricians to solve social problems and reunify the citizenry. This 
perhaps underestimates the extent to which those with power will cynically seek to maintain it. 
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attention would have been needed for reconstruction and lawsuits arising from disputed property 
rights, and multiple military commanders would have been counterproductive in these domestic 
roles. Therefore, officials with a specific urban specialization were required, and the newly 
instituted praetor and curule officials fulfilled these needs.421 The fact that the plebs maintained 
access to the highest office, despite the restriction in the number of officials per year, is seen by 
von Fritz as a testament to their growing clout at this time. In a dense discussion of the theories of 
political office holding, Roberta Stewart highlights the position of the new praetorship with 
imperium, guaranteed judicial oversight, and no colleague. For Stewart, this represents an 
administrative shift towards unilateral officials exercising civic control, and in this particular case, 
addressing the pressing issues of debt.422 Finally, Corey Brennan sees the primary function of the 
new praetor to be in civil defense, although he acknowledges that it likely held judicial functions 
as well.423 
 The final group of theories about this period highlights the implications that the Licinian-
Sextian laws had for the military aspects of the city. De Sanctis held that this change was spurred 
by the need to concentrate military power into fewer hands per year and to reimplement a collegial 
check on imperium; plebeians had to be included because of they had already held the consular 
tribunate.424 Develin points out that these alterations to the Roman constitution must have been 
enacted by the comitia centuriata and thus represent a desire to reform the military hierarchy by 
the soldiers themselves, although to the benefit of wealthier plebeians alone by the fourth 
century.425 Emphasis has also been placed on military achievement as an expression of aristocratic 
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competition and therefore a major motivating factor for plebeians to achieve magistracies with 
imperium.426 Raaflaub takes this a step further by claiming that plebeian military successes of the 
previous half-century had raised the wealth and status of certain plebeian gentes to the point where 
they could legitimately challenge hereditary patricians for political equality.427  
 Perhaps the most radical position in this vein is taken by Jeremy Armstrong, who argues 
for a totally decentralized state at Rome during the sixth and fifth centuries. Instead of unified 
armies levied through centuriate organization, Armstrong sees consular tribunes as quasi-warlords 
at the head of gens-based armies and allied urban plebeians, or the unaffiliated populus. The 
institution of the consulship represents a dramatic step toward state exertion of control over the 
army, as it created a new magistracy shared by these two groups and at the head of a unified force. 
The urban plebs accepted patrician control of the office, which included imperium and the right to 
triumph, because it enticed them to remain at Rome and in competition, while also providing 
defence.428 The implications of this theory are wide and deep, requiring rejection of large swaths 
of the historical narrative and selectively accepting points, but it provides an enticing counter-
model for many difficulties in the record. 
 Thus far, these potential explanations have not sufficiently addressed the conditions of the 
early fourth century and why they might have initiated constitutional and economic reform. While 
scholars may have identified real motivating factors for administrative or social change, they 
nevertheless imagine rather rigid political groupings with consistent and predictable goals and fail 
to account for the deep impact that Rome’s increased militarism would have had on the dynamics 
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of political debate. In short, they have not fulfilled the sort of conditions that Hölkeskamp identifies 
as required to initiate a fundamental review of the system itself. What is needed now is a 
reevaluation of the climate of the early fourth century with more appropriate topics taking center 
stage, namely the increased political leverage wielded by tribuni plebis, the decentralization of 
established political relationships, and the hardships of land and debt, all of which were resultant 
from Rome’s increased military orientation and belligerence during this period. 
The narrative of the fourth century BCE highlights two developments very clearly: an 
explosion in military activity and efficacy, and the gradual loosening of magisterial qualifications 
for the highest offices in the polity. The military aspects of this narrative, at least in their broad 
strokes, cannot be denied: the Roman state emerges in the better documented mid-third century 
BCE as wielding the most expansive and comprehensive power in the southern half of the 
peninsula. Therefore, its expansion both in territory and influence is evident even though the 
details of this progression are likely heavily interpolated by later historians. The second event, a 
slow-moving revolution of the Roman political system, is subtler, and therefore requires a closer 
scrutiny of the sources to determine its nature and scope. The two processes, however, cannot be 
viewed in isolation; it would be extremely myopic to think that such consequential developments 
occurred simultaneously but independently from one other. Unfortunately, this is the way the 
fourth century is often described in textbooks on early Rome, with a section concerning the social 
and political upheavals of the city either preceding or following a separate section on Roman 
expansion within Italy, often with little communication between the two.429  
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 To experience such a dramatic overhaul in the manner of conducting war, especially in a 
polity so geared to its pursuit, and not feel reverberations throughout society runs counter to the 
expectations of established military theory. It is helpful here to reference the groundbreaking work 
of Michael Roberts, who described the sweeping economic and social consequences that can 
accompany significant changes in the way a state wages war. Roberts was focused on 17th century 
Sweden and its king, Gustavus Adolphus, who utilized the improving technology of firearms and 
artillery and dramatically altered the size and professionalism of his new standing army.  Soon, 
the state was the only entity capable of supporting, administratively, technically, and financially, 
the huge standing armies that were required to compete in the changing landscape of warfare.430 
Political offices sprouted to deal with logistics and masses of bureaucrats were mobilized to fund 
an ever-widening scope of conflict.431 No longer were birth and wealth required for serving in the 
upper ranks of the military: a new and lucrative path of social advancement was opened to the 
lower class, as demand for officers guaranteed promotion to those deemonstrating skill and 
survivability. Thus, Roberts identifies a “Military Revolution:” changes in technology, tactics, and 
the conduct of war that precipitate substantial changes throughout society at large. Roberts 
originally presented this thesis in 1955, and it has been discussed and challenged since; however, 
the basic principles of this reciprocal relationship between the military and society have never been 
discredited.432 
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The evidence of the fourth century does indicate a substantive technical and tactical 
changes in the nature of warfare: the shift from hoplite to manipular styles of conflict. This is 
accompanied (either as a cause or effect) by an increase in the scope and intensity of the campaigns, 
and we must therefore expect a corresponding reflection in society as well. When viewed through 
a lens of reciprocal development, this military shift of the fourth century BCE can frame our 
understanding of the politico-social climate, providing context, motivation, and opportunity for 
the radical governmental changes that the city also experienced. 
 
The Increasing Leverage of the Tribuni Plebis 
 
 A survey of the history of militarism repeatedly demonstrates: “during wartime, when 
governments are desperate for manpower to help fight more effectively, they may be forced to pay 
more attention to the common man.”433 Rome indeed found itself in growing need of manpower 
at the beginning of the fourth century. From 415 to 265 BCE, the period of expansion in central 
and southern Italy, Oakley counts only 13 years of peace.434  Not only was it increasing the 
frequency of campaigns (which is hard to measure precisely because of the uncertainty in earlier 
periods), it was also increasing the burden that these campaigns placed onto its soldiery. The war 
with Veii, Livy tells us, required the wintering of the legions under arms for the first time in Roman 
history.435 Roman armies were increasingly required to travel further from Rome, invading 
Tarquinian and Aequian territory in 388 and Volscian in 386.436 This heavy, annual style of 
campaigning continues throughout the 380s and the beginning of the 370s, when Livy becomes 
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distracted with the domestic upheavals at Rome that will culminate in the Licinian-Sextian laws. 
Despite reports of successes in these campaigns, this period also witnessed many setbacks for the 
fledgling empire, such as the defeat to the Gauls and the betrayal of previous allies, including other 
Latin cities and the Hernici.437 While the reliability of this narrative is not above suspicion—for 
example, it is unclear how the city could have recovered so effectively after the Gallic sack, and 
the semi-mythic figure of L. Furius Camillus plays a large role438—nevertheless the trend is highly 
credible: Rome is broadening her ambit and demanding more time and service from her citizen 
army. The city controls a limited area within Latium at the beginning of the century and possessed 
significant portions of land in Etruria and Campania by the end. 
 This effort must have been acutely felt by the soldiery, and there are some notices that 
concessions were made to lighten their burden. Livy and Diodorus both claim that payment was 
instituted for the army during the siege of Veii in 406,439 although coinage was not present at Rome 
until the beginning of the third century. Some have speculated that this compensation could have 
been through the aes rude,440 but Harris suspects that payment was irregular, distributed depending 
on the particular campaign, and non-monetary in nature.441 The primary form of compensation for 
soldiers in this period was likely plunder. In protracted sieges or campaigns further from Rome, 
where there were fewer opportunities for plunder, this would have seemed an increasingly 
inadequate system. Furthermore, descriptions of debt and debt bondage are common in the fourth 
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century,442 and their connection to a heightened demand on the Roman soldiery, who find 
themselves increasingly unable to work towards their own subsistence, seems credible and 
logical443 (see extended discussion below concerning debt, nexum, and public land, p. 165). 
 There is robust scholarship on the willingness of citizens to enroll for military service in 
the third and second centuries BCE, which is the ultimate conclusion through Harris and 
Rosenstein, that there was no significant resistance to the levy until the middle of the second 
century: patriotic zeal and the promise of plunder motivated large numbers of Roman citizens to 
sacrifice their civilian life.444 Romans of the fourth century, however, were not sacking and looting 
the opulent cities of the eastern Mediterranean, but much humbler polities in central Italy. There 
was wealth in the region, especially in Etruria, but the level to which thousands of Roman soldiers 
could hope to sufficiently profit from this plunder must be seriously questioned. There is no 
guarantee at all that warfare in this period provided the same level of incentivization that would 
have mobilized the citizenry in later periods, despite Harris’ statement to the contrary concerning 
warfare within Italy.445 This dynamic, therefore, seems a likely venue for a confrontation between 
patrician desire to win glory and prestige on the battlefield and the plebian control of their means 
to do so. 
 The argument that disenfranchised members of a society can leverage their wartime 
contribution to achieve political concession is well-founded in other historical contexts. There can 
be many reasons why citizens feel compelled to participate: wars can seem, and often are, an 
existential threat to one’s own life, motivations of national pride, compulsion by fear, or the 
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promise of economic gains. Some or all of these might be operable simultaneously as one decides 
whether to engage in military efforts. Studies of modern conscription, however, have shown that 
there are instances where these motivations are not sufficiently operable to entice participation by 
enough soldiers and a bargaining process begins between the government and the citizenry to 
bolster participation.446 In this way, measures of democratization can be introduced as a means 
towards mobilization efforts and to generate unity during wartime.447 
 Conscription events from the 19th and 20th centuries bear strong witness to this potential 
development. Napoleon III tried to multiply the numbers of Frenchmen serving from 1866-1870, 
preparing for coming wars with Prussia, but met strong resistance from a populace who could not 
see the immediate rewards of their service. The original proposed system of universal military 
service of 1866, which was to replace a preexisting lottery system, was met with fierce opposition 
and even violence, even as war with Prussia seemed increasingly likely. By the time the bill was 
finally passed in 1868, public outcry had diluted it down to 15 days of service in the reserve each 
year during peacetime, innovations that ultimately failed to prepare France for war just a couple 
of years later.448 Even though the reservists were never mustered for fear of political reprisal, 
nevertheless the elections of 1869 saw huge gains for the opposition party, who railed against the 
law and its impact on agriculture and finances.449 In 1875, as the French Third Republic attempted 
to stitch society back together after the disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, universal male 
suffrage was granted in an effort to boost national cohesion. Chancellor Bismarck, who had even 
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wider military ambitions in the region, followed suit in Prussia450 as both countries heavily 
conscripted their citizenry by the end of the century. 
 Mobilization efforts in England during the First World War, although initially successful 
on the reports of German barbarism in Belgium, eventually slowed by 1916 as casualty reports 
returned over the channel. In the wake of conscription bills over the next three years, debate began 
concerning the enfranchisement of all men over 21 and all women over 30, rights which were 
granted in 1918 once again for the purpose of instilling national cohesion in the post-war setting.451 
The demands of war had indeed “strengthened the political hand of those supplying the resources 
with which to fight.”452 Although France did not have difficulty in mobilizing its own citizens to 
fight a war within its borders, as needs became more dire it turned to conscript soldiers from its 
African possessions, it too had to promise political concessions. Recruiters in Algeria guaranteed 
exemption from indigénat (summary native jurisdiction) to those who served for a year, and grants 
of citizenship were proposed to Algerians, Senegalese, and other West Africans. In all, Africa sent 
450,000 soldiers to fight for France and 135,000 to work in its factories during the war; while the 
indigénat system was eventually reformed, only 256 (of 50,000) Algerians gained French 
citizenship.453  
 The connection between wartime manpower needs and concessions (even if only promised) 
to the politically disenfranchised is a demonstrable feature of certain contexts of heavy military 
conscription. It is by no means the only way in which such concessions are won, however, and it 
can only operate to provide ammunition to movements already underway.454 For example, England 
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was already in the process of extending suffrage through acts of parliament in 1867 and 1884, and 
the grant of women’s suffrage in the United States in 1919 can be viewed as an inevitable step, 
expedited by increased female contribution to the economy during wartime.455 Wars by no means 
guarantee such compromises will take effect but nonetheless force a dialogue between those in 
power, who desire war or see its benefits, and those who control the resources for waging it. 
 There is no reason to doubt that this dynamic was not, in some way, operable in the ancient 
world as well. The authority of Athenian radical democracy is often characterized as legitimated 
through the contribution of the poorest citizens as rowers in the navy. Aristotle calls the lowest 
class of citizens at Athens trireme rowers (τριηρικὸν) and credits Salamis with making the 
democracy stronger.456 The Athenaiôn Politeia says that the poor, in their capacity to man the fleet, 
impart more strength to the city than the hoplites;457 it is not likely a coincidence that Athens 
achieves the final phase of its radical democracy in the reforms of Ephialtes in 461 BCE just as 
the city was amassing a huge, imperial navy.  Like modern comparanda, wartime necessities might 
have jumpstarted a process already underway.458 
 At Rome, too, we might expect a similar process as military demands of the aristocracy 
begin to take a heavier toll on plebeian manpower. It is possible, therefore, that Roman campaigns 
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return for pay from the oligarch. The idea that poor rowers were increasingly important is also contested: Balot, 
(2006), 83 notices on inscriptions from the fifth century that hoplites and cavalry are still disproportionately 
represented, leaving the rowers without memorialization to the same degree.  
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in the beginning of the fourth century, due to their protracted nature and increasingly distant 
destinations, ceased to be rewarding enough on their own, and a process of bargaining commenced 
to secure the people’s willing participation.459  
 Those in the best position to negotiate this dialogue and enforce plebeian demands would 
have been the tribuni plebis. Although this office is of uncertain origin,460 it nevertheless emerges 
in the fourth century with a suite of powers that counter the authority of higher magistrates and 
advocate on behalf of the lower classes. Hölkeskamp suggested that the tribunes acted as 
“negative” magistrates in the early period, checking the absolute power of imperium within the 
city, but still powerless elsewhere.461 Their abilities certainly developed over time, but stemmed 
from the basic notion of sacrosanctity bestowed upon them by oath sworn at the assembly in which 
they were elected and over which they presided. They exercised this authority on behalf of the 
plebs through intercessio, the physical intercession of the tribune between the abusive magistrate 
and his victim.462 This principle gives the tribune extended authority to veto actions of other curule 
magistrates, enact legislation through the plebeian assembly, prosecute individuals for abuses and, 
most importantly for our purposes, disrupt the levying of troops by senior magistrates.463  
Livy, in fact, does record episodes of strong resistance to the levy going back nearly to the 
beginning of the Republic.464 While most of these notices inspire little confidence, they do 
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continue down into the fourth century, just before the Licinian-Sextian Laws. In 397, Livy 
describes the obstruction by the tribunes in reaction to the prolonged siege at Veii, and in 380 the 
tribunes preemptively prevented a levy despite the approach of an enemy army, which was allowed 
to continue when the threat became too dire to ignore.465 In 378, the tribunes of the plebs are 
described as citing economic grievances in order to block the levy of troops, and they successfully 
achieved a hold on the collection of the war-tax (tributum) and any prosecution for debt default 
until the war with the Volscians was concluded.466  
These sorts of disruptions are not restricted to the early period but punctuate social 
discourse into the better documented later centuries, such as the military sedition of 342 BCE. 
Although Livy provides multiple versions of the event, Gabba argues that this is proof of the socio-
economic strain placed on the Roman soldiery during this period of intensive campaigning.467 
Perhaps highlighting the potential political ramifications of such unrest, this year also witnesses 
the second great compromise of the century: the Genucian laws which (according to the tradition) 
allowed both consuls to be plebeian, forbade iteration within ten years, disallowed the holding of 
multiple, simultaneous offices, and made lending at interest illegal.468 The final secession of the 
plebs in 287 motivated similar concessions to the plebeians. The Lex Hortensia represented a 
significant landmark, as measures carried by the concilium plebis were now binding to the Roman 
state as a whole.469 The exercise of control over the flow of manpower throughout the fourth 
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century must be considered a legitimate force that could be mobilized to advocate for plebeian 
goals.470 
It is precisely this atmosphere of need and tension that could have spurred the aristocracy 
at Rome to cede to the sorts of demands that we find in the laws of 367 BCE and, further, could 
provide context for the progression of successes that the plebs achieved throughout this period. 
The ability to control the human resources of war could have provided the tribunes with significant 
leverage to disrupt the functioning of the state and military operations, helping to explain the 
chaotic nature of the historical narrative in the years before the passage of the Licinian-Sextian 
Laws. Patrician reaction to this development might be glimpsed in a fleeting episode of Livy. The 
consul of 357, Cn. Manlius Capitolinus, convened his army to vote in tribes while away from 
Rome, and in this unconventional fashion he manages to pass a law imposing taxes on 
manumission.471 Lushkov views this episode as further enmeshing of city and army functions, 
resulting in less freedom for Roman voters,472 and Hodgson sees an attempt at creating legitimacy 
for generals’ actions based on the consent of their armies, even when away from Rome.473 Both of 
these views are geared towards observing nascent developments in the relationships between 
generals, their soldiers, and the city which radically change by the late Republic; they are therefore 
overly complicated explanations for what likely was cynical pragmatism: avoiding the authority 
of the tribune in the city, swollen with extra leverage through the demands on the Roman army.474 
Although events which happen away from the city, because they are so easily interpolated and not 
likely to be grounded in the records at Rome, should be viewed with caution (see Chapter 1), the 
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subsequent action taken by the tribunes to forbid such a process of legislation could provide the 
archival foundation for this episode, not to mention the law itself, which seems to have stood. 
Increased demands on Roman manpower and the growing dissatisfaction with military 
service in the beginning of the fourth century likely translated into increased leverage in the 
ongoing plebeian negotiation with the patricians for full enfranchisement. Like the above modern 
examples, this process did not initiate the discussion or constitute the necessary means for its 
conclusion, but it likely created the conditions to accelerate a process punctuated by the 
compromises of 367, 342, and 300. 
 
Changes to the Electorate and “Political Groupings” 
 
  If political leverage gained as a result of increased military demand formed the first piece 
of this constellation of causative factors, the second concerns an erosion of traditional political 
groupings. A rapid enlargement of the Roman voting base at the beginning of the century, and 
steady growth throughout, fundamentally disrupted those traditional blocs that had previously 
maintained an aristocratic status quo; a newfound fluidity of votership may have combined with 
this increased leverage precisely at the beginning of the fourth century and precipitated the sort of 
socio-political change that is recorded in 367 BCE.  
After the annexation of Veiian territory, four new tribes, the Stellatina, the Tromentina, the 
Sabatina, and the Arnensis, are added to the original 21 in 387 BCE, thus imparting full Roman 
citizenship to their constituents.475 Livy claims that grants of land and status were assigned to 
defectors from Veii, Capena, and Falerii, and represented additional new citizens (novis 
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civibus).476 Lily Ross Taylor calculates that these new areas added as much as fifty per cent to the 
Roman ager and therefore likely contained a larger number of citizens than the existing tribes.477 
Livy records the organization of eight more tribes during the second pentad: the Pomptina and the 
Poblilia in 358, the Maecia and Scaptia in 332, the Oefentina and Falerna in 318, and the Aniensis 
and Terentina in 299.478  
Like the military exploits, even if the extension of land and the enrollment of new citizens 
cannot be precisely described in its details (although these are some of the best candidates to 
populate early archival records), it is a process that assuredly occurred: the end-results are obvious 
as Rome emerges in better-documented periods with a wealth of land and a profusion of citizenry 
throughout central Italy. As Fergus Millar states, such citizenship extensions down to 241 BCE 
and the foundation of colonies in Italy “represent the major known element in the social and 
constitutional history in the fourth and earlier third centuries.”479 It remains now to understand 
how this expansion of the voter base might have precipitated social and political change in the 
capital itself. 
 The notion that rigid groupings of dependent clients in service of patrician goals 
dominated domestic politics is very old in the study of early Rome. Matthias Gelzer, in an oft 
quoted passage, states that personal relationships based on fides, mutual commitment, and financial 
obligation dictated the distribution of political power; the most powerful men at Rome could 
mobilize, by virtue of their friends and clients, the greatest number of voters.480 H. H. Scullard 
follows this line of thinking, claiming that Republican politics was guided, albeit with intermittent 
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and brief impositions of popular will, by nobles and their extensive client networks.481 Münzer’s 
hypothesis of sweeping use of political parties at Rome, based on his prosopographical analysis of 
the fasti, can only work if one adopts this schema of rigid power structures and therefore the 
possibility of predictable deployment of clients towards certain goals.482 This approach is likely 
the result of an exaggerated notion of the importance of the patron-client relationship in the later 
Republic,483 based on its descriptions in Cicero and Aulus Gellius, among others.484 John North, 
in his strong rebuke of this model, refers to it as the “frozen waste theory”; it completely divorces 
the Roman voter from any agency in political decisions and subordinates the city to an all-powerful 
oligarchic elite.485 
There is evidence, however, that this institution of patronage does have a place in the 
political and social environment of the early Republic. For what they are worth, notices of large-
scale clientage play a heavy role in the narratives of the sixth and fifth centuries, especially in 
Dionysius. Clients are depicted accompanying their patrons to battle, advocating for and disrupting 
actions of the state, mobilizing toward common goals, and as a source of pride and power for the 
aristocrats.486 Ogilvie, however, states flatly that Livy knows nothing of value about early clientage 
and only projects backwards the nature of this institution in the first century.487 Brunt argues for a 
different interpretation, following his beliefs that patron-client relationships of the later period 
have exaggerated importance in modern scholarship. He sees later annalists amplifying the 
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primacy of the clientage system, understanding that conditions must have been different in the 
remote past, and therefore archaizing the institution in their narratives.488 
While little stock can be put in these stories, there are more concrete indications of early 
clients and their relationships with patrons. Taking prime position in this discussion must be the 
Twelve Tables from the middle of the fifth century, which records a law stating, “if a patron 
commits a crime against [his] client, may he be condemned to death.”489 Mommsen believed this 
to be a real attestation of fifth century law, possibly even older, but Brunt finds it hard to believe 
that patrons would leave themselves open to such a strict penalty for such an ill-defined and 
potentially ambiguous crime.490 Ambiguity, however, can work in both directions and an 
aristocratically dominated court could impose a high bar to meet this standard, functionally 
reducing patrician liability to zero. In any case, the presence of patroni (obviously based on pater) 
and clientes in the earliest legal document from Rome nevertheless speaks to the antiquity of this 
hierarchical, paternalistic relationship. 
Additionally, the late sixth century inscription found at the temple of Mater Matuta in 
Satricum, the so-called Lapis Satricanus, can be marshalled in support of this early institution. 
Although most of the stone is missing, it nevertheless references a dedication to Mars (mamartei) 
by the suodales of Poplios Valesios.491 This name has been credibly attached to P. Valerius 
Poplicola whom tradition identifies as playing a crucial role in the foundation of the Republic,492 
and the suodales identified as a permanent retinue or warband bound to its patron by Versnel.493 
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Although Bremmer’s interpretation softens the nature of the suodales to an ad hoc type of retinue 
for raiding purposes,494 it nevertheless represents this type of vertical relationship headed by a 
patron. The fact that the dedication is to Mars further highlights the potential military nature that 
constituted early clientage.495 The evidence, therefore, that some form of dependent relationship 
existed in the early period of the Republic is strong, but little else can be said about its nature and 
scope.  
Among these uncertainties, unfortunately, is the patricians’ ability to use this institution to 
impose their will in the steering of the Roman state. If the general trend of fifth century narrative 
has any merit, however, we are led to believe that an aristocratic oligarchy of about 50 families 
was able to maintain its exclusive hold on power for nearly a century and half, despite the presence 
of popular elections for magistrates and legislation. This trend, if accepted, could be explained by 
the mobilization of extended client networks within the political system at Rome, guaranteeing 
patrician success.496  
While this might have been the case in the early period, there is a growing body of 
scholarship that doubts this sort of aristocratic stranglehold in the middle and later Republic. 
Central to this argument is the implausibility that a single patrician gens, or even a coalition of 
gentes, could ever muster enough support to dominate a popular vote as the population grew.497 
This is especially true in the election of lower magistrates and the passing of legislation. These 
votes would have taken place in the comitia tributa, instituted by 447 BCE at the latest, which was 
organized according to tribal membership and therefore not structurally designed to preference the 
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wealthiest voters.498 Lily Ross Taylor has demonstrated, however, that patrician gentes often 
enrolled members in multiple tribes, in order to spread their influence to as many voters as possible, 
and would focus on tribes more distant from Rome, whose actual voting members would be low 
in the capital and therefore easier to dominate.499 The plausibility of this strategy would seem to 
meet diminishing returns as the circle of citizenry expands. 
The trend has been to ascribe much more subtlety and nuance to the practice of politics in 
the mid-Republican period. Jochen Bleicken sees a gradual loosening of the ability of aristocrats 
to muster sufficient support and argues for a much more fluid system of alliances forming and 
dispersing, based on specific goals or policies, but never again so rigid and determinative.500 Brunt, 
in a landmark discussion of this institution, finds that certain plebeian families, through their rising 
economic or political fortunes, gradually broke free of patron control. They found a large group of 
the lower classes who were ready to separate from their own patrons or had none (for the nexi had 
either been failed by their patron or had no protection at all), and gradually began to fill that role 
for them and, in this way, achieved successes for the popular agenda.501 
Millar finds no evidence that clientage ever played a pivotal role in politics.502 Instead, he 
argues that Rome was replete with lower magistrates, such as the tribunes, who, unlike the consuls, 
were permanently stationed in the city and ready to offer auxilium to the lower classes. To claim 
that even the tribunes were universally complicit in this oligarchic domination is to seriously 
overrepresent our knowledge of the men who held these offices and their politics.503 Christopher 
Smith also advocates for a more diversified political landscape, arguing that the plebs was likely 
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a massive group, some with interests aligned with patricians and others divergent. As long as the 
condition of clientage did not mean a semi-servitude, it was possible even for clients to advocate 
for anti-patrician measures.504  
None of these conceptions are mutually exclusive and, indeed, a combination of their points 
likely gets us closer to historical reality. These scholars, however, are never specific about any 
causal events or provide any relative timeline for these developments, reflecting the speculative 
nature of their arguments and lack of definition provided by the sources.505 A new perspective 
might give more definitive context to this problem. 
Considering the extensive settlement which occurs at the beginning of the fourth century 
on the ager Veientinus, therefore, it is logical to situate the beginning of this transformative process 
precisely in our period, as Rome is expanding the size, not only of its land possessions, but also 
the range of its citizenry. As Taylor’s research shows, this would have been a huge addition to the 
voting population, even if some of the occupants of the new landholdings were resettled, former 
citizens.506 Even if this was so, these were likely citizens displaced, both physically and 
economically, from whatever patron they might have had in their old tribe. Coupled with the 
increased military successes at the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth, wealth 
probably accrued in a few plebeian households, enough to satisfy the conditions which Brunt sees 
as necessary to breaking oligarchic domination of the political system. Furthermore, the new tribes 
were not far enough away so as to be politically remote; it was within a day’s journey to travel to 
Rome and participate in whatever political action one desired. This would not have guaranteed 
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universal participation, but they were much more accessible even than the tribes added in 318 and 
299. This diffusion of the electorate, and whatever political groupings they might have previously 
constituted, could have contributed to the erosion of oligarchic control that is hypothesized by 
these scholars and therefore facilitated the onset of significant political reform, such as that which 
occurs in 367 BCE.  
A periodization of this sort, based on Rome’s increasing ambit, has been attempted before, 
but with far different results. Christian Meier is not often cited in English scholarship, but he 
nevertheless contributes greatly to our understanding of the development of clientela in the early 
and middle Republic. He does see a very rigid system in the earliest phase of the city, when clients 
were personally bound to a patron, even at the expense of their own political participation.507 This 
system begins to loosen in the fifth century, however, as the tribunate appears and offers an 
alternative form of advocacy, citizenship is granted universally, and participation in the comitia 
centuriata defined one’s participation in the state. Rich plebeians also began to emerge and 
accumulate their own clients, but rather than advocating for plebeian causes, they simply hardened 
the existing oligarchy. This second phase of Meier’s schema lasts until late in the fourth century.508 
 His third phase is well aligned with my own, even though I would like to place its 
occurrence a half-century earlier. Meier characterizes this phase by a separation of client and 
patron, both in the strength of dependence and in political ambition. This is all compounded by the 
enlargement of the Roman state; what had previously been a small community became expansive 
and strained the personal relationships that had underwritten the previous clientage system. At this 
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point, it is no longer appropriate to speak of “clientage,” but more vaguely of a “binding status” 
(Bindungswesen).509  
Thus, the breakdown of this patron-client relationship as caused by literal and figurative 
distance between its members, coupled with the rise of wealthy plebeians/tribunes that offer 
alternatives to patrician protection, coincides very strongly with the social and political upheaval 
that I would place at the beginning of the fourth century and that culminates in the compromise of 
367 BCE. Meier never details why he sees this as such a late occurrence, but he must view with 
skepticism the plebeian success of the mid-fourth century. All of the conditions that he requires, 
however, are present much earlier and would help explicate the social turmoil of the earlier period. 
While the disruption of old voting blocs was likely sufficient to allow daylight for reform, 
the new voters in these tribes represented tremendous potential for individuals who could sway 
them. This threat is recognized and addressed in 358 in the form of the lex Poetelia, concerning 
bribery. Livy claims this law was introduced by the tribune, C. Poetelius, with the support of the 
Senate, and it aimed to stifle the canvassing attempts of “new men” in country places 
(conciliabula).510 Even if Livy’s additional information about the impetus for the law is incorrect 
(which is entirely possible), it is passed in the same year as the organization of two tribes, the 
Pomptina and Publilia, and thus heavily suggests a connection between the two and an 
acknowledgment of the electoral upheaval that such enfranchisement can cause. Looking into this 
matter further, C. Poetelius seems to be taking a very restrictive measure against his own order, as 
“new men” are most likely attempting to take advantage of recent plebeian access to the 
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consulship; Senate support in this way makes sense. Poetelius is, however, listed as consul for 360, 
and the gens Poetelia are one of just seven plebeian gentes to reach the consulship before 340, 
suggesting that they were, perhaps with patrician support, one of a limited number of palatable 
families in the highest offices.511 Poetelius’ proposal of this law, therefore, can be seen as an 
attempt to keep the consulship as restricted as possible, and his advocacy carried it through the 
tribal assembly despite what should have been plebeian opposition.  
This reconstruction is admittedly speculative and based on just the sorts of methodological 
pitfalls that result from an overemphasis on rigid factional politics and prosopographical study, 
but nevertheless the basic connection between the opening of new tribes and potential electoral 
benefits still stands: the inclusion of new voters into the Roman system represented a threat to 
established political groupings. Either by diffusing the earlier composition of reliable voting blocs 
or providing avenues for the creation of new ones, extensions of Roman citizenry in the beginning 
of the fourth century, like the increased burdens of military service, created the conditions under 
which dramatic sociopolitical change was a likely outcome. 
 
Access to Public Land and the Problems of Debt and Nexum 
 
 The last circumstance that can be mustered in support of a general revolutionary 
atmosphere at Rome is an economic one. In some ways, this is the easiest case to make: restricted 
access to land and the connected notices of increasing debt permeate the narratives of the late fifth 
and fourth centuries. Debt bondage, or nexum, too, is a logical consequence of a strong and 
politically dominant aristocracy which depended on large amounts of agricultural labor before the 
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implementation of mass-chattel slavery. There are strong hints, however, that these issues, as 
described in the historical narrative, are not operative in the fourth century but rather retrojections 
of the second century BCE, when many similar issues were raised and debated at Rome.512  
Despite these concerns, there is significant treatment of these economic issues in the 
narrative, suggesting that such issues were operative as early as the fifth century. Nexum is 
addressed in the XII Tables;513 although it does not provide a definition or describe the status of 
its participants, it nevertheless attests to the antiquity of the institution.514 Possible archival notices 
which could demonstrate these issues are problematic as well. Livy records that the Licinian-
Sextian laws included provisions which capped the possession of public land to 500 iugera,515 
stipulated that interest paid would be deducted from the principal, and debt could be repaid over 
three years.516 The largest criticism that has attached itself to this agrarian law has been the size of 
the restriction, as some scholars see 500 iugera as being excessively large for the small size of the 
Roman ager in the mid-fourth century.517 Livy is not alone in his attestation of this law and its 
regulation, however, as a number of ancient authors also refer to this limitation. Varro, among 
others, refers to a “law of Stolo” (the cognomen of Licinius) which set a limit at 500 iugera.518 
Licinius himself is said to have been prosecuted for breaking this very law,519 which Oakley takes 
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as “powerful testimony to its existence.”520 Even the narrative of the Gracchan reforms refers to 
this 500 iugera limitation, which was unenforced by the late second century, although it does not 
provide any indication of the restriction’s origin.521  
 It is entirely possible that Niese and De Sanctis are correct to assume that this is an 
excessive amount of land to restrict, but this nevertheless does not mean that legislation de modo 
agrorum did not occur as early as the fourth century. Beloch sees the organization of the newly 
added public sections of the ager Veientinus as susceptible to exploitation by the rich, and therefore 
creating a legitimate basis for regulation at this time.522 We are also terribly uninformed concerning 
the specifics of the sizes of Roman land and additions that were made at the beginning of the fourth 
century; it is therefore not valid to dismiss any notice based on assumptions of land sizes.523  
 Whether or not the specific provisions of these laws can be confidently known, it is clear 
that they reflect a real and pressing social dilemma of the early to mid-Republic. Interest rates on 
debt were established in the XII Tables,524 and legislation on debt and nexum continue with 
regularity throughout the fourth century: in 357 interest was set at 100% per annum, in 352 a 
commission of five was set up to alleviate debts, a 50% cap on interest was set in 347, and in 344 
lenders were prosecuted by the aediles.525 This must evidence a severe hardship with reference to 
land and indebtedness; it is hardly sufficient to categorize all of these notices as retrojections of 
later economic hardships. However, the extent to which any of these laws, including the limit on 
public land, were ever enforced must always remain in question. Lending at interest is finally 
outlawed in 342, coinciding with the occurrence of the Genucian plebiscite and the second 
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compromise.526 Although De Sanctis claims that the debt legislation of 367 is too revolutionary 
for such an early period and must be a fiction created from later events,527 he nevertheless accepts 
this later notice.528 This law still presents some problems, however, as it seems to be a drastic step 
in service of no one’s best interest: the rich would not benefit at all from making loans, and the 
poor could therefore not secure them. It is clear that this law, if it was ever accepted as binding to 
all Roman people, was nevertheless not strictly enforced. Finally, nexum itself was abolished in 
327.529 The notices of debt and its redress are abundant in this period and must be read as strong 
indication of the seriousness of the issue in this context of Roman politics.530 
 Other circumstantial evidence also points to hardships of the plebs. There are indications 
of plagues, which would have found firm attestation in the list of religious prodigies for expiation. 
The years of 384, 365, and 348 all record heavy disruption due to illness and a corresponding lack 
of archival activity at Rome.531 Livy notes that the construction of a fortification wall in the fourth 
century,532 a logical investment considering the military strain the city undergoes after the Gallic 
episode, plunges the plebs into debt.533 Wars in general, increasing in duration and scope since the 
late fifth century, would have demanded that more and more time be spent away from farms, 
disrupting the economy further.  
 Roman colonization in this period is also very uneven, with a heavy efforts at resettlement 
only at the end of the fourth century. After Nepet is established in 373 BCE, there are no notices 
for new colonies until 338, from which time until 268 a total of 25 citizen and Latin colonies are 
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founded.534 Even though two tribes are organized in 358, it is unclear how available these would 
have been to  poor landless farmers. Thus, economic pressures would understandably be operative 
in the middle of the century, precisely when laws and notices concerning debt occur. The 
increasing scope and success of Rome’s wars as the fourth century progressed also would have 
provided another source of agricultural labor, chattel slavery, potentially loosening patrician 
desires to maintain the institutions that bound the plebs to them.  
 The conditions at Rome in this period are not unlike other Mediterranean cities for which 
early social and economic development is attested. The tradition is sound also for issues of debt 
and land distribution at Athens as well, although addressed two centuries prior. Solon is said to 
have found all of Attica either in debt to the rich—and therefore tied to the land and forced to pay 
1/6 of their produce (and thus ἑκτημόριοι)—or already possessed and sold into slavery.535 Solon 
instituted his famous “unburdening” (σεισάχθεια) of the poor, which was either a complete 
cancelling of debts or a reduction of the interest rates.536 The historical narratives for this event, 
much like the Roman case, were not composed for over two hundred years, in the fourth century 
by the Atthidographers, and there is likely some intrusion of fourth century economic conditions 
into this picture, especially the institution of the ἑκτημόριοι, but the general picture of the debt is 
nevertheless largely credible.537  
The specifics of this story are very different from Rome—in the Greek case, there is no 
gradual progression of redress but there is a strong reformer at the center—suggesting that this is 
not simply a borrowed historical account: if there was really no tradition at Rome and the annalists 
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were using Athenian history as a model for their recreation, they horribly over-complicated the 
story.  It is far more likely that both accounts were independently evidenced, and we can witness 
parallel tensions that befell many Mediterranean polities with limited arable land, a growing 
population, and increasing wealth inequality. Because land is the foundation of wealth in these 
early periods, it is only logical that unequal land distribution sits at the heart of these conflicts. 
It is clear from this accumulation of evidence that the sources are correct for focusing so 
heavily on debt and distribution of land in their descriptions of the economic tensions in the late 
fifth and fourth centuries. The motivations which animated the lower classes, those who could 
never hope to access political office but who could benefit from elevating their advocates to 




 Rome is thus imbued with motive, means, and opportunity to reform on the eve of its social, 
political, and economic compromises of the mid-fourth century.  Heavy burdens of debt and land 
deprivation would have motivated sufficient voter/soldier support to back the ambitions of wealthy 
plebeians in their pursuit of high aristocratic honors. The diffusion of the electorate into newly 
acquired territory and the inclusion of brand-new citizens would have provided the means to 
disrupt the old political groupings and voting blocs that had perpetuated a closed oligarchic regime. 
Finally, the tribuni plebis found an opportunity to leverage the increased demands on the common 
soldier to achieve greater concessions. In this way, the groups advocating for change, both 
wealthier and poorer plebeians, could marshal all of these advantages during their negotiation with 
the traditional possessors of money and power. 
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 Any one of these conditions alone might not have been sufficient to trigger such reforms 
or might have forced a more gradual progression of change. With these conditions operating 
simultaneously, however, Rome was pushed towards a rapid integration of previously excluded 
gentes into the upper circle of powerful magistrates and priesthoods: within 70 years, plebeians 
gained access to every office in the city, regardless of former exclusivity. These victories were not 
linear, however, as the patricians likely resisted at key moments, and social and economic 
grievances continued to beset the Roman Republic. The weight of the bargaining power 
accumulated through these developments, nevertheless, propelled the plebeian case towards 
demonstrable and permanent redress. There was significant impetus behind these democratizing 
developments, from every quarter of the plebeian movement (though not necessarily from every 
member), and significant political force brought to bear against a weakened oligarchic opposition. 
It is thus possible to see these reforms, not simply as enlarging the pool of potential participants, 
but as overhauling the obligations of the government to be more responsive and transparent in its 
operation.  
 These developments are not wholly based in the later archival narratives but stem from 
evident realities about the changes to the Roman state in the fourth century, both in its geographic 
stretch and political composition. These circumstances combine to create the conditions at Rome 














Documenting the Roman Senate 
 
While the types of documentation described in previous chapters might have predated the 
fourth century in one form or another, potential publication or preservation of Senate records marks 
a watershed moment in archival practice at Rome. The composition, function, and authority of the 
Senate in this early period, unfortunately, have never been well understood, let alone any 
publication of their proceedings or decisions. Many modern scholars therefore point to the primacy 
of the curule magistrates in important decision making at this period, while others look to the 
authority of the comitia; the role and significance of the Senate, however, needs to be reevaluated 
in light of the expanding ambit of the Roman state and the increased turnover of its chief 
magistrates. 
 
Emerging Role of the Senate in State Decision Making 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the fourth century witnessed the cessation of the old model of 
Roman warfare. No longer would (a) magistrate(s) gather troops at the beginning of their tenure 
and engage in annual raiding against Rome’s immediate neighbors. Campaigns like the siege at 
Veii in 396 BCE, if indeed an historical event, signal a shift towards multi-year entanglements 
requiring continuing commitment and strategizing. Wars of these types would become 
increasingly frequent, against enemies such as the Samnites, Campanians, and Vestini across the 
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Apennines, all requiring significant investments in manpower and, most important to the 
development of the Senate, time as well as a cohesive long-term strategy. The second-power 
sharing agreement of 342 had seemingly made these commodities scarcer: by severely limiting the 
iteration of consuls, a practice which was largely followed (although not absolutely) through the 
rest of the century, an individual could hope to see the office only once in his career.538 Despite a 
lack of experience in high command, these men were not necessarily ignorant or uninformed; they 
likely had been a part of the decision making process before, as a member of the Senate earlier in 
their career. This aspect of office holding in Rome is often overlooked: a politician would spend, 
at most, a handful of years serving as a magistrate, while the clear majority of his life was spent as 
a member of the Senate. This circumstance does not necessitate that he agreed or allied himself 
with all other members, but it does imply that he was likely not antagonistic to the body itself, as 
is sometimes suggested.539 Rather, he might have felt, in relation to the Senate, like something of 
a representative when in magisterial office and closely consulted with it. Of course, individual 
personalities being what they are, there was likely a wide range of potential dynamics that 
occurred. 
 There is an intrinsic hostility to this relationship, however. While an individual general 
might reach the summit of the mountain only once in his life, it was especially incumbent upon 
him to make the most of his time while he was there. W. V. Harris’ argument that the importance 
of laus and gloria to the competition between aristocratic careers would not have been diminished 
by the new laws of iteration but rather exacerbated by it.540 Every year and every campaign would 
                                                 
538 Cornell (1995), 372. 
539 Carney (1958), 19-26. Such is the thesis also of Schlag (1968), although she is writing about a much later time 
period. Against this, Eckstein (1987), xiii, argues that there was “mutual trust and mutual confidence” between 
Senate and consul. 
540 Harris (1979), 17-26. 
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have assumed the utmost importance, as individuals were unlikely to see another opportunity to 
serve as consul. Often, the interests of Roman generals and the welfare of the state were 
coterminous, but tension could arise when they became unaligned, such as overeager pursuit of 
gloria at the expense of state interests. The Senate was positioned to play a large mediating role in 
the combination of dangerous factors that intersected the Roman military in the latter half of the 
fourth century: increasing scope and intensity of warfare, decreased experience among those 
wielding imperium, and moderating the worst manifestations of intensifying personal ambition. 
  While this all makes logical sense when considering the concrete data points as provided 
by demonstrable Roman expansion and the fasti, it does not necessarily explain the historical 
realities of the fourth century. The direct evidence that remains for the status and functions of the 
Senate does not allow for a clear picture of its development, and scholarly opinion has not 
approached a consensus. Arthur Eckstein sees a largely advisory body that defers in most instances 
to the presiding consul. In his conception, the magistrate in the field has ultimate control over 
foreign policy, while the Senate would have been relegated to a secondary role, often after the fact. 
While Eckstein acknowledges that the Senate might have had a greater hand in those military 
operations that took place closer to Rome, and thereby reducing the delay of communication, 
nevertheless he envisions foreign policy waged in yearly intervals and at the behest of rotating 
generals.541 Although writing about the events of a slightly later time, Eckstein would have even 
less to say about the authoritative value of the Senate in the fourth century. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, Fergus Millar argues that the power ultimately rested 
with the people to pass legislation and determine the conduct of elected officials. While 
acknowledging that the comitia centuriata was biased in favor of the wealthy, the comitia tributa 
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was not; the latter body passed legislation and elected the lower magistrates, who were based 
permanently at Rome and operated at the whim of the people.542 Further, Millar points to 
archaeological material from the forum to demonstrate that it was the Comitium, not the Curia, 
that was monumentalized in the fourth century, signifying the true weight of authority in the state. 
In particular, he finds it indicative of this dynamic that the ship prows retrieved from Antium in 
338 were mounted to the rostra rather than the Senate house.543 While Millar is correct to point 
out that the consuls formed only one magistracy and actually had little authority to act unilaterally 
while at Rome, investment in public space, where it could reap the most political capital for the 
investor, would have taken precedent over the personal aggrandizement of the wealthy. Further, it 
is difficult to imagine foreign policy decisions emanating from the comitia, which could not 
convene without magisterial presidency and could only vote to approve the proposals put before 
it.544 
 A pivotal question for our understanding of the Senate in any period is the method of its 
enrollment. Legends of the first Senate suggest that Romulus composed it from the leading citizens 
at Rome, thus marking the establishment of a patrician class.545 This has led later scholars to see 
the early Senate as having occupied a purely advisory role, serving at the pleasure of the king and 
later the consuls. Mommsen says this resulted in an informal arrangement, with no set meetings or 
authority; they met on a case-by-case basis and could recess for extended periods of time.546 A. 
                                                 
542 Millar (1989), 142-4. The main thrust of Millar’s review of Hölkeskamp (2011) is that too  weight has been given 
to the primacy of a patricio-plebeian elite, without considering the authority that the voting people are able to 
exercise. Millar believes that Hölkeskamp is creating a unified bloc out of what was likely a very mixed group of 
goals and ambitions.  
543 Millar (1989), 141. 
544 Taylor (1966), 74-8. 
545 Livy I.8.7: centum creat senatores, sive quia is numerus satis erat, sive quia soli centum erant qui creari patres 
possent. patres certe ab honore, patriciique progenies eorum appellati. Dion. Hal. 2.12.1; Ovid Fast. 3.127; Prop. 
4.1.14; Vell Pat. 1.8.6; Plu. Rom. 13.1. 
546 Mommsen, vol. 3.2  (1887-1888), 856.  
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Drummond, however, sees the special abilities of the Senate as indicative of more than simply an 
ad hoc body of irregular advisers. He argues that the powers the Senate held during an interregnum 
and its ability to consent or deny the votes of the comitia through its patrum auctoritas both signify 
that the body had far more power, even into the fifth century.547 This argument has merit, at least 
before the fourth century, as the bestowal of patrum auctoritas became a point of strong 
contention, and Livy implies that it was utilized to stymie the efforts of reforming plebeians, such 
as in the narrative of the Leges Liciniae Sextiae.548 Furthermore, the Publilian Law of 339 
mandated that the Senate provide their auctoritas before legislation was voted on in the comitia 
centuriata,549 suggesting that this might have been an actual feature of senatorial purview by the 
middle of the fourth century.550 Auctoritas was seen in later times by Cicero and Sallust as a means 
to veto undesired measures,551 and therefore this law could be understood as another way to 
mitigate the power of the old oligarchy.552  
Uwe Walter sees a watershed moment in the functions of the Senate when its enrollment 
was placed into the hands of the censors,553 a development associated in the ancient world with 
the Lex Ovinia. However, this law, if genuine, is incredibly poorly attested, appearing only in 
Festus and no other ancient author, including Livy:  
Previously, senators who were passed over (excluded from the Senate) were not held in 
disgrace, because, as kings enrolled them by themselves, or enrolled replacements, whom 
they maintained in public council, thus later the consuls and military tribunes with consular 
powers enrolled for themselves their closest associates from the patricians, then from the 
plebeians, until the Ovinian tribunate occurred by which this was outlawed. This resulted 
in the censors enrolling each of the best men by Curia into the Senate from every order. By 
                                                 
547 Drummond (1989), 185. 
548 Livy VI.42.10: quia patricii se auctores futuros negabant. 
549 Livy VIII.12.15: ut legum, quae comitiis centuriatis ferrentur, ante initum suffragium patres auctores fierent. 
550 Drummond (1989), 185. 
551 Cic. Planc. 8: tum enim magistratum non gerebat is qui ceperat, si patres auctores non erant facti; Sall. Hist. 
3.48.15: libera ab auctoribus patriciis suffragia maiores vostri paravere. 
552 Thus, Ferenczy (1976), 57-9. Oakley, vol. 2. (1997-2005), 526-7 is skeptical that anything historical can be said 
about this law. 
553 Walter (2017), 49-50. 
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this act, those senators who had been excluded and removed from their position were held 
in dishonor.”554   
  
If this notice is a genuine historical memory, it is a remarkable statement concerning the 
formulation of the Senate in the early Republic and its advisory ad hoc nature. It would imply that 
the early Senate served at the pleasure of the chief magistrate and, therefore, may have had no 
more authority over decision making than that magistrate allowed. It is troubling that this measure 
receives no coverage in Livy or any other ancient commentator, and there is some puzzling 
ambiguity about the meaning of some words and phrases. For example, ex omni ordine, if it does 
refer to the two social orders of the patricians and plebs, is a strange rephrasing of ex utro ordine. 
E. Ferenczy suggests that this refers to each military century; however, Ryan points out the 
absurdity that, while men over sixty were excluded from military service, they were assuredly 
never barred from the Senate.555 Instead, he proposes that omni ordine actually refers to the 
divisions of property qualifications within the army, such as the pedarii and equites.556 In any case, 
this text presents problems too numerous to allow its use without strong reservation. Nevertheless, 
Mommsen views the Lex Ovinia as crucial to removing the Senate from under the power of the 
consuls and exerting the sort of independence that characterizes this body in later centuries.557 
 Because the Lex Ovinia has the potential for transformational change in the nature and 
authority of the Senate, it is unfortunate that it does not have a firm (or even rough) date. It is often 
associated with the problematic censorship of 312 and its troublemaking censor, Ap. Claudius.558 
                                                 
554 Festus p. 290 L: Praeteriti senators quondam in opprobrio non erant, quod, ut reges sibi legebant, 
sublegebantque, quos in consilio publico haberent, ita post exactos eos consules quoque et tribuni militum consulari 
potestate coniunctissimos sibi quosque patriciorum, et deinde plebeiorum legebant; donec Ovinia tribunicia 
intervenit, qua sanctum est, ut censores ex omni ordine optimum quemque curiatim in senatum legerent. Quo factum 
est, ut qui praeteriti essent et loco moti, haberentur ignominiosi. Cornell (1995), 468 n.3 emends the text to read 
“censors sworn by oath” instead of “by Curia.” 
555 Ferenczy (1976), 159. Ryan (1998), 146. 
556 Ryan (1998), 147-50. 
557 Mommsen, vol. 3.2 (1887-1888), 880. 
558 Mommsen, vol. 2 (1887-1888), 418; Rotondi (1976), 161. Raaflaub (1992), 39.  
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Here is the first such notice in Livy of the conduct of a lectio during a census, and thus suggesting 
that this event is, in fact, a result of this new organizational principle.559 Cornell would like to 
place this law earlier, at least to the census of 318, based on a remark by Diodorus for 312 that this 
lectio was conducted “according to previous assessments.”560 Cornell would therefore see the 
advent of this procedure between 338 and 332, when Q. Publius, the author of the law concerning 
patrum auctoritas, was censor.561 Regardless of whether we adopt the earlier or the later date for 
this law, it fits well with the “revolutionary” tenor of the fourth century, and is appropriately placed 
in the middle of the fourth century. What is unclear, however, is whether the so-called Lex Ovinia 
was breaking ground in terms of articulating a new power dynamic between the chief magistrates 
and the Senate, or if it was concretizing or reaffirming an existing dynamic already in place. In 
much the same way as the second compromise in 342 permanently reasserted the plebeian goals 
achieved in 367, it is possible that the Lex Ovinia concerning the duty of the censors performed 
the same function. If this were the case, then we could logically see such a law coinciding with the 
reorganization of the chief magistracy and the implementation of the consulship in 367, which also 
likely entailed a corresponding need to articulate the consul’s relationship to its advising body.  
 Whether we accept this or not (and it is far from certain, as it would require believing that 
Livy omitted discussion of two pivotal laws), it is nonetheless clear that the Senate was forced to 
adapt to three operative dynamics in the middle of the fourth century: an increasingly hostile and 
demanding foreign policy, an increased turnover in the magistrates of the state, and an apparent 
desire by certain interests to define and/or liberate the Senate’s authority. It is within this 
confluence of factors that the Senate likely asserted itself as a permanent and revered deliberative 
                                                 
559 Livy IX.29.7. 
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body in the middle of the fourth century BCE.  This is the positioned favored by Hölkeskamp, who 
states that the Senate was “able to view the military, strategic and political situation as a whole as 
well as the specific needs of a concrete emergency…[it was] competent to deal with these matters, 
for it was in this charmed circle that all military, political and legal expertise and experience were 
concentrated.”562 
 However, it is another matter entirely to demonstrate securely this emergence of senatorial 
authority in the surviving sources. This effort is made especially difficult since Livy seems to 
believe, as with so many other institutions, that the Senate operated in the same way in the early 
Republic as it did in later periods.563 He elides or implies crucial details that would allow for an 
assessment of senatorial power, likely assuming his audience’s familiarity with the topic obviates 
elaboration.564 Thus, his descriptions of the formal processes for declaring war, establishing a 
colony, or appointing a dictator is largely unhelpful for precise reconstructive efforts of the 
Senate’s fourth century iteration. Such a reconstruction has been attempted, however, by L. Loreto, 
who compiled a comprehensive list of references to senatorial action in this period, suggesting that 
the role of this body intensified during the conquest of Italy. Unfortunately, many of his data points 
are very tenuous and cannot be tied to any conceivable primary document, including reports from 
allies in the field, descriptions of debates, and details of communications between the Senate and 
magistrates.565 Although Loreto is tasking the text beyond its limits in these instances,566 his 
methodology is not inherently flawed. It is much more useful to take a narrower, but just as 
diagnostic, survey of the data. By doing so, it becomes evident that there were two areas in which 
                                                 
562 Hölkeskamp (1993), 34. Although I accept his point, I do not accept his larger thesis, which elucidates a 
rigidifying group of patrician-plebeian elite, with the Senate acting as a figurehead for this group. This is overly 
reductive and schematizing (see Introduction). 
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565 Loreto (1991-2), 268-84. 
566 Oakley, vol. 4 (1997-2005), 468-70. 
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the Senate took a direct and active hand, both of which are able to be corroborated outside of 
Livy’s narrative of the second pentad: the emergent practice of prorogation and the direction of 
colonial foundations. 
 Conspicuous in the patterns of office-holding throughout the fourth century is the gradual 
waning of the dictatorship and, in its place, the advent of a new type of power distribution: the 
proconsulship. The tradition for the prorogation of Q. Publius in 326, if the narrative is to be 
believed, seems to be set in the extraordinary circumstances of an extended siege lasting late into 
the magisterial year. In the face of the impracticality of recalling Publius for elections and 
replacement, the Senate decided to extend his imperium until the conclusion of the war. This 
context, as it is confirmed in the Fasti Triumphales, has been viewed as largely credible,567 
although Beloch calls into question the early date of the prorogation, rejects most of these notices, 
and therefore does not see any credible such extension of power until the third century.568 This 
position is hypercritical, however, and does not take into account the contextual evidence for the 
necessity of such constitutional flexibility in Rome’s expanding military operations.  
As the proconsul rose in importance, so waned the dictatorship. For the latter half of the 
fourth century there was a dictator appointed every 1.5 years, but after 302, none appear until the 
First Punic War.569 In order to compensate for this loss of strategic insertion of imperium, consuls 
received an elongation of their command into the following year 12 times from 326 to 291, 
although there is some doubt as to the prorogation of Q. Fabius in 309, which is set into a “dictator 
year” and only attested in the Fasti Triumphales. This transition might mirror the relative power 
dynamics of the Senate versus the consuls, as the former had purview over magisterial prorogation 
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and the latter over the appointment of a dictator.570 Although Livy includes a popular vote to 
confirm the prorogation,571 Polybius makes it clear that the Senate oversaw this extension of 
imperium.572 Polybius is likely eliding over the role of the people in this process, more concerned 
with establishing the checks to magisterial power possessed by the Senate; it would be out of line 
with other constitutional developments to exclude a popular vote in a measure of this sort.573 What 
is significant, however, is that the consuls played no part: the Senate recommended, the tribunes 
convened the meeting, and the people ratified. In this way, as more individuals were admitted to 
the consulship but fewer dictators were appointed during the late fourth century and early third, 
the Senate took a prime position in evaluating the strength of generals in the field and making 
informed decisions about where to allocate resources and manpower. 
The second aspect of the late fourth century that evidences the Senate’s emerging role is 
the distribution of colonies throughout newly acquired lands; like the institution of prorogation, 
later evidence for this practice is good, and can therefore act as a firm data point against which we 
can witness the emerging power of the Senate. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the establishment 
of colonies and the extension of citizenship forges the most reliable aspects of the historical 
narrative of the fourth century.574 For a long time, E. T. Salmon generated the dominant scholarly 
opinion that military considerations were paramount in the timing and placement of colonial 
foundations.575 While this assuredly played a significant role, especially during the wars of the 
                                                 
570 See the description of the appointment of a dictator in 326 to hold elections. Livy VIII.23.15 says that the consul 
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fourth century and Rome’s tenuous position of power, this has nevertheless been justifiably 
challenged in recent scholarship.576 The scope of the current study, however, is not for the 
motivation of colonization, but for the Senate’s participation in this process and therefore its ability 
to accurately record the project.  
Livy sometimes gives narrative priority to the consuls in the establishment of colonial 
foundation577 and he may be referencing a period before the passage of the Lex Ovinia which 
rigidified the authority of the Senate. It is far more likely that Livy is not concerned to share the 
details of state workings, assuming that they are similar to his own day. Mommsen concluded that 
the Senate must have played the leading role in selecting a location and offering the resolution to 
the people,578 and this seems to be supported by a statement by Velleius Paterculus who implies 
that, at least before the time of the Gracchi, all colonies were founded on the order of the Senate.579 
Similar to the assignment of a proconsulship, the Senate likely needed a magistrate to propose the 
measure to the people for a vote in order for the decision to take effect. Individual colonies and 
potential motivations for their establishment will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Notices of Fourth Century Senate Records: An Argument for Plausible Coherence 
 
 In much the same way that we should expect the fasti, if really based on contemporaneously 
produced and maintained sources, to present a largely credible and coherent picture of the fourth 
                                                 
576 For an insightful collection of essays that succeed in problematizing the issue of Roman republican colonization, 
see Stek and Pelgrom, eds (2014). The theses included detail potential alternative motivating factors including 
personal and familial agendas (N. Terrenato, 45-59), efforts at the construction of Italian infrastructure (G. Bradley, 
60-72), social factor of colonial composition (J. Pelgrom, 73-86), and the importance of local cult to settlement 
nucleation (T. Stek, 87-105). 
577 Livy VIII. 16.13-4, IX.28.8. 
578 Mommsen, vol. 2.1 (1886-1887), 625-6. This is acknowledged by Bradley (2014), 65-6, although he 
acknowledges that the Lex Ovinia likely played a large part in endowing the Senate with this capability. 
579 Vell. Pat. 1.14.1: quae quoque tempore post Romam a Gallis captam deducta sit colonia iussu senatus. 
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century, so too should the potential Senate records be held to the same standard. This process, 
however, is not so simple as compiling a list of names or triumphs and assessing it for 
correspondence with concurrent legal and social developments. There is often not such 
comparanda against which to test the potential proceedings of the Senate, except for battle and 
other such narratives, which are hopelessly compromised by biased family history and oral legend. 
The single exception to this might be the list of triumphs, but the credibility of each individual 
notice in this document has also been questioned (see Chapter 2).  
 The most effective way to make this assessment, therefore, is to map the notices that 
potentially spring from these Senate records and concern its interactions with foreign peoples. In 
this way, we might better understand the thrusts of Rome’s foreign policy as it was articulated 
through the Senate and determine whether such data points could represent a consistent and 
comprehensible set of actions in fourth century BCE. Rome was facing belligerent enemies on all 
sides from the middle of this century to its end; without the anchor of reliable documentation, 
historical reconstructions of the sorts suggested by Wiseman and Beloch would likely reveal a 
scattershot picture of Rome’s activity abroad, assuming foreign activity was interpolated from 
various non-authoritative sources, such as family histories. In contrast to this overly pessimistic 
view of the sources, I argue that the notices mined from potential Senate records displays a very 
coherent agenda, with specific theaters of focus, logical progression of escalation and de-
escalation, and is free from radically abnormal information.  
 The data points that populate the following series of maps are taken directly from the list 
of archival notices from Books VII to IX (including the first few years of Book X) found in Table 
1 and is therefore collected on the same principles. It isolates those notices which specify or 
strongly suggest senatorial action with respect to Rome’s relations with external friends or foes. 
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Therefore, the dispatching of fetial priests, the declaration of war, the reception of foreign envoys, 
colonial foundations, grants of citizenship, treaties/truces signed, and triumphs celebrated are all 
displayed in Figures 1-12. Specific military actions or decrees, when emanating from a mandate 
of the Senate, also appear. The temporal ranges of each map are set at five years (except for the 
first which is eight years) and is intentionally arbitrary: while specific wars or campaigns can be 
isolated to force a more cohesive picture of the data, a random range will preclude this type of 
manipulation. This survey starts in 362 BCE, which is the first year that Rome began to engage 
substantially in foreign affairs, having suffered a plague during the previous three years; as a result, 
there are no Senate notes of external actions, and this year thus represents our first indication of 
internal coherence. Triumphs against the Gauls are also not included in this reckoning, because 
placement on the map would be arbitrary and it would not represent Roman foreign policy 
directives, although they are a threat in the 360s-50s, and Rome marches out to meet them in 361, 
360, 358, and 350. Lastly, because Livy and the FT are not always specific about the polities with 
which Rome was contending, but instead often refer to broad groupings or tribes, certain events 
are shown within a general region and are differentiated by color from events attributed to 
explicitly named towns.  
Similar to the compilation of Table 1, I expect that there will arise some disagreement 
about the content of or omissions from these maps. Again, the goal is not to achieve perfect 
accuracy, which is impossible for any reconstruction of the fourth century, but to present a picture 
of general trends and tendencies, which will facilitate broader conclusions about internal 
consistency and plausibility of the Senate’s foreign policy actions. 
 When the narrative of the fourth century is distilled down to just putative Senatorial actions 
in the foreign sphere, Rome’s foreign policy appears cohesive and focused, plausibly turning its 
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attention to specific theaters of conflict. The first demonstrable trend is the gradual geographic 
expansion of Rome’s interactions. Figure 1 shows a relatively small cluster of interests, dealing 
with the Latins, and specifically the city of Tibur, and the nearby Hernici. Subsequent years see 
expansion of activity into Etruria and Volscian territory (fig. 2), into Campania (fig. 3), 
involvement with Samnium (fig. 4), and finally across the Apennines in a war with the Vestini, 
(fig. 7). There are also apparent logical constrictions of military focus in the later years of the 340s 
and beginning of the 330s (figg. 4 & 5), as Rome was forced to deal with rebelling Latin allies. 
This period shows a corresponding lack of activity elsewhere, as the Senate was apparently 
consumed with nearby threats. Consolidation of the coasts of Latium and Campania accompanies 
increased hostilities with the Samnites, who appropriately appear to dominate Senatorial focus in 
Figg. 8 and 9. The disaster at the Caudine Forks in 321 during the Second Samnite War is also 
well represented here, as Rome seems to recover from this event sluggishly in its regional activity. 
The years of 319 to 315 show a marked reduction in activity (fig. 9), aside from one triumph and 
a truce (the actions in Antium and Capua during this time deal with codification of laws in those 
cities). By the end of the century, Rome had established alliances, dependencies, or continuing 
conflict with all of central Italy south of Etruria and Umbria, having reached agreements with those 







Fig. 1: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 362-355 BCE 
362-355 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 2: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 354-350 BCE 
354-350 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 3: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 349-345 BCE 
 
349-345 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 4: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 344-340 BCE 
344-340 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 5: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 339-335 BCE 
 
339-335 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 6: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 334-330 BCE 
334-330 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 7: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 329-325 BCE 
 
329-325 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 8: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 324-320 BCE 
324-320 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 9: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 319-315 BCE 
 
319-315 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 10: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 314-310 BCE 
314-310 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 11: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 309-305 BCE 
 
309-305 BCE 
Fetiales/ War declared 
Envoys received 
Colonist sent/  
Colony founded 
Citizenship granted Triumph celebrated 
Military action or 
decree 










Fig. 12: Senatorial foreign policy actions in central Italy in 304-300 BCE 
 
 
The second phenomenon that stands out is the strategic value of colonies and the types of 
land incorporated by the organization of new tribes. Livy often separates notices of the foundation 
of colonies, usually set in the annalistic sections at the beginnings or endings of the year, from the 
military narratives, and thus the two types of events should not necessarily be seen as causally 
linked. Therefore, seeing a strategic correlation between colonial placement and larger foreign 
interests of the Senate could be seen as mutually confirming authenticity. We have already 
discussed the military value of Rome’s colonies above, but these maps illustrate this point well. 
The colonies founded in 338 are described within the context of the settlement of the Latin revolt, 
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and, therefore, Livy’s notices of the displacement of the local population and the establishment of 
colonies at Antium and Velitrae convey clear strategic value.580 A colony at Cales in 334, however, 
is mentioned among other annalistic notices of consular elections and a dictatorial appointment,581 
but it has clear strategic value: this city of the Aurunci was a strong staging point in Rome’s 
ongoing struggles with the Campanians and the Samnites, which it had fought in the late 340s. 
Cales sat at a crucial point between the two groups and the Senate likely hoped to keep these 
entities separate. For the same purpose, Acerrae, which is also a pivotal point between the coastal 
Greeks and the Samnites, was given citizenship in 332. The colony in Anxur (329) should be seen 
as taking further control over the area of the Volscians, just as the foundation of Antium in 338 
served to monitor troublesome Privernum.582 
 The strategic value of Fregellae (established 328) and Luceria (314) was well known to 
Livy, but the trio of colonies set up in 313 are again quickly mentioned amid the annalistic notices 
of consular elections. These three colonies, Suessa, Pontiae, and Interamna Sucasina, were pivotal 
locations as a buffer to the belligerent Samnites, with whom Rome was still engaged in a long war. 
The two mainland colonies, in particular, were located at key points of entry into Latium along the 
Liris river,583 and Pontiae, situated across from the colonies of Antium and Acerrae, would 
dominate all traffic up the west coast.  Finally, the colonies established in 303, Sora and Alba 
Fucens, clearly serve this goal of dividing enemies.584 Although the Marsi signed a peace treaty in 
304, the FT nevertheless records a triumph by M. Valerius in 301 over the Etruscans and the Marsi. 
While it is troubling that Livy omits this campaign altogether, it nevertheless explains the 
                                                 
580 Livy VIII.14.2-12. 
581 Livy VIII.16.12-4. Hopkins (1978), 21 n.27 suggests that Livy’s number of 2,000 settlers seems impossibly high 
given Rome’s population, but Badian (1982), 165 argues that high numbers of colonists were likely sent to 
dangerous colonies. 
582 Anxur: VIII.21.11; Antium: VIII.14.8. Oakley, vol. 2 (1997-2005), 620-1 for strategy. 
583 Oakley, vol. 3 (1997-2005), 341. 
584 Coarelli and La Regina (1986), 62-63. 
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placement of these two colonies, which would have served to isolate the Marsi both from the 
Aequi, with whom the Romans had recently renewed hostilities, and the Etruscans. These notices 
are also recorded without elaboration, only that they once belonged to other peoples, among the 
archival notices at the very beginning of Book X. In fact, Livy omits entirely the war with the 
Marsi, and so the strategy of martial narrative could not have led to the notice of the colony 
foundation in his account. This series of maps, then, makes it apparent that a clear strategy of these 
colonial foundations existed despite their separation from military narratives in Livy’s text. The 
fact that the data points supplied by potential Senate records, namely the theaters of war and colony 
placement, are mutually supportive, should strongly suggest that these maps depict a realistic 
picture of Rome’s discrete and sensible foreign policy thrusts in the latter half of the fourth century. 
 Moreover, the extension of tribes is also well reflected by this data. The first tribes added 
after the four from the territory of Veii, the Publilian and Pomptine in 358,585 are likely situated in 
the region that was just taken during the war with the Hernici from 362-358.586 Taylor locates the 
Scaptian and Maecian tribes (332) on land confiscated from the Latins after their revolt, thus 
making the ager Romanus continuous.587 The Oefentina and Falerna (318) continue this trend 
towards southward expansion, with the land recently acquired from the Volscians and following 
the capitulation of Neapolis in the previous decade.588 Finally after successful campaigns to the 
west, Rome integrates territory outside of Latium in the territory of Aequi, which had been subdued 
in the war of the late 300s.589 Thus Taylor locates the Aniensis in this area around the river Anio. 
She places the other tribe established in 299, against the argument of Beloch who located it in the 
                                                 
585 Livy VII.15.11.  
586 Taylor (2013), 50-3. 
587 Livy VIII.17.11, Taylor (2013), 53-55. 
588 Livy IX.20.6, Taylor (2013), 55-6. 
589 Livy X.1.9; FT. 
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land taken from Privernum,590 on the coast of the old Auruncian territory, therefore linking it with 
the Falerna.591 
 In sum, this collection of evidence, when stripped of the longer campaign narratives of 
dubious origin, presents a highly plausible picture of the Senate’s foreign policy decisions in this 
century. The fact that this picture is so coherent and evinces strong strategic decisions of which 
Livy himself could not have been fully aware, is strong evidence that notices likely go back to 
legitimate records of the Senate. Although Livy, or Livy’s sources, did not feel the necessity to 
relate the details of every senatorial meeting or decision, it is clear that this emergent body and its 
solidifying powers, form the core of the narrative of Books VII-X, likely due to the 
conspicuousness of the Senate through their surviving records. 
 
Conclusions   
 
  The putative Senate records outlined in this chapter represent a major departure from 
previous conceptions of state records from the fourth century BCE. What is paramount to this 
reconstruction, however, is the time and nature of its transition from an ad hoc, advisory role to a 
permanent, independent deliberative body; it is hard to imagine that its meetings would have had 
much binding force on the state, let alone be recorded among the city’s archives before this 
development. As is visible from the sequence of maps above and explained within the larger 
narrative of Roman expansion within central Italy, the information potentially stemming from 
these Senate records does not demonstrably change in character or quantity from Books VII-IX, 
possibly suggesting either an early or a late date for the Lex Ovinia. 
                                                 
590 Beloch (1926), 417. 
591 Livy X.9.14; Taylor (2013), 56-8. 
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 The two roles of the Senate mentioned above, that of granting prorogation and the founding 
of a colony, might offer hints to the date of the Senate’s emancipation. Although the first attested 
proconsul was in 324, the circumstances of this appointment, if genuine, are extraordinary and 
might explain this outlying event. The majority of proconsular activity occurred in the 290s during 
the Third Samnite War and after the dictatorship had become completely defunct. This is well 
within the content of Book X, when it is generally agreed (and confirmed by Table 1) that our 
information becomes demonstrably better. A causal connection could be made here between the 
Mommsen’s “liberation” of the Senate and the improved nature and reliability of the historical 
narrative of Book X. On the other hand, colonial foundation began in earnest only in 338, which 
correlates to Cornell’s placement of this law during the censorship of Q. Publilius, a powerful, 
agitating figure in the period, both of which would indicate an earlier date for the Senate’s 
assumption of its primary role. This is an intractable problem in the current state of our evidence. 
A later date for the Lex Ovinia is not necessarily mutually exclusive with the implementation of 
record keeping, however. As I suggested above, this law could have reinforced a previous law or 
custom that Ap. Claudius was attempting to obstruct in his unorthodox lustrum of 312. This does 
not further our understanding of the time frame for the law, but it might allow us to decouple it 
from the formality of a lex, and thus help to explain its complete omission from the text of Livy. 
 Whenever this occurred, the individual Senators likely had various motivations for the 
publication of this material: creating a permanent record of their accomplishments for their 
younger peers to study, memorializing their achievements, or adding legitimacy and permanence 
to their decrees through the act of recording them. Another possibility presents itself in this survey, 
however, and that is Rome’s increasing interaction with Etruscan and with Greek city-states in 
southern Italy. Mainland Greece had a plentiful history of political epigraphic writing, beginning 
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public display of this material as early as the seventh century,592 and their colonies in Magna 
Graecia display similar affinities for inscribing official material.593 Furthermore, the corpus of 
Etruscan inscriptions from the archaic period is more than 13,000 strong.594 It is possible that 
Roman envoys, and potentially even the Senate itself, as it began to interact with these polities on 
increasingly important matters, might have found themselves at an archival or informational 
disadvantage. Such self-documenting polities would have a much better command of historical 
precedent, specifics of old decrees or agreements, and, in general, be able to maintain a more 
consistent approach to their foreign policy. It could be that Rome’s lack of such documentation 
represented a liability in their negotiations with such cities and therefore necessitated a change in 
documentary policy. 
 In any case, when stripped of the extraneous battle narratives, the notices of Senatorial 
activity, especially in the realm of foreign policy, present a highly credible and coherent picture of 
an expanding state. If Cicero and Livy were correct, and later families were filling in “false 
triumphs and multiple consulships,” then they did a remarkable job of maintaining a tight foreign 
policy focus throughout the latter half of the fourth century. One would expect, if the narrative of 
this time was unanchored and later authors and family biographers had free rein to create a 
narrative of their choice, that the foreign policy map would not look so consistent and deliberate. 
This speaks highly for the integrity of this potential archive and the improbability that this material 
was significantly altered. 
  
                                                 
592 Rowe (2009), 25. Hornblower (2011), 7.  
593 Such as the “Decree of Nakone” (IGDS 206, ASNP 6,1 (2001)) set up in Sicily, a formal declaration of 
friendship between the Nakonians and the Segestans. It has been variously dated between the fourth and mid-third 
centuries.  









The fourth century and the “conflict of the orders” belong in the realm of myth…But it is 
a paradoxical and insoluble problem only if we insist, like the Roman annalists, on knowing 
too much. It is all the more unfortunate that those who deal with it, in spite of ritual 
expressions of caution, do insist on knowing too much.595 
 
 
It has been the goal of this project to resurrect something of the fourth century from the 
“realm of myth.” The guiding principle throughout, however, was “not to try to know too much.” 
I hope, in any case, that we know a little more now than before. When it comes to the fourth 
century, historians have either been exceptionally harsh, like Fergus Millar above, or exceptionally 
lenient like, Tim Cornell or Friedrich Münzer. Neither of these approaches has the sufficient 
precision to pry away the fictitious and leave the hard core of historical truth intact. 
The novel contribution of this work is a reevaluation of the methodology with which 
scholars approach the remote areas of Roman history. The standard approach—assessing the 
surviving sources, compare it with any known archaeological or epigraphic evidence, and judge 
what is accurate or fabricated—creates the image that information was stored and transmitted on 
an ad hoc basis. By confronting the historical tradition with the assumption of a systematic and 
predictable (if inconsistent) compilation of historical data, which is how Mediterranean societies 
of Rome’s size and complexity in the fourth century operated, then the narrative can be assessed 
                                                 
595 Millar (1989), 138, 140. 
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with similar systemization. The factors that motivated the Romans to self-document are highly 
predictable: religious security, practical utility, and personal aggrandizement. By factoring in such 
contextual information as Rome’s increasing belligerence and socio-economic crises, even more 
specific motivations can be postulated. Armed with knowledge of this sort and attendant 
expectations of content, we do not have to rely on the text to reveal its own accuracy but can 
critically assess its foundation in contemporaneously recorded archives. This method by no means 
eliminates unknown variables in this equation, but it employs those variables that can be known 
in the assessment of the surviving accounts. 
This still leaves some variables that cannot be known, unfortunately. In order to have a 
more perfect understanding of the context of these records, it would be immensely helpful to have 
better knowledge of the institutions that produced them. This is only partially possible in the case 
of the fourth century. While the consistency and motivations behind the Fasti Consulares leave 
relatively little mystery, the nature and authority of the Senate in this period is still too nebulous 
to offer firm conclusions as to the intent and content of records that it might have produced. The 
pontifical tables too, could have covered a range of topics, including triumphs, laws, provinciae, 
and interreges; without a clear picture of the scope of religious interest in these matters, it is 
difficult to assess with certainty their content. 
By understanding that a changing state also changes its record-keeping habits, this 
methodology could also be applied to periods both earlier and later than the fourth century. The 
expected content of archives from the fifth or sixth centuries would be much more exiguous, 
presuming that the role of the Senate was greatly reduced, and that political and religious 
knowledge was in the hands of a narrow band of citizens. Conversely, as the Senate gains in 
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authority throughout the third century, and more citizens and foreign peoples become involved in 
the Rome’s imperial project, the archives would be augmented correspondingly. 
Finally, this methodology also allows greater insight in the historiographic process 
conducted by compilers of these documents and their successors. By isolating instances of 
plausible archival underpinning, the construction of the “superstructure” becomes much more 
obvious. Whether this is the result of literary flourish on the part of historians, or competing 
narratives introduced through family archives, by distinguishing information which may spring 
from contemporaneous records, and that which was added later, is vital information for 
reconstructing the historiographic process. 
In terms of this context, this methodology has produced valuable insights on the larger 
society and development of the Roman state in the fourth century. I have shown that these archives 
were generated by the same social and political upheaval that forced a “revolutionary” compromise 
on the city twice in the middle of the fourth century. The outcome of these power-sharing 
agreements was that new participants in the government felt it incumbent upon themselves to 
publish and advertise the conduct of the state. There was likely a range of motivations—religious, 
social, and legitimation—that drove these decisions. The result is that the historical tradition of 
Rome, while still obscured by a thick layer of literary fiction, nevertheless retains an increasingly 
reliable set of hard data points that give shape to and animate the narrative. Thus, the historical 
context and the appearance of this improved documentation are mutually supportive developments 
in this century. 
Nevertheless, there still appear to be fundamental inadequacies with these sources, such as 
seeming legal impossibilities, confusion, or even outright contradiction. There are many potential 
explanations for these phenomena which do not cripple the assumption of increased record keeping 
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throughout the fourth century. First, many of these problems are very likely the result of our own 
flawed expectations for the content of these original notices. They were probably very sparse and 
contained little more than was necessary to fulfil the original motivation of the record, which, in 
the case of the eponymous list, was the names of the magistrates and their relative order of service. 
This list of consuls, as opposed to the extensive Augustan Fasti Capitolini, contained likely little 
more than praenomen, nomen, and paternal filiation. Considering that provincial assignment is one 
of the leading areas of contention as reported by Livy and the Fasti Triumphales, this aspect was 
unlikely to be included here or in the senate records. It is also unlikely that dictatorial assignment, 
there mandate, and interreges were also recorded in this list, as confusion on this account too seems 
to evidence a lack of authoritative sources. We should also expect that cognomina were not a part 
of the original notation until the Middle-Late Republic. 
A second factor that has motivated widespread pessimism with regard to these documents 
is a false notion of legal rigidity in the world from which these sources originate. We expect that 
laws will operate as passed and adhered to when applicable. Thus, the presence of all-patrician 
colleges after 367, and other legal impossibilities, signals irreparable harm inflicted at some point 
to the tradition. We must realize that laws are only as binding as the desire to enforce them among 
those with the capacity to do so. In the context of the Early-Middle Republic, this might have been 
relatively few individuals in any given context. 
Uncertainties apply especially to the list of dictators and interreges. A likely candidate for 
the repository of these lists are the religious tablets, as these magistrates acted as temporary 
safeguards for the auspicia publica. This applies also to the list of triumphs, the celebration of 
which consisted of a ritual procession to the Capitoline temple, with the triumphator robed in the 
accoutrement of Jupiter Optimus Maximus. The triumph list, however, shows the highest level of 
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inconsistencies, but this is hardly surprising, considering its susceptibility to distortion and 
interpolation. Cicero’s statement of falsi triumphi does not seem to be entirely misplaced. These 
three groups of texts provide a problematic accompaniment to the relatively reliable eponymous 
magistrate list, as found in Livy and Diodorus, and strong preference should be given to the list as 
it appears in these two authors. 
Finally, seeming irregularities in the archival record could stem from difficulties in the 
compilation of a variety of different record deposits. To expect that the various archiving 
authorities would have coordinated the form, style, and content of their records is unreasonable, 
and we should recognize that early compilers of this information likely approached serious 
discrepancies in the material that, ironically, only became more pronounced as more record sources 
were added throughout the fourth and third centuries. Much like the realization that records were 
more abundant but less informative, so too is it clear that more sources might have resulted in less 
certainty.      
The safest assumption of record keeping in early Republican Rome is the pontifical tables. 
Essential for compiling a working knowledge of the world and how man might improve his 
condition within it, the pontifical tables are likely the oldest records kept at Rome. They noted 
such events as natural disasters, celestial occurrences, plagues, droughts, famines, and other such 
indications of divine favor or disfavor. Most intriguing for this period, however, are indications 
that actual Senate records were kept and maintained. The precise reasons for this shift in archival 
habit are difficult to discern, but they are likely tied to the significant sociopolitical and military 
upheavals through which Rome trudged during the fourth century. In particular, the Lex Ovinia, if 
in fact successful in casting off the burden of magisterial oversight, might have provided the 
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impetus to start publishing Senate records: this would have been a strong statement of the 
legitimacy of the body and the authority of its decisions. 
 Thus, the increasing cohesion and discipline that Livy’s text displays over Books VII-X is 
the result of the diversifying, but nevertheless imperfect, group of primary sources on which it is 
based. Like a skeleton growing from the inside, it increasingly dictates the shape and direction of 
the overall narrative. Although these conclusions allow for a more confident reading of Rome’s 
history in the fourth century, this methodology of record reconstruction has illuminated much 
about the processes and motivations of becoming a self-archiving state. Thus, the history of the 
fourth century is not at all a lost subject, only to be glimpsed through the distorted mirror of late 
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________. Römisches Staatsrecht, 3 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1887-1888. 
 
Münzer, Friedrich. Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1920. 
 
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg. History of Rome, vol. 2, trans. J.C Hare and C. Thirlwirl, 3rd ed. 
Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1844. 
 
Niese, Benedictus. “Das sogenannte Licinisch-Sextische Ackergesetz.” Hermes 23 (1888): 410-
23. 
 





________. “Diviners and Divination at Rome.” In Pagan Priests: Religion and Power in the 
Ancient World, edited by Mary Beard and John North, 49-71. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990b. 
 
Oakley, S. P. “The Roman Conquest of Italy,” In War and Society in the Roman World, edited by 
John Rich and Graham Shipley, 9-37. London: Taylor and Francis, 1993. 
 
________. A Commentary on Livy, 4 vols. Oxford, MA: Clarendon Press, 1997-2005. 
 
________. “C. Licinius Macer.” In The Fragments of the Roman Historians, vol. 1, edited by 
Tim Cornell, 320-31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
________. “L. and Q. Aelius Tubero.” In The Fragments of the Roman Historians, vol. 1, edited 
by Tim Cornell, 361-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
Ogilvie, Robert. M. A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. 
 
Parker, Geoffrey. “The ‘Military Revolution,’ 1560-1660—a Myth?” The Journal of Modern 
History 48.2 (1976): 195-214. 
 
Pellam, Gregory. “A Peculiar Episode from the ‘Struggle of the Orders’? Livy and the Licinio-
Sextian Rogations.” Classical Quarterly 64.1 (2014): 280-92. 
 
Perl, Gerhard. Kritische Untersuchungen zu Diodors römischer Jahrzählung. Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1957. 
 
Pinsent, John. “The Tradition for 342V and the Admission of the Plebeians to the Consulship.” 
Historia Einzelshriften 24 (1975): 1-83. 
 
Prosdicimi, A. L. “Satricum: i sodales del Publicola steterai a Mater (Matuta?).” La Parola del 
Passato 49.5 (1994): 365-77. 
 
Raaflaub, Kurt. “From Protection and Defense to Offense and Participation: Stages in the 
Conflict of the Orders.” In Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the 
Conflict of the Orders,” edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 198-243. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986. 
 
________. “Rome, Italy, and Appius Claudius Caecus before the Pyrrhic Wars.” Université 
Catholique de Louvain, Publications d'Histoire de l'Art et d'Archéologie 75 (1992): 13-
50. 
 
________. “Between Myth and History: Rome’s Rise from Village to Empire (the Eighth 
Century to 264).” In A Companion to the Roman Republic, edited by Nathan Rosenstein 




Rawson, Elizabeth. “Prodigy Lists and the Use of Annales Maximi.” The Classical Quarterly 
2.21.1 (1971): 158-69. 
 
Rich, John. “Structuring Roman History: The Consular Year and the Roman Historical 
Tradition.” In Livy edited by Jane D. Chaplin and Christina S. Kraus, 118-47. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Richard, Jean-Claude. “Sur le Plébiscite ut liceret consules ambos plebeios creari (Tite-Live VII, 
42, 2).” Historia 28.1 (1979): 65-75. 
 
________. “The Definition of patres and plebs.” In Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New 
Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 105-129. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986. 
 
Richardson, James H. “The Vestal Virgins and the Use of the Annales Maximi.” In Priests and 
State in the Roman World, edited by James H. Richardson and Federico Santangelo, 91-
106. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2011. 
 
Ridley, Ronald T. “Fastenkritik: A Stocktaking.” Athenaeum 58 (1980): 264-98. 
 
________. “Falsi triumphi, plures consulatus.” Latomus 42.2 (1983): 372-82 
 
________. “Patavinitas among the Patricians? Livy and the Conflict of the Orders.” In Staat und 
Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik, edited by Walter Eder, 103-138. 
Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990. 
 
Rilinger, Rolf. Der Einfluß des Wahlleiters bei den römischen Konsulwahlen von 366 bis 50 
v.Chr. Munich: Beck, 1976. 
 
Roberts, Michael. “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660.” In The Military Revolution Debate: 
Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, edited by Clifford J. 
Rogers, 13-36. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
 
Rosenstein, Nathan. “Competition and Crisis in Mid-Republican Rome.” Phoenix 47.4 (1993): 
313-38. 
 
________. Rome at War: Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
 
Rotondi, Giovanni. Leges publicae populi Romani. Milan: Società Editrice Libraria, 1912. 
 
Rotstein, Andrea. “The Parian Marble and the Mnesiepes Inscription.” Zeitschrift für 
Papyrologie und Epigraphik 190 (2014): 3-9. 
 
Rowe, Gregory. “Epigraphical Cultures of the Classical Mediterranean: Greek, Latin, and 
Beyond.” In A Companion to Ancient History, edited by Andrew Erskine, 23-36. 




Rüpke, Jörg. “Fasti: Quellen oder Produkte römischer Geschichtsschreibiung.” Klio 77 (1995): 
184-202. 
 
________. “Communicating with the Gods.” In A Companion to the Roman Republic, edited by 
Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx, 215-235. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. 
 
________. Fasti Sacerdotum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Ryan, Francis. Rank and Participation in the Republican Senate. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998. 
 
Salmon, E. T. Samnium and the Samnites. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
 
________. Roman Colonization under the Republic. London: Cornell University Press, 1969. 
 
Samuel, Alan E. Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendars and Years in Classical Antiquity. 
Munich: C.H. Beck, 1972. 
 
De Sanctis, Gaetano. Storia dei Romani: La conquista del primato in Italia. Turin: Fratelli 
Bocca, 1907. 
 
Satterfield, Susan. “The Viri Sacris Faciundis and the Consulship.” Classical World 107.2 
(2014): 217-35. 
 
Schlag, U. Regnum in Senatu: Das Wirken römischer Staatsmänner von 200 bis 191 v.Chr. 
Rome: E. Klett, 1968. 
 
Schwarte, Karl-Heinz. “Zum Ausbruch des zweiten Samnitenkrieges (326-304 v. Chr.).” 
Historia 20.2/3 (1971): 368-76. 
 
Scullard, Howard. H. Roman Politics, 220-150 BC. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951. 
 
________. A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 BCE, 4th ed. London: Routledge, 1980. 
 
Seeck, Otto. Kalendertafel. Berlin: Weidmann, 1885. 
 
Shapiro, Ian. The Moral Foundations of Politics. Princeton, NJ: Yale University Press, 2003. 
 
Sigwart, Georg. “Römische Fasten und Annalen bei Diodor.” Klio 6.6 (1906): 341-379. 
 
Smith, Christopher. The Roman Clan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
________. “The Origins of the Tribunate of the Plebs.” Antichthon 46 (2012): 101-125. 
 




________. Die Anfänge der römischen Geschichtschreibung. Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1909. 
 
________. “Das Pontifikale Jahrbuch und Seine Rekonstruktion.” Historische Vierteljahrschrift 
17 (1914/15): 321-42. 
 
Staveley, E. Stuart. “The Significance of the Consular Tribune.” Journal of Roman Studies 43 
(1953): 30-6. 
________. “The Conduct of Elections during an ‘Interregnum’.” Historia 3 (1954): 193-211. 
 
Stek, Tesse D., and Jeremia Pelgrom, eds. Roman Republican Colonization: New Perspectives 
from Archaeology and Ancient History. Rome: Palombi & Partner, 2014. 
 
Stewart, Roberta. Public Office in Early Rome. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 
 
Taylor, Lily Ross. “New Indications of Augustan Editing in the Capitoline Fasti.” Classical 
Philology 46.2 (1951): 73-80. 
 
________. Roman Voting Assemblies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. 
 
________. The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic, 4th ed. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2013. 
 
Taylor, Martha C. “Implicating the Demos: A Reading of Thucydides on the Rise of the Four 
Hundred.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 122 (2002): 91-108. 
 
Therborn, Göran. “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy.” New Left Review 103 
(1997): 3-41. 
 
Tibiletti, G. “Il possesso dell’ager publicus e le nome de modo agrorum sino ai Gracchi I-III,” 
Athenaeum 26 (1948): 173-236. 
 
Timpe, Dieter. “Memoria and Historiography in Rome.” In Greek and Roman Historiography, 
edited by John Marincola, 150-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Toynbee, Arnold. Hannibal’s Legacy: The Hannibalic War’s Effects on Roman Life. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1965. 
 
Von Ungern-Sternberg, Jürgen. “The Formation of the ‘Annalistic Tradition’: The Example of 
the Decemvirate.” In Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict 
of the Orders, edited by Kurt Raaflaub, 77-104. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986. 
 
________. “Livy and the Annalistic Tradition.” In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard 




Vaahtera, Jyri. “Livy and the Priestly Records: À Propos ILS 9338.” Hermes 130.1 (2002): 100-
8. 
 
Versnal, H. S. Triumphus: An inquiry into the origin, development and meaning of the Roman 
Triumph. Leiden: Brill, 1970. 
 
Walsh, P. G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1961. 
________. Livy. Greece and Rome: New Surveys in the Classics 8. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974. 
 
Walter, Uwe. Politische Ordnung in der römischen Republik. Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 
2017. 
 
Warrior, Valerie M. Roman Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
 
Wiseman, T. Peter. Clio’s cosmetics: three studies in Greco-Roman literature. Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1979. 
 
________. Remus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
________. “What do we really know about early Rome?” Journal of Roman Archaeology 9 
(1996): 310-15. 
 
________. Roman Drama and Roman History. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1998. 
 
________. “History, Poetry and Annales.” In Clio and the Poets: Augustan Poetry and the 
Traditions of Ancient Historiography, edited by David S. Levene and Damien P. Neils, 
331-62. Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
 
________. “The Prehistory of Roman Historiography,” In A Companion to Greek and Roman 
Historiography, edited by John Marincola, 67-75. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007. 
 
________. Remembering the Roman People. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Wissowa, Georg. Religion und Kultus der Römer. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1902. 
 
Wright, Gordon. “Public Opinion and Conscription in France, 1866-70.” The Journal of Modern 
History 14.1 (1942): 26-45. 
 
